Lopez v. City of Opa-Locka

1

YOLANDA LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF OPA-LOCKA, et al., Defendants.

No. 24-22076-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

September 17, 2024

ORDER

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendants, City of Opa-Locka, Johane Taylor, Gabriela Llanes, and Link Logistics's Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 21], filed on July 26 2024.^[1],[2] Plaintiff, Yolanda Lopez filed a Response [ECF No. 32]; to which Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 37]. The Court has considered the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6] the parties' written submissions, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an allegedly unlawful arrest that took place on October 1, 2022. (See Am. Compl. 2). At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was standing outside the Opa-Locka Flea Market, “minding her own business and attempting to pass out flyers[.]” (Id. ¶ 17 (alteration added)). On that day, Johane Taylor and Gabriela Llanes (“the Officers”) were contracted with Link Logistics to provide security services as police officers for the City of Opa-Locka (“the City”). (See id. 2, ¶¶ 13, 18).

Llanes allegedly harassed, detained, and arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. (See Id. ¶¶ 19-21). Taylor then “arrived on the scene and physically assisted” Llanes (id. ¶ 23), at which point both Officers “tasered [Plaintiff] multiple times while she laid [sic] helpless on the floor and screaming for mercy” (id. ¶ 24 (alteration added)). Plaintiff was transported to the hospital for medical care and then to jail, although eventually “the charges against [her] were dismissed as having no merit.” (Id. ¶ 29 (alteration added); see also id. ¶¶ 27-28).

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges violations of state and federal law. Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint, asserting it is a shotgun pleading and all counts either fail to state claims for relief or are barred by immunity. (See generally Mot.).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Shotgun pleading. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim” showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration adopted; other alteration added; citation and quotation marks omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) further requires that a pleading “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b) (alteration added).

“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.'” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). A shotgun pleading makes it “virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore, “shotgun pleadings are routinely condemned by the Eleventh Circuit.” Real Estate Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Cadrecha, No. 11-cv-474, 2011 WL 2881928, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2011) (citing Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Motion to dismiss. “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration added; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A pleading withstands a motion to dismiss if it alleges “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Amended Complaint contains 10 claims for relief. (See generally Am. Compl.). In Count I, Plaintiff alleges the Officers falsely arrested her, in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. (See id. ¶¶ 30-38). In Count II, Plaintiff alleges the Officers used excessive force against her, also in violation of section 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See id. ¶¶ 39-48). In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff alleges the Officers assaulted and battered her (see id. ¶¶ 49-55) and falsely imprisoned her (see id. ¶¶ 56-61).

In Count V, Plaintiff alleges the City violated her federal civil rights. (See id. ¶¶ 62-76). In Counts VI and VII, Plaintiff alleges the City is liable for the Officers' assault and battery and false imprisonment of her. (See id. ¶¶ 77-89). In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges the City was negligent in training and supervising the Officers. (See id. ¶¶ 90-94). And in Counts IX and X, Plaintiff alleges Link Logistics is directly liable for negligent security (see id. ¶¶ 95-99) and vicariously liable for the Officers' conduct (see id. ¶¶ 100-106).

The Court first addresses Defendants' argument that the Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading and then turns to the sufficiency of each challenged claim.

A. Shotgun Pleading

Defendants argue Plaintiff improperly combines claims: (1) against the Officers (see Mot. 9-10, 12); (2) involving different allegedly unconstitutional policies (see id. 17-18); (3) for assault and battery (see id. 22-23); and (4) for negligent training and supervision (see id. 23 n.8). While the Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity, it is not a shotgun pleading.

To begin, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) only requires that “claim[s] founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . be stated in a separate count” if “doing so would promote clarity[.]” Id. (alterations added). Importantly, as the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned, “[m]ultiplicity does not always equate with clarity.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325 n.18 (alteration added) (explaining that “[a] complaint is not always required to contain a separate count for each constitutional provision that the same set of facts is claimed to violate” (alteration added)).

Parties should be careful not to conflate claims with theories. See Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts sometimes use “the word ‘claim'” as “potentially confusing” shorthand for “theories of liability”). After all, even when “it may well be preferable to plead different theories of recovery in separate counts, it is not required.” Id. at 1247 (emphasis added; citation omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(2) (permitting parties to “set out [two] or more statements of a claim . . . in a single count” (alterations added)). In the end, what matters is whether the pleading “give[s] the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (alteration added; footnote call number omitted).

With that, the Court turns to each category of claims challenged by Defendants as running afoul of the shotgun pleading proscription.

The Officers. Defendants take issue with two aspects of Plaintiff's claims against the Officers. First, Defendants argue that in Counts I and II, Plaintiff relies only on “blanket[] and conclusory allegations against [the Officers]” and impermissibly commingles her claims against them. (Mot. 9-10 (alterations added)). Second, Defendants argue all claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff “fails to distinguish which capacity [-] individual, official, or both [-] [the Officers] are being sued under.” (Id. 12 (alterations added)). Neither argument is convincing.

Beginning with the first argument, the Court is not persuaded Plaintiff fails to “specify[] each individual's actions for the alleged claims” or “specifically identify[] which, if any, of the Officers engaged in the alleged unlawful acts[.]” (Id. 10 (alterations added)). Plaintiff alleges Llanes baselessly harassed, detained, and arrested her. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21). Then, “Taylor arrived on the scene and physically assisted” Llanes. (Id. ¶ 23). Eventually, “Llanes and Taylor” also “tasered her multiple times[.]” (Id. ¶ 24 (alteration and emphasis added)).

It is clear what each Officer allegedly did; Plaintiff also alleges both Officers acted unlawfully. Any more specific questions regarding which Officer caused which injury are fact questions Defendants may explore in discovery. Cf. Wopshall v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. 18-14424-Civ, 2019 WL 5697986, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2019) (“Under Florida law, the fact-finder (jury) determines the percentage share of each tortfeasor's comparative fault.”).^[3]

Moreover it is not impermissible to simultaneously plead claims against both Officers. Rule 10(b) requires separate counts where “each claim [is] founded on a separate transaction or occurrence[,]” and the use of separate counts “would promote clarity[.]” Id. (alterations added). “Accordingly, claims founded on the same transaction or occurrence may be [pleaded] together in the same count.” Duquesne v. City of Miami Beach, No....