Losee v. Skinner

JACK LOSEE, Plaintiff, v. BETH SKINNER, KRISTOFER KARBERG, MICHELLE WADDLE, TRACY DIETSCH, and LINDSAY STUPKA, Defendants.

No. 22-CV-4-CJW-KEM

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division

April 7, 2022

ORDER

C.J Williams United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Jack Losee's pro se complaint filed under Title 42, United States Code Section 1983 (Doc. 1).^[1] Plaintiff also filed motions to appoint counsel (Doc. 2), for class certification (Doc. 3), for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Doc 4), and for a hearing (Doc. 6). Plaintiff also filed a supplement to his complaint. (Doc. 5). Plaintiff alleges defendants are deliberately indifferent to conditions in the Anamosa State Penitentiary, defendants' classification system violates due process, and defendants have retaliated against him for filing grievances and complaints. For the following reasons, plaintiff's claim related to the air quality and ventilation conditions and plaintiff's claim related to retaliation are allowed to proceed, his due process claim related to the classification system is dismissed for failure to state a claim, his motion for class certification is denied, his motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is denied, his motion for a hearing is denied, and his motion to appoint counsel is granted.

I. INITIAL REVIEW STANDARD

Courts must liberally construe a pro se complaint. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court must review this case under the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915A(a). The Court may dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant that is immune from a monetary judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In reviewing a prisoner or in forma pauperis complaint, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a court must weigh them in favor of the plaintiff. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). Pro se complaints, however, must allege sufficient facts to support the plaintiff's claim. Stone, 364 F.3d at 914. A claim is “frivolous” if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Carmichael v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2010 WL 5829239, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2010) (applying Neitzke in a Section 1915A initial review). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, courts rely on the standards articulated under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). See Hake v. Clarke, 91 F.3d 1129, 1132 & n. 3 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating initial review for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes was authorized for prisoner cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, . . . to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)) (modifications in original).

II. INITIAL REVIEW ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Standard

Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...

Section 1983 was designed to provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978).

However, Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 provides no substantive rights. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). “One cannot go into court and claim a ‘violation of [Section] 1983'-for [Section] 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything.” Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. Rather, Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (stating that Section 1983 “merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (“Constitution and laws” means Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of rights created by federal statute, as well as those created by the Constitution.). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) the alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Initial Review Analysis

Plaintiff's pro se complaint alleges that his Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and First Amendment rights have been violated. He makes three claims: 1) defendants are not remedying air quality issues stemming from poor ventilation and mold and the conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment; 2) defendants' job classification process violates the due process clause; and 3) defendants have retaliated against plaintiff for filing grievances and complaints in violation of his First Amendment rights. The Court will address each claim in turn.

1. Air Quality and Ventilation

Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of confinement in Living Unit C (LUC) at Anamosa State Penitentiary violate the Eighth Amendment. He alleges that LUC has poor ventilation and air quality and that there is mold throughout the pipe chases that run through the cells and under the plaster. (Doc. 1, at 8). More specifically, he contends that there is no central air system, the air quality does not meet ASHREA standards for a correctional setting, and the walls drip with moisture from humidity and lack of ventilation. (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that, because the air quality is poor, there were over 300 cases of COVID-19 among LUC inmates within one week in October 2020 and that 8 inmates consequently died. (Id.). He states that there is a high risk of further outbreaks and additional deaths from COVID-19 because LUC houses numerous elderly inmates with medical conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Beth Skinner, Director of the Iowa Department of Corrections, and defendant Kristofer Karberg, Warden of Anamosa State Penitentiary, know about the poor air quality and ventilation but have failed to take any actions to improve the conditions. (Doc. 1, at 8). Plaintiff also filed a related motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and declaration in support, seeking an order closing LUC while the mold is removed and an “adequate ventilation system” is installed. (Doc. 4, at 2-3).

“The Eighth Amendment scrutinizes the conditions under which prison inmates are confined in order to prevent the inhumane treatment of inmates.” Robinson v. Hager, 292 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent either to a prisoner's existing serious medical needs or to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious future harm. Weaver v. Clark, 45 F.3d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (stating that prison “[c]onditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment” nor can they result “in unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs”). To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate existed and (2) the prison official knew of and disregarded that risk. Robinson, 292 F.3d at 563-64. A prison official thus “cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

The Court finds that plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to pass initial review on this claim. Inadequate ventilation conditions have been found to be Eighth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F.Supp. 1276 1293 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (holding that “this Court must find that the ventilation system at CCJ constitutes a constitutionally intolerable living condition”); Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F.Supp. 504, 511 (S.D. Ill. 1980); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y 1974). Plaintiff alleges that the poor air quality, inadequate ventilation, and mold cause a substantial risk of serious harm. He also contends that there is a substantial risk stemming from another potential COVID-19 outbreak. Plaintiff alle...