Lopez v. Quiros

1

RAMON LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. ANGEL QUIROS; STATE OF CONNECTICUT, Respondents.

No. 3:22-CV-565 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 6, 2023

RULING ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

SARALA V. NAGALA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Ramon Lopez filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state convictions for murder, attempted murder, and assault. In response to the Court's Order to Show Cause, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in its entirety contending that Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies with respect to some of the grounds asserted in the petition. For the following reasons, the Court finds that although some of the grounds asserted in the petition are not exhausted, Petitioner may proceed to consideration of the merits of his unexhausted claims to avoid impairing his right to seek federal habeas relief. Accordingly, Respondents' motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Connecticut Supreme Court, in considering Petitioner's direct appeal from his convictions, set forth the following facts that a jury reasonably could have found. State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 783 (2007). On February 2, 2002, the three victims-Shariff Abdul-Hakeem, Manuel Rosado, and Gary Burton-were standing outside Pettway's Variety Store at an intersection in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Id. Two men, nicknamed Diamond and Chef, and a third unidentified man who was carrying a gun approached Pettway's. Id. Around the same time, two other men approached the store from a white car parked on a nearby street. Id. Although they wore cloths over their lower faces, an eyewitness named Tony Payton identified these two other men as Boo McClain and Petitioner. Id. McClain carried a handgun and Petitioner carried a shotgun. Id. at 783-84. After Petitioner cocked the shotgun, a commotion ensued, at which point Petitioner and McClain opened fire on the crowd. Id. at 784. A later ballistics analysis revealed that two shotguns and four handguns in total were used in the shooting. Id. Abdul-Hakeem died from his bullet wounds several hours after the shooting, and Rosado and Burton received bullet wounds. Id.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the murder of Abdul-Hakeem, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), the attempted murders of Rosado and Burton, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a(a), and assaults in the first degree of Rosado and Burton, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(5). Lopez, 280 Conn. at 785. After the verdict, the trial court granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss his trial counsel, but the trial court denied substitute counsel's motion to continue the sentencing until a date after the trial transcript would be available. Id. Thereafter, Petitioner was sentenced to a total effective term of one hundred years of imprisonment. Id. at 786.

Petitioner directly appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, where he raised the following arguments: that the trial court improperly denied substitute counsel's motion to continue the sentencing; that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Petitioner's prior misconduct; that the state prosecutor engaged in several instances of misconduct in violation of due process; that there was insufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on accessory liability. Id. at 786, 793, 797-98, 807, 820. The Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 823.

While that direct appeal was pending, Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition. Lopez v. Comm'r of Corr., No. CV05-4000857-S, 2012 WL 234150, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2012). The state habeas court acknowledged that the petition raised “several claims,” but reasoned that the evidence presented at the habeas trial focused on Petitioner's contention that his criminal trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective by failing to present an alibi defense. Id. The state habeas court ultimately denied the petition. Id. at *8. The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed, Lopez v. Comm'r of Corr., 150 Conn.App. 905 (2014), and the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal, Lopez v. Comm'r of Corr., 314 Conn. 922 (2014).

While the appeal of his first state habeas petition was pending, Petitioner filed his second state habeas petition. Lopez v. Warden, No. CV12-4004836-S, 2019 WL 2369528, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 2019). Petitioner's second state habeas petition raised the following arguments: that the prosecutor failed to disclose certain evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); that Petitioner's previous habeas counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective by failing to prove that his criminal trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective; and that he was actually innocent. Lopez, 2019 WL 2369528, at *6, 9, 17. The state habeas court ultimately denied the petition. Id. at *23. The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed, Lopez v. Comm'r of Corr., 208 Conn.App. 515, 517 (2021), and the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal, Lopez v. Comm'r of Corr., 340 Conn. 922 (2022).

Thereafter, in April of 2022, Petitioner filed the present federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254. Pet., ECF No. 1. He raises eight grounds for habeas relief:

(1) that the prosecutor failed to disclose certain evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Pet. at 30-35;

(2) that Petitioner's criminal trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective by failing to present an alibi defense, id. at 36-38;

(3) that his criminal trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective by failing to present a third-party culpability defense, id. at 39-43;

(4) that the prosecutor presented false testimony by two witnesses that they did not expect to receive favorable treatment in exchange for inculpatory testimony, id. at 44-46;

(5) that the criminal trial court denied Petitioner's right to counsel by improperly denying substitute counsel's motion to continue the sentencing, id. at 47-49;

(6) that the state prosecutor engaged in several instances of misconduct in violation of due process, id. at 50-52;

(7) that Petitioner's criminal trial counsel was generally unconstitutionally ineffective in various respects, id. at 53-61; and

(8) that he is actually innocent, id. at 62-63.

Following the Court's Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 5, Respondents filed the present motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss a habeas petition, like any other motion to dismiss a civil complaint, is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Spiegelmann v. Erfe, No. 3:17-CV-2069 (VLB), 2018 WL 1582549, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (reviewing motion to dismiss § 2254 petition under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). To survive dismissal, the petition must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must offer more than “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57.

Because Petitioner filed the present petition pro se, the Court must construe his filings “liberally” and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). “Despite the special solicitude that the Court must show [Petitioner] out of consideration for his pro se status, his petition must still include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Anderson v. Williams, No. 3:15-CV-1364 (VAB), 2017 WL 855795, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court typically may consider only the complaint, or, here, the petition. However, the petition “is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference,” as well as any documents deemed “integral” to the petition. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 15253 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that, in considering a motion to dismiss, “the court may consider any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in the complaint by reference, as well as documents upon which the complaint relies and which are integral to the complaint”). To that end, because the petition relies on the various state court proceedings underlying the procedural history of this case, the Court will consider the documents relevant to those proceedings, some of which were cited in the petition and others of which were submitted by Respondents in support of the motion to dismiss.

B. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), requires a state prisoner to exhaust all available state court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. O'Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). The exhaustion requirement seeks to promote considerations of comity and...