Lopez v. City of Opa-Locka

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YOLANDA LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF OPA-LOCKA, et al., Defendants.

No. 24-22076-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

December 2, 2024

ORDER

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant, City of Opa-Locka's Motion to Dismiss Counts V and VIII of [Plaintiff, Yolanda Lopez's] Second Amended Complaint . [ECF No. 50], filed on October 15, 2024. Plaintiff filed a Response [ECF No. 55], to which Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 56]. The Court has carefully considered the record, the parties' written submissions, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from an allegedly unlawful arrest that took place on October 1, 2022. (See 2d Am. Compl. (“SAC”) [ECF No. 43] 1-2).^[1] Plaintiff was standing outside the Opa-Locka Flea Market “minding her own business and attempting to pass out flyers[.]” (Id. ¶ 18 (alteration added); see also id. ¶ 17). On that day, Johane Taylor and Gabriela Llanes (“the Officers”) were contracted by Link Logistics to provide security services as police officers for the City of Opa-Locka (“the City”). (See id. ¶¶ 10-11, 19).

Llanes harassed, detained, and arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. (See id. ¶¶ 2023). Taylor then “arrived on the scene and physically assisted” Llanes (id. ¶ 24), at which point the Officers “assault[ed]” and “tasered [Plaintiff] multiple times while she laid [sic] helpless on the floor and screaming for mercy” (id. ¶ 25 (alterations added)). Plaintiff was later transported to the hospital for medical care and then to jail (see id. ¶¶ 28-29), although eventually “the charges against [her] were dismissed as having no merit” (id. ¶ 30 (alteration added)).

On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action against the City, Taylor, and Llanes, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and state law against the Officers for false arrest, excessive force, assault and battery, and false imprisonment; and against the City for civil rights violations, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent training and supervision of its police force. (See generally Compl. [ECF No. 1]). On June 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6] adding Link Logistics as a defendant and asserting claims against it for negligent security and vicarious liability. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95-106). Defendants followed with a Joint Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21] the Amended Complaint, which the Court partially granted, dismissing all claims against the City. (See Sept. 17, 2024 Order [ECF No. 40] 14-25).^[2]Plaintiff then filed the Second Amended Complaint. (See, e.g., SAC 1 n.1).

The City now seeks dismissal of Counts V and VIII of the Second Amended Complaint. In Count V, Plaintiff brings a section 1983 claim against the City, alleging that its policy, practice, and custom of failing to discipline its police officers for the use of excessive force resulted in a violation of “her Fourth Amendment right to bodily integrity and security from unreasonable searches and seizures,” as well as “her First Amendment right to pass out flyers in a public area[.]” (Id. ¶ 79 (alteration added); see also id. ¶¶ 63-81). In Count VIII, Plaintiff asserts a separate section 1983 claim against the City, accusing it of failing to train and negligently hiring, retaining, supervising, and promoting its police officers, which she alleges culminated in her arrest. (See Id. ¶¶ 96-97, 101).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration added; quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (alterations added; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration added; citation omitted). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. DISCUSSION

The City argues that the section 1983 claims - one based on a failure to discipline and the other on a failure to train and related negligence - should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to plausibly establish that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind her constitutional deprivations. (See Mot. 6; see also id. 9-10).

The two claims are analyzed under the same framework. “[T]o adequately state a claim for municipal liability under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that [her] constitutional rights were violated; (2) the municipality had a ‘custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right,' and (3) that policy or custom caused the violation.” Wade v. City of Miami Beach, 565 F.Supp.3d 1248, 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (alterations added; quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). Further, “to allege a ‘custom or policy,' a plaintiff must plead either ‘[] an officially promulgated policy or [] an unofficial custom o[r] practice shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the [city].'” Id. at 1251 (alterations added; quoting Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003)). And “[t]o meet the ‘deliberate indifference' standard, a plaintiff must allege that ‘the municipality knew of a need to [discipline,] train[,] and/or supervise in a particular area and . . . made a deliberate choice not to take any action.'” Id. (alterations added; quoting Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998)).

Count V.

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that at the time of the incident, the City had a policy or custom of failing to discipline officers who have engaged in excessive force and other misconduct, amounting to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's First and Fourth Amendment rights. (See Mot. 2-7; Resp. 1-3; Reply 2-3). According to the City, Plaintiff fails to cite to any other factually similar incident to the one alleged in this case, and she offers no factual allegations regarding any meritorious claim for prior constitutional violations asserted against the City. (See Mot. 6; see also Reply 2-3). Plaintiff insists that her pleading draws on a wealth of sources in support of her failure-to-discipline claim, including what she describes as factually analogous section 1983 lawsuits against the City. (See Resp. 1-3).

In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that the City had a policy or custom “of concealing and/or suppressing officer misconduct” (SAC ¶ 67) and “of deficient and biased procedures for investigating complaints [of] excessive force and unlawful searches and seizures” (id. ¶ 68 (alteration added)) - all of which “encouraged and[] motivated Llanes and Taylor to engage in the . . . wrongful acts against [Plaintiff]” (id. ¶ 78 (alterations added)). To support these allegations, Plaintiff references various newspaper articles and prior section 1983 lawsuits against the City (see id. ¶¶ 75-77), as well as “hundreds of constitutional violations” committed by the City and its police force “against countless innocent civilians” (id. ¶ 77). These sources, Plaintiff asserts, illustrate how the City “ha[s] fertilized and tolerated an inordinate amount of” officer misconduct. (Id. ¶ 74 (alteration added)).

Plaintiff's new allegations still lack the factual support needed to substantiate her section 1983 claim and survive dismissal. For instance, Plaintiff cites a Miami New Times article from 2008, which states the City's police department “has been steadily deteriorating for 20 years” due to a shrinking force. (Id. ¶ 75). This adds little, if anything, to Plaintiff's claim regarding the 2022 incident. The article neither identifies an official municipal policy nor describes a custom, which “must be a ‘widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to [have] the force of law.'” Wade, 565 F.Supp.3d at 1251 (alteration adopted; other alteration added; quoting Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Again, to proceed, Plaintiff must “allege a ‘pattern' of [constitutional violations,] including specific facts of numerous incidents[.]” Casado v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 340 F.Supp.3d 1320, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (alterations added). Generalized criticisms of a police department's history or citations to “random acts or isolated incidents” will not suffice. Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).

This critique applies equally to Plaintiff's reference to a 2012 Miami New Times article, which reports that one-fifth of the City's police force some 12 years ago had engaged in “at least one instance of potentially career-ending misconduct[.]” (SAC ¶ 76 (alteration added)). There is no indication these incidents bear any similarity to Plaintiff's case, that the behavior continued in 2022, or how the incidents might relate to the City's disciplinary practices in 2022. Likewise, the final newspaper article Plaintiff cites - a 2015 Miami Herald piece describing a history of harmful “customs, policies[,] and practices” within the City's Police Department - adds little weight to her claim, as she again fails to draw any meaningful connection to her own arrest in 2022. (Id. ¶ 76 (alteration added)).

Similarly ...