Lopez v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs.

1

TODD LOPEZ, Personal Representative of the Wrongful Death Estate of RICHARD PAIZ and LORETTA PAIZ, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE SERVICES; HOSPITALISE MEDICINE PHYSICIANS OF TEXAS, PLLC d/b/a SOUND PHYSICIANS HOLDINGS LLC; KENNETH DALE; and KARAN MAHAJAN, Defendants-Appellees.

No. A-1-CA-41177

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

April 10, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY Francis J. Mathew District Court Judge

Brace E. Thompson Law Firm, P.C. Bruce E. Thompson Albuquerque, NM The Law Office of Amalia S. Lucero, L.L.C. Amalia S. Lucero Placitas, NM for Appellants.

Rodey Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Jocelyn Drennan Jeffrey M. Croasdell Albuquerque, NM for Appellee Presbyterian Healthcare Services

Miller Stratvert P.A. Jennifer D. Hall Kelsey D. Green Laureana A Larkin Albuquerque, NM for Appellants Hospitalist Medicine Physicians of Texas d/b/a Sound Physicians Holdings LLC and Karen Mahajan

Priest & Miller, LLP Ada B. Priest Dominic B. Romero Albuquerque, NM for Appellee Kenneth Dale

OPINION

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge

{¶1} This case involves the relationship between the appointment of a personal representative (PR) under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA), see NMSA 1978, § § 41 -2-1 to -4 (1882, as amended through 2001); Chavez v. Regents of the Univ, of N.M., 1985-NMSC-114,103 N.M. 606,711 P.2d 883; see also Rule 1-017(B) NMRA, and statutory standing as a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a cause of action in New Mexico state court, see Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Johnston, 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 11, 369 P.3d 1046. Plaintiffs Loretta Paiz, individually, and Todd Lopez, as the PR of the "Wrongful Death Estate of Richard Paiz," (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed claims, including a wrongful death action, against Defendants Presbyterian Healthcare Services, Sound Physicians Holdings LLC, Kenneth Dale, and Karan Mahajan (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs, however, did not seek the appointment of Mr. Lopez as the PR under the WDA^[1] until months into the litigation. The district court determined that Plaintiffs' late request to appoint a PR deprived the court of jurisdiction over the wrongful death action and dismissed the wrongful death claim with prejudice. On interlocutory appeal, we consider whether a failure to petition for appointment of a PR before or simultaneously with the filing of the original complaint brought under the WDA is a jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal of the action. Holding that it is not, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} This case began with the death of Richard Paiz at the University of New Mexico Hospital on April 21, 2019. Three years later, in April 2022 Plaintiffs filed a complaint for wrongful death against Defendants. The primary plaintiff in the caption was identified as "TODD LOPEZ, as Personal Representative of the Wrongful Death Estate of Richard Paiz." Four months after that, in August 2022 Defendant Sound Physicians Holdings LLC served interrogatories and asked Mr. Lopez to "[d]escribe all court proceedings leading to your appointment as [PR] of the Estate of Richard Paiz." Mr. Lopez responded in October 2022 that "the petition for appointment as [PR] of the wrongful death estate was filed with the wrongful death action, all parties had notice in the original complaint, and formal court appointment is pending." Despite this response, Plaintiffs did not request appointment of Mr. Lopez as the PR until two days after the date on the discovery response-approximately six months after the complaint was filed. All Defendants opposed the motion to appoint and argued that Rule 1-017(B) required a request to appoint a PR before or "with" the complaint and that Mr. Lopez's discovery responses had "stated incorrectly that the petition for his appointment as [PR] was filed with the wrongful death action."

{¶3} During the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion to appoint, "the [d]istrict [c]ourt sua sponte raised the issue whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to appoint the [PR]." The district court referred the parties to our Supreme Court's opinion in Johnston, a foreclosure case that deals with standing, and offered the parties the following quote from that case: "when a statute creates a cause of action and designates who may sue, the issue of standing becomes interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing then becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action." 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 11 (text only) (citation omitted). Based on this language, the district court questioned "whether [it had] jurisdiction to do anything with respect to the wrongful death action." The district court requested and received supplemental briefing on this issue from the parties, and Plaintiffs filed an additional motion to amend the complaint to add a request to appoint a PR. At a second hearing, the district court determined that based on Johnston "and Rule 1-017(B), which . . . does clarify who and when a [PR] may bring-or a party may bring a wrongful death action under the [WDA]," the court did not have jurisdiction to proceed on the wrongful death claim and the motion to amend was "moot." The district court dismissed the wrongful death action with prejudice but certified the matter for interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted.

DISCUSSION

{¶4} The parties dispute whether a timely petition for appointment of a PR, as set forth in Rule 1-017(B), is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a wrongful death action. Our Supreme Court in Chavez rejected the view that the requirement for a PR under the WDA is jurisdictional and that without a PR a suit is a "nullity," because such a view of the PR "requirement of the [WDA] is unnecessarily restrictive" and the rules "dictate[d] a different result." 1985-NMSC-114 ¶ 11. Defendants argue that Chavez was decided almost forty years ago and newer authorities-Johnston and amendments to Rule 1-017-have "analytically superseded" Chavez by reaffirming statutory standing as a jurisdictional prerequisite and mandating the timing for appointing a PR. To consider Defendants' arguments, we first review longstanding WDA principles and procedures as well as the more recent developments in standing analysis. Second, we consider the WDA and standing principles together in order to determine whether the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' WDA claim. See Ottino v. Ottino, 2001-NMCA-012, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 168, 21 P.3d 37 (considering de novo the question of the district court's jurisdiction).

I. Longstanding and Developing Legal Landscapes

{¶5} We first set forth the WDA and its context, then consider Chavez and the governing rules for amending pleadings and parties-Rule 1-015 NMRA and Rule 1-017-and last outline New Mexico's unique view of standing.

A. The Wrongful Death Act and Appointment of a PR

{¶6} In 1882, New Mexico adopted the WDA in derogation of the historical common law principle "that the right of recovery died with the injured party" and "the theory that a person harmed by another's death had no right to recover." Est. of Brice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2016-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 18, 19, 373 P.3d 977. Section 41-2-1 states that

[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, although such death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony, and the act, or neglect, or default, is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which, would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.

This provision ensures that the death of an injured person will not prevent a cause of action against a responsible party. "The WDA permits the cause of action to survive." Est. of Lajeuenesse ex rel. Boswell v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 2013-NMCA-004, ¶ 10, 292 P.3d 485.

{¶7} A WDA cause of action "accrues as of the date of death," § 41-2-2, and "[e]very action mentioned in Section 41-2-1... shall be brought by and in the name of the [PR] of the deceased person." Section 41-2-3. Thus, although the deceased suffered the injury that created the cause of action, a PR must stand in their place to bring the action and distribute any proceeds to the statutorily identified beneficiaries. See Est. of Lajeuenesse, 2013-NMCA-004, ¶¶ 12, 14 (explaining that the PR "acts as a nominal party for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries" and that "[f]or the purposes of preservation of the right of action, the [PR] replaces the injured deceased under the WDA"). The PR pursues "the same cause of action exactly as it would have been possessed by the decedent . . ., and any limitations on the decedent's personal right to maintain an action will survive as well." Est. of Krahmer ex rel. Peck v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2014-NMCA-001, ¶ 6, 315 P.3d 298. For this reason, the PR's rights under the WDA are entirely "derivative of the decedent's Id. ¶ 8.

{¶8} In Chavez, our Supreme Court addressed whether the failure to seek appointment of a PR within the WDA statute of limitations bars suit. 1985-NMSC-114, ¶ 2. The Chavez parties brought a wrongful death action but after litigating for approximately two years, the defendants moved to dismiss the case "based on [the] plaintiffs' failure to obtain, within the time limitation period, court appointment of a [PR] to sue." Id. ¶ 1. The district court denied the defendants' motion but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. Id. This Court determined that the failure to appoint a PR was jurisdictional-a position our Supreme Court...