Lopez v. Smiley

375 F.Supp.2d 19

Ramon LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. James SMILEY, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:02CV1020 (MRK).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

June 24, 2005.

Ramon Lopez, Somers, CT, pro se.

Robert F. Vacchelli, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING AND ORDER

KRAVITZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Ramon Lopez, a Connecticut inmate, brings this action primarily pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of correctional officers at the Northern Correctional Institution ("NCI") in Somers, Connecticut. Mr. Lopez claims that Officer James Smiley assaulted him on August 31, 2001 and again on September 5, 2001, in violation of federal and state law. Mr. Lopez further asserts that the other defendants were present during the alleged September 5, 2001 assault and that they failed to intervene to protect him, again in violation of federal and state law. Currently pending before the Court are Mr. Lopez's Motion for Reconsideration [doc. # 108] and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration [doc. # 109], which pertain to Chief Judge Robert N. Chatigny's Ruling and Order of October 5, 2004 [doc. # 104]. Also pending is Mr. Lopez's Motion to Amend the Second Amended Complaint [doc. # 147], which raises many of the same issues as the motions for reconsideration.

For the following reasons, Mr. Lopez's motions for reconsideration [docs. # 108 & # 109] are GRANTED, and Mr. Lopez's Motion to Amend the Second Amended Complaint [doc. # 147] is DENIED.

I.

On January 31, 2005, this case was transferred to the undersigned from Chief Judge Chatigny. Chief Judge Chatigny's Ruling and Order of October 5, 2004 [doc. # 104] (the "October 5 Ruling") granted in part and denied in part Mr. Lopez's motion to modify his amended complaint [doc. # 68] and denied Mr. Lopez's motion to substitute a party [doc. # 83] as moot. Familiarity with the October 5 Ruling and the underlying facts of this case is presumed.

Over one month after issuance of the ruling, Mr. Lopez filed a motion for reconsideration [doc. # 108] and a supplemental motion for reconsideration [doc. # 109] (on November 10, 2004 and November 15, 2004, respectively). The Court notes — as correctly observed by Defendants in their Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [doc. # 114] at 1 — that under Local Rule 7(c)(1) of the District of Connecticut, "[m]otions for reconsideration shall be filed and served within ten (10) days of the filing of the decision or order from which such relief is sought." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1). Ordinarily, a failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration constitutes sufficient grounds for denying the motion. However, in this case, the Court will exercise its discretion to address Mr. Lopez's untimely motions for reconsideration, in view of the issues raised in the motions and since Defendants do not claim any prejudice from the delay. See, e.g., Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 843 F.Supp. 811, 812 (D.Conn.1994) (Cabranes, J.) ("The defendants make several arguments in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, claiming first that it is untimely. The court, however, declines to deny the plaintiff's motion in such summary fashion."); cf. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 99 F.3d 538, 541 (2d Cir.1996) ("[A] district court is vested with the power to revisit its decisions before the entry of final judgment and is free from the constraints of Rule 60 in so doing....").

II.

The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995). "Such a motion generally will be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Id. A "motion for reconsideration may not be used to plug gaps in an original argument or to argue in the alternative once a decision has been made." Horsehead Resource Dev. Co., Inc. v. B.U.S. Envtl. Services, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, a "motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.

Mr. Lopez seeks reconsideration on the following grounds: (1) the October 5 Ruling misconstrued the Connecticut Supreme Court's holdings in Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998), and Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 802 A.2d 814 (2002), and therefore Mr. Lopez should be allowed to press his claims for money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief based on violations of Article First, §§ 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution, (2) the October 5 Ruling does not take into account the Second Circuit's recent guidance in Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.2004), regarding estoppel and exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and therefore Mr. Lopez should be allowed to press his claims related to the alleged August 31, 2001 incident; and (3) the October 5 Ruling failed to consider Mr. Lopez's request to amend his complaint to bring state common law battery claims involving both the alleged August 31, 2001 incident and the alleged September 5, 2001 incident, and therefore Mr. Lopez should be allowed to press both these claims.

The Court will address each ground for reconsideration in turn.

A.

Mr. Lopez first asserts that the October 5 Ruling improperly interpreted Binette v. Sabo and Martin v. Brady, supra, as allowing Connecticut constitutional tort claims only when they are asserted against state employees in their official capacities. According to the Connecticut Supreme Court, "for some circumstances, [Binette] created a private cause of action for violations of article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution." ATC P'ship v. Town of Windham, 251 Conn. 597, 602-03, 741 A.2d 305 (1999). The October 5 Ruling stated that a "Binette cause of action may be brought against a person in his official capacity only." Ruling and Order of October 5, 2004 [doc. # 104] at 3 (citing Martin, 261 Conn. at 374, 802 A.2d 814). The October 5 Ruling then denied Mr. Lopez's motion to add a Binette cause of action because Mr. Lopez was suing Defendants in their individual capacities, not in their official capacities. See Ruling and Order of October 5, 2004 [doc. # 104] at 3.

As Defendants concede, however, "the state of the law on this point is, at best, murky." Defs.' Mem. in Resp. [doc. # 114] at 2. For example, in Martin, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that "at oral argument before this court the defendants conceded that, in the plaintiff's complaint, properly construed, he sued them in their individual, rather than their official, capacities, and that, therefore, Binette v. Sabo, was inapplicable." Martin, 261 Conn. at 374, 802 A.2d 814 (internal citation omitted).¹ However, as Defendants acknowledge, the Supreme Court in Martin dismissed the case on the ground that the defendants in that case were immune from suit under section 4-165 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which states in relevant part that "[n]o state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment." Conn. Gen.Stat. § 4-165 (emphasis added); see Defs.' Mem. in Resp. [doc. # 114] at 2. Furthermore, Defendants recognize that under Connecticut law, an action for money damages cannot be brought against state defendants in their official capacities. Defs.' Mem. in Resp. [doc. # 114] at 2; see Prigge v. Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 542 (2003) ("[T]he exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity for actions by state officers in excess of their statutory authority applies only to actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, not to actions for money damages. When a plaintiff brings an action for money damages against the state, he must proceed through the office of the claims commissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General Statutes, §§ 4-141 through 4-165. Otherwise, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.") (citing Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003)). Finally, as Defendants also concede, the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Brocuglio, 264 Conn. 778, 826 A.2d 145 (2003), explicitly stated (albeit in dicta) that "a victim of an illegal entry properly may file a civil action seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief or, in certain circumstances, damages against the officers in their official or individual capacity." Id. at 790, 826 A.2d 145 (emphasis added); see Defs.' Mem. in Resp. [doc. # 114] at 2. In view of the foregoing, Defendants all but admit that there are "controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked [in its October 5 Ruling] — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.

It is appropriate, therefore, for the Court to reconsider the October 5 Ruling in this regard. Upon reconsideration, the Court concludes that Mr. Lopez's request to amend his complaint to add claims arising from Defendants' alleged violations of Mr. Lopez's rights under Article First, §§ 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution is not barred by the mere fact that Mr. Lopez sued Defendants in their individual, as opposed to official, capacities. See Martin, 261 Conn. at 374, 802 A.2d 814; Brocuglio, 264 Conn. at 790, 826 A.2d 145; Prigge, 265 Conn. at 349, 828 A.2d 542. Having reconsidered the October 5 Ruling, however, the Court nonetheless denies Mr. Lopez's request to amend his complaint to assert a panoply of Connecticut constitutional claims for money damages....