Lott v. Sipes

MARK LOTT, PLAINTIFF, v. ALLYSON SIPES, CYNTHIA HELFFAND GALEN SANDERS DEFENDANTS.

C/A No. 2:14-CV-1761-RMG-MGB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

June 16, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action presumably under Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983. The Plaintiff is currently in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health ("DMH") pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-10 through § 44-48-170. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 47.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.

The Plaintiff brought this action on or about May 1, 2014.¹ (See Dkt. No. 1.) On December 19, 2014, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 47.) By order filed December 22, 2014, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Plaintiff was advised of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. On January 5, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a Motion of Plaintiff's Objection to Summary Judgment by the Defendants/Dismissal of Defendant. (Dkt. No. 50.) On January 15, 2015, the Defendants filed a Reply. (Dkt. No. 53.) On January 26, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a letter with the court asking for discovery before the court rules on the Motion for Summary Judgment.² (Dkt. No. 56.)

ALLEGED FACTS³

The Plaintiff alleges he arrived at DMH on February 19, 2013, approximately 14 months before he filed his lawsuit. Between February 19, 2013 and April 19, 2014, the Plaintiff was on therapeutic room restriction ("TRR") for approximately 290 days.⁴ He has had an early bed time for 36 days. The Plaintiff has been disciplined since being at DMH many times, and the Plaintiff admits he "may be" guilty of "90%" of the "charges" levied against him. The "charges" against him have included the following:

1. Entering Peers Room

2. Physical Aggression

3. Violation of TRR

4. Unauthorized Movement

5. Insolence

6. Touching Peer

7. Violation of No-Contact

8. Forgery

9. Exchanging Sexually Explict [sic] Notes

10. Sexual Misconduct

11. Having Peer in Room

12. Unauthorized Communication

13. Giving False Information to Staff

14. Violation of Sexual Behavior Precautions

15. Concealment of Identity

16. Disobeying Direct Order

17. Attempt to Get Canteen From Peer

18. Saving Seats

19. Giving Radio to Peer

20. Soliciting Peer to Come to Room

21. Physical Horseplay

22. Contraband

23. Possession of Peers Radio

The Plaintiff received "most of these charges multiple [sic].⁵" The Plaintiff states that he was "secluded/isolated" in his room for 290 days as a result, and it was not "theraupedic[sic]." The isolation "frustrate[d]" the Plaintiff and held him "back in treatment and from going home."

The Plaintiff states that since May 6, 2013, he has been made to wear an orange jumpsuit because of his "sexual behaviors." The Plaintiff has been placed on "no contact" as well which forbids face to face interactions with other individuals in DMH custody.

Defendant Cynthia Helff⁶ is never mentioned in the Complaint except for in the caption, being listed as a defendant, and in the prayer for relief. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 3, 6). The complete allegations against Defendant Allyson Sipes⁷ are that she "is the case managers' boss and she approves [no contact]." (Id. at 5) The complete allegations against Defendant Galen Sanders⁸ are that he "is the Head nurse and is a party because he refuses to help me too. He signed some requests." (Id. at 5.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "'the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).

ANALYSIS

The Plaintiff is presumably making a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he or she "has been deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States," and (2) "that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 540 (1983); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980). However, his Complaint is far from clear.

FED. R. CIV. P. 8 requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. "The complaint must provide enough specificity to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is.'" Pringle v. City of Charleston Police Dep't, No. C/A 2:06-cv-3295-PMD, 2007 WL 295629, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2007) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, (1993) (internal quotation omitted)). Failure to make any factual allegations against a defendant requires dismissal of the defendant. See Id. ; See Also Mohsin v. California Dep't of Water Res., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1018 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

In the case at bar, the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 8. While the Plaintiff's primary complaint is that the consequences of his numerous disciplinary infractions have been too severe in his opinion, he has not alleged any legal claims against the three named defendants. The court gives the Complaint liberal construction but cannot recognize any claim against the three defendants.

In a § 1983 action, "liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). The Plaintiff failed to mention Defendant Helff in the body of his Complaint at all. (Dkt. No. 1.) As To Defendant Sipes, the only claim is that she supervised an unidentified "case manager" and "approves these things," presumably referring to the "no contact" orders. The only mention of Defendant Sanders in the Complaint is his position as "head nurse" and that he "refuses to help" the Plaintiff. There are no cognizable claims made under §1983 against Defendants Helff, Sipes or Sanders personally. The bare assertions made by Plaintiff do not provide any detail of any actions undertaken by the defendants or give them any notice as to what claim he is seeking to bring.

The naming of Defendants Sipes and Sanders, at least in part, appears to be because they are supervisors. The doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 927-29 (4th Cir. 1977). "Supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates." Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). In such a case, liability "is not premised on respondeat superior, but on a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care." Id. (citations omitted). A plaintiff in a supervisory liability case "assumes a heavy burden of proof," as the plaintiff "not only must demonstrate that the prisoners face a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source, but he must show that the supervisor's corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive practices." Id. at 373 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Generally speaking, a plaintiff cannot satisfy this heavy burden of proof "by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents," but "[a] supervisor's continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses . . . provides an independent basis for finding he either was deliberately indifferent or acquiesced in the constitutionally offensive conduct of his subordinates." Id. (citations omitted); see also Ouzts v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[A] warden's general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement."). As the Plaintiff has not made a cognizable claim, he has not met his burden to show any liability of the defendants in their roles as supervisors.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 47.) be GRANTED.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

June 16, 2015

Charleston, South Carolina

/s/_________

MARY GORDON BAKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that the...