LOTT v. WORKMAN

RONALD CLINTON LOTT, Petitioner,

v.RANDALL G. WORKMAN, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent.¹

Case No. CIV-05-891-M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Dated: March 31, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner, Ronald Clinton Lott, a state court prisoner, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 16. Petitioner, who is represented by counsel, is challenging the convictions and sentences entered against him in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-87-963. In that case, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of two counts of Murder in the First Degree and was sentenced to death on both counts.

In his Petition, Petitioner has presented twenty-two grounds for relief, including a request for an evidentiary hearing. Doc. 16. Respondent has responded to the Petition and Petitioner has replied. Docs. 25 and 26. The state court record has been provided.² After a thorough review of the entire state court record, the pleadings filed herein, and the applicable law, the Court finds that, for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner is not entitled to his requested relief.

I. Procedural History.

Petitioner's convictions and death sentences are the result of a jury trial held in December 2001. The jury found two aggravating circumstances supporting each death sentence, namely: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution (O.R. VII, 1250-51, 1253-54).

In Case No. D-2002-88, Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (hereinafter "OCCA"). In a published opinion, Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004), the OCCA denied relief. Rehearing was denied October 13, 2004. Petitioner sought review of the OCCA's decision by the United States Supreme Court. His petition for writ of certiorari was denied on March 28, 2005. Lott v. Oklahoma, 544 U.S. 950 (2005).

In Case No. PCD-2002-961, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief from the OCCA. In an unpublished opinion, the OCCA denied Petitioner his requested relief. Lott v. State, No. PCD-2002-961 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2004) (unpublished).

II. Facts.

On or about September 2, 1986, 83-year-old Anna Fowler was raped and murdered in her home. On or about January 11, 1987, 90-year-old³ Zelma Cutler, who lived across the street from Mrs. Fowler, was raped and murdered in her home. Both ladies lived alone. Lott, 98 P.3d at 327. On February 26, 1987, Robert Miller was charged with the crimes (O.R. I, 1-4). While Mr. Miller was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death for their murders, DNA testing, conducted in 1992 during the pendency of his appeal, showed that he was not the source of the semen found at the scenes (O.R. VIII, 1437; II Trial Tr. VII, 1235-36). Lott, 98 P.3d at 327. Additional DNA testing conducted in 1994 implicated Petitioner, and Petitioner was initially charged with the crimes on March 10, 1995 (O.R. I, 5-8; II Trial Tr. VI, 1132-34). Id. At the time he was charged, Petitioner was incarcerated for the rapes of Grace Marshall and Eleanor Hoster. Mrs. Marshall was raped in her home on March 22, 1987, and Mrs. Hoster was raped in her home on May 7, 1987. Both Mrs. Marshall and Mrs. Hoster were elderly women who lived alone. Id. Additional facts will be referenced herein as they relate to the individual grounds for relief raised by Petitioner.

III. Standard of Review.

A. Exhaustion as a Preliminary Consideration.

The exhaustion doctrine is a matter of comity. It provides that before a federal court can seek to grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, it must first determine that he has exhausted all of his state court remedies. As acknowledged in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991), "in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights." While the exhaustion doctrine has long been a part of habeas jurisprudence, it is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State."

B. Procedural Bar.

Beyond the issue of exhaustion, a federal habeas court must also examine the state court's resolution of the presented claim. "It is well established that federal courts will not review questions of federal law presented in a habeas petition when the state court's decision rests upon a state-law ground that 'is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.'" Cone v. Bell,__U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1780 (2009) (quoting Coleman). "The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30.

C. Merits.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Court's ability to grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners is limited. When a state prisoner presents a claim to this Court, the merits of which have been addressed in state court proceedings, the Court cannot grant habeas corpus relief upon the claim unless it determines that the state court proceedings resulted in a decision (1) "that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The focus of Section 2254(d) is on the reasonableness of the state court's decision. To obtain relief, a petitioner must show that the state court decision is "objectively unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring but delivering the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II). "The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

"Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported . . . the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Harrison v. Richter,__U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Relief is warranted only "where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme Court's] precedents." Id. The deference embodied in Section 2254(d) "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (citation omitted).

IV. Analysis.

A. Ground One: Speedy Trial.

In his Ground One, Petitioner asserts that his right to a speedy trial was denied. Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. In a thorough analysis, the OCCA applied Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. Lott, 98 P.3d at 327-33. Because the OCCA addressed Petitioner's speedy trial claim on the merits, Petitioner may obtain relief from this Court only upon satisfaction of Section 2254(d). With reference to Section 2254(d), Petitioner argues that the OCCA's denial of his claim is both an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law and an unreasonable determination of the facts. Respondent acknowledges that the claim is exhausted and contends that the OCCA's decision is reasonable. Respondent further contends that the Court should afford a presumption of correctness to facts determined by the trial court in its resolution of the claim.

1. Applicable Law.

" The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused." Barker, 407 U.S. at 519. First, in addition to the general concern that criminal procedures be fairly applied, society as a whole has an interest in the swift administration of justice. Second, unlike other constitutional rights, a speedy trial infringement might actually benefit the defendant. Because fading memories and witness unavailability can hamper the prosecution in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, a delay does not automatically result in prejudice to the defendant. Third, the speedy trial right is a vague concept which cannot be precisely determined. Id. at 519-21. "[H]ow long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate[?]" Id. at 521.

With these considerations in mind, the Supreme Court developed a balancing test to assess speedy trial claims. The test, as pronounced in Barker, weighs "the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant." Id. at 530. Applied on an case-by-case basis, the factors may vary, but include consideration of the following: length of the delay, reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice. Id. The Supreme Court's guidance as to application of the factors is as follows:

We regard none of the four factors identified . . . as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full...