Lopez v. City of N.Y.

ANTHONY LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CAPTAIN AVON, DEPUTY WARDEN MITCHELL,and CHARLES APPIAH, Physician's Assistant, Defendants.

1:19-cv-03887-MKV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 9, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, United States District Judge:

Incarcerated pro se Plaintiff Anthony Lopez ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants The City of New York (the "City"), Captain Avin ("Avin"),¹ Deputy Warden Mitchell ("Mitchell"), and Physician's Assistant Charles Appiah ("Appiah") seeking damages for injuries in connection with a slip-and-fall in the shower area of the Manhattan Detention Complex ("MDC"). (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") [ECF No. 20].) Defendants the City, Avin, and Mitchell (collectively, "Defendants") have moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. Dismiss [ECF No. 26].)² For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES the claims against Appiah sua sponte.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background³

On December 28, 2018, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Plaintiff slipped and fell as he stepped out of the shower area in the MDC. (SAC 4.) Plaintiff lost consciousness from the fall. (SAC 4.) After he regained consciousness, Plaintiff remained on the floor unable to move due to a sharp pain in his head, neck, and back. (SAC 4.) The housing area officer called Avin and the medical response team, requesting assistance for a medical emergency. (SAC 4.) Upon her arrival, Avin "ordered Plaintiff to get up." (SAC 4.) Plaintiff responded that "he was in a lot of pain and that he couldn't move." (SAC 4.)

The medical response team arrived shortly thereafter. (SAC 4.) Appiah, a physician's assistant, "demanded [Plaintiff] to get up." (SAC 4.) When Plaintiff advised him that he could not move, Appiah "grabbed the back of Plaintiff's head and stated, there is a little bit of blood but yor [sic] hair broke your fall, so you dont [sic] have a fracture." (SAC 4.) Plaintiff requested a neck brace, a bandage for his head, a stretcher to transport him to the medical clinic, pain medication, and an X-ray. (SAC 4.) Appiah stated that he would "not do[] anything for Plaintiff unless he stood up and walked to the clinic." (SAC 4.) Plaintiff then requested emergency medical services ("E.M.S."). (SAC 4.) Appiah responded that he would not call E.M.S. and that he was "tired of the slip and falls." (SAC 4.) Appiah and the medical team then left the shower area. (SAC 4.) After they left, Avin approached Plaintiff and stated, "'your [sic] faking' and Im gonna [sic] make sure [Deputy Warden] Mitchell does not call E.M.S." (SAC 4.)

At approximately 9:00 p.m., the MDC locked down for the night. (SAC 4.) Plaintiff remained on the floor of the shower area and thought he was going to die. (SAC 4.) At approximately midnight, Plaintiff managed to walk to his cell. (SAC 4.) Plaintiff requested that the night officer contact the clinic. (SAC 4.) At approximately 2:00 a.m., the night officer gave Plaintiff two packs of nonaspirin and advised him that the clinic did not want to see him. (SAC 4.) After he demanded medical attention, correctional officers escorted Plaintiff to the clinic, but the doctor on duty denied medical treatment. (SAC 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from lumbar and cervical pain, radiculopathy, a laceration, and mental suffering as a result of the fall and continues to take pain medication as of November 2019. (SAC 6.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action in April 2019, with the filing of a Complaint and a request to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). (Compl. [ECF No. 2]; IFP Request [ECF No. 1].) The Court (McMahon, C.J.) granted Plaintiff's IFP request (Order Granting IFP Request [ECF No. 4]) and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint (Order Amend [ECF No. 5]). Chief Judge McMahon found that Plaintiff had failed to allege facts sufficient to state claims for municipal liability, deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement with respect to the slippery floor, or denial of adequate medical care. (Id. at 3, 6-7.) Chief Judge McMahon granted Plaintiff leave to amend the municipal liability claim and the claim for denial of medical care but not the claim regarding conditions of confinement. (Id. at 3-4, 6-7.)

The case was thereafter reassigned to Judge Andrew L. Carter. In July 2019, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint naming a John Doe doctor. (Am. Compl. [ECF No. 7].) Judge Carter entered an Order pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997), directing the City toascertain the identity of the John Doe defendant. (Order Service [ECF No. 9].) The City identified the John Doe doctor as Appiah. (Letter [ECF No. 15].) Plaintiff then filed the Second Amended Complaint.

The case was reassigned to me in February 2020. Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. (Pl.'s Opp. [ECF No. 31].)

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).

A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff "must be construed liberally with 'special solicitude' and interpreted to raise the strongest claims that it suggests." Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Wilson v. Dalene, 699 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that courts are "required to afford [a pro se plaintiff] leniency, holding his complaint to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadingsdrafted by lawyers'" (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007))). Nevertheless, the complaint must satisfy the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard. See Costabile v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 951 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2020). Thus, "a pro se plaintiff must support his claims with 'specific and detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms.'" Wightman-Cervantes v. ACLU, No. 06 Civ. 4708, 2007 WL 1805483, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2007) (quoting Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2000)).

B. Law of the Case Doctrine

The law of the case doctrine posits that "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." Musacchio v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 709, 716 (2016) (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 506 (2011)). This principle "holds true even where a case has been reassigned to a new judge." Laurent v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 963 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 733 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that "courts are understandably reluctant to reopen a ruling once made, especially when one judge or court is asked to consider the ruling of a different judge or court" (citation omitted)). Under the law of the case doctrine, departure from a prior ruling is proper only where there is "an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent a manifest injustice." Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (noting that "courts should be loathe to [revisit prior decisions] in the absence of extraordinarycircumstances such as where the initial decision was 'clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice'" (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983))).

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

"Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . ."

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege "(1) that the defendants deprived him of a right 'secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States'; and (2) that they did so 'under color of state law.'" Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999)).

DISCUSSION

The Second Amended Complaint again fails to state a claim notwithstanding Plaintiff's additional factual allegations. As it...