Lopez v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Homeless Servs.

MARIAH LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF HOMELESS SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

17-CV-3014 (VEC) (OTW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 2, 2019

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

ONA T. WANG, United States Magistrate Judge:

TO THE HONORABLE VALERIE E. CAPRONI, United States District Judge,

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Mariah Lopez ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, filed clams against, inter alia, Defendants Women in Need, Inc. ("WIN") and Christine C. Quinn (collectively "WIN Defendants"), alleging violations of the New York City and New York State Human Rights laws, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Before the Court now is the WIN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed on October 5, 2018. (ECF 105).¹ Plaintiff filed her opposition on May 28, 2019. (ECF 146). The WIN Defendants' reply was filed on June 21, 2019. (ECF 154). For the following reasons, I recommend that the WIN Defendants' motion be GRANTED in its entirety.

II. Background

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on April 25, 2017 against New York City Department of Homeless Services ("DHS") and Project Renewal, Inc. ("Project Renewal"). (ECF 2). Plaintiff alleged that Project Renewal was unlawfully refusing to permit her dog into Project Renewal's Marsha's House homeless shelter, where Plaintiff was living, without proof that the dog was a "service animal." Id. DHS subsequently reversed its decision and permitted Plaintiff's dog to stay with Plaintiff at Marsha's House regardless of whether it was a service animal. (ECF 11).

On June 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed an emergency request for a temporary restraining order, which the Court later construed as an amended complaint. (ECF 31, 39). In this First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that DHS transferred her from Marsha's House, "the only transgender shelter in New York,"² to WIN West, a female-only homeless shelter, in retaliation for her "whistleblowing" concerning abuses at Marsha's House. (ECF 31 at 1-2). Plaintiff alleged that WIN West was an unacceptable placement because Plaintiff felt the need to "hide" her transgender identity alongside her cisgender female roommates, triggering post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 3. The City of New York³ and Project Renewal filed their respective motions to dismiss on July 28, 2017 and August 3, 2017 respectively. (ECF 44, 49). In his report and recommendation, Judge Peck recommended denial of the City's motion in its entirety and denial of Project Renewal's motion in part. (ECF 58). In recommending dismissal of the failure to accommodate claim against Project Renewal, Judge Peck found that Plaintiff's allegations of denying a reasonable accommodation focused "almost entirely on DHS" because ProjectRenewal lacked authority over housing placement. Id. at 25-26. Plaintiff's retaliation claim against Project Renewal, however, adequately alleged a "close temporal relationship" between Plaintiff's reported complaints about Marsha's House and her transfer to the WIN West shelter. Id. at 30. Judge Caproni adopted the report and recommendation in full on March 15, 2018. (ECF 67).

Plaintiff initiated a separate state action in the New York Supreme Court on April 26, 2018 against, inter alia, DHS, Project Renewal, WIN, Inc., and Christine C. Quinn. (ECF 1 in 18-cv-4293). In her complaint, filed on May 10, 2018, Plaintiff alleged that during her time at Marsha's House,⁴ staff members made unwanted sexual advances towards her and verbally harassed her about her transgender identity. Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (ECF 1-2 in 18-cv-4293) at 6-7.⁵ Plaintiff alleged that after she threatened to report on the shelter director, DHS transferred her from Marsha's House to WIN West. SAC at 10. Although she expressed her concern to Defendant Quinn that she could not live with cisgender females, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Quinn failed to "stand up" to DHS and prevent transfers of transgender individuals to shelters that were not exclusive to transgender individuals. SAC at 12-13. Because Plaintiff believed that living with cisgender females would cause her to feel that she needed to hide her transgender identity and to be exposed to "constant questions," Plaintiff rejected her placement at WIN West and is now homeless. SAC at 16-17. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages of $10 million and injunctive relief against DHS, ordering DHS to transfer Plaintiff to a new shelterand prohibiting DHS from ever transferring individuals to shelters that are inconsistent with their gender identity. SAC at 18.

The City of New York removed the April 26 state action to this Court based on Plaintiff's federal claims, i.e., claims under the ADA and FHA. (ECF 1 in 18-cv-4293 ¶ 9). After the cases were consolidated, I ordered that the May 10, 2018 state court complaint shall be deemed Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in the now-consolidated matter. (ECF 78). The WIN Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF 105).

III. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be granted where the complaint fails to contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court is limited to the complaint's factual allegations, documents attached to the complaint, matters of judicial notice, and documents which the plaintiff relied on in filing the complaint. Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993). If the parties present extrinsic evidence, the Court shall either exclude consideration of those documents or convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2002). If the latter, the parties should be permitted the opportunity to conduct discovery and supplement the evidentiary record as contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id.

Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint is to be "liberally construed." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This includes drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor and reading the allegations to "raise the strongest claims thatthe allegations suggest." Grimes v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 269, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Although the Court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true when deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court does not need to accept "labels and conclusions" or "assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is appropriate "if the court 'lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.'" Scroggins v. Scroggins, No. 15-CV-9524, 2017 WL 1047356, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2017) (quoting Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hallas Telecomms. S.A.R.L., 790 F.3d 411, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2015)). In resolving a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the complaint's allegations are also accepted as true, but the Court may consider "materials outside the pleadings." McDermott v. N.Y. Metro LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 2009). Because the burden is on the plaintiff to show she has Article III standing, the Court is not required to draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004).

IV. Analysis

a. Standing

The WIN Defendants argue that each of Plaintiff's claims fail for lack of standing because DHS, and not the WIN Defendants, held the actual authority over housing placement. (ECF 106 at 9). Standing is an "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirement to have a case heard in federal court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A plaintiff has standing where the plaintiff shows a concrete "injury in fact" "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant" that will "likely" be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 560-61. In civil rights cases, such as this one, "a 'broad view of constitutional standing' is appropriate because'private enforcement suits are the primary method of obtaining compliance.'" See Harty v. Spring Valley Marketplace LLC, No. 15-CV-8190 (NSR), 2017 WL 108062, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017).

The WIN Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has alleged a concrete injury. (See ECF 106 at 10). Plaintiff alleges that because she was denied a reasonable accommodation at any of DHS's contracted shelters, she has been forced into homelessness, an actual injury that affects Plaintiff's physical, emotional, and mental well-being. SAC at 17; see also Lee v. Pierce, 698 F. Supp. 332, 336 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding homelessness a concrete injury).

The WIN Defendants' contention is with the lack of traceability and redressability. Although a defendant's conduct does not need to be the "proximate cause" of the injury, the plaintiff must at least show a "causal nexus." See D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The WIN Defendants argue that none of Plaintiff's injuries, e.g., emotional distress and displacement, are alleged in the complaint to be connected to any specific action of the WIN Defendants. (ECF 106 at 10-11). The primary factual allegations concerning the WIN Defendants consist of the following: Plaintiff alleges that she called Defendant Quinn multiple times after her transfer to WIN West to request that she be housed elsewhere. SAC at 11-12. Plaintiff then alleges that the WIN Defendants' inability to provide the necessary accommodations caused her psychological stress. SAC at 15.

While accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, but not making any favorable inferences, I find that Plaintiff fails to tie the WIN Defendants' actions to her injuries of trauma caused by potentially living with...