Loughlin v. Loughlin

910 A.2d 963

280 Conn. 632

Sharon LOUGHLIN v. William LOUGHLIN, Jr.

No. 17634.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 19, 2006.

Decided December 12, 2006.

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Jeffrey D. Ginzberg, Seymour, for the appellant (plaintiff).

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Hugh D. Hughes and Jacqueline F. Barbara, Shelton, for the appellee (defendant).

BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

KATZ, J.

The plaintiff, Sharon Loughlin, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the trial court relied on impermissible factors in crafting its financial orders under General Statutes § § 46b-81¹ and 46b-82,² pursuant to the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant, William Loughlin, Jr. Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 889 A.2d 902 (2006). We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following two issues: "(1) Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court had improperly relied on the total length of the parties' relationship³ in fashioning its financial orders? (2) Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court had improperly relied on the presence of the parties' adult children and grandchild in the home in fashioning its alimony reward?" Loughlin v. Loughlin, 277 Conn. 926, 895 A.2d 798 (2006). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following undisputed facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal. "The parties initially were married from 1981 to 1992. Their three children were born during that marriage. Within a year or so of the 1992 divorce, the parties resumed cohabiting. In 1998, they remarried. The judgment of dissolution that is the subject of this appeal was rendered in 2004. At that time, the parties' [eldest daughter, Elizabeth Loughlin, was] twenty-two, [their middle child, Kathryn Loughlin, was] twenty and [their son, Kevin Loughlin, was] sixteen years old. [Kathryn Loughlin], who was unmarried, recently had become a mother." Loughlin v. Loughlin, supra, 93 Conn.App. at 620-21, 889 A.2d 902. At the time of the second dissolution proceedings, the parties' two youngest children and their grandchild were living in the family home with the plaintiff.

"During the period of time that the parties were cohabiting but unmarried, the plaintiff attended nursing school, receiving an associate's degree in 1996. Thereafter, she worked in various nursing positions. The defendant also pursued his education at that time, completing a bachelor's degree primarily between 1993 and 1998 and, subsequently, a master's degree. He began working at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in 1986 and remained with that employer through the time of the second divorce. In 2000, the parties purchased a house for $315,000.⁴ In 2001, the defendant accepted an assignment from his employer that required him to live in Turkey. After his departure, the parties grew apart and, in October, 2003, the plaintiff filed for divorce.

"A hearing was held on June 9 and 10, 2004, at which each of the parties testified. At the time of the hearing, the plaintiff was forty years old and the defendant was forty-three. The plaintiff's annual full-time salary was determined to be $52,676 and the defendant's, $153,495. The parties were in partial agreement as to the terms of a proposed property division and financial orders. They disagreed, however, as to the specifics of an alimony award, particularly as to its term, and to the distribution of the marital residence and the defendant's retirement accounts. The defendant was willing to pay alimony for two and one-half years, while the plaintiff requested a permanent award. With respect to the residence, the defendant was willing to transfer his interest therein to the plaintiff in exchange for $60,500. As to his retirement accounts, he submitted that only the amounts accrued during the second marriage were at issue and requested that they be awarded to him in full. The plaintiff requested the residence outright and 50 percent of the entire value of the defendant's retirement accounts.

"The court rendered an oral decision at the conclusion of the hearing and, thereafter, reduced its judgment to writing. Pursuant to the court's judgment, the parties were awarded joint legal custody of their one minor child, the sixteen year old son. The son's primary residence was to be with the plaintiff, and the defendant was ordered to pay $272 weekly in child support and provide for the son's health insurance.⁵

"With respect to the distribution of the parties' assets and liabilities, the defendant was ordered to transfer his interest in the marital home, and all of its contents, to the plaintiff,⁶ and the defendant was awarded the entirety of his 401(k) retirement account.⁷ The court considered the equity in the home and the value of the defendant's 401(k) to be roughly equal.⁸ The defendant was to assume responsibility for payment of the elder daughter's student loan and to pay for the entirety of the son's college education.⁹ The parties were to divide equally the expenses of the younger daughter's attendance at a community college. The defendant also was to repay the younger daughter's automobile loan.¹⁰ The defendant additionally was to convey to the plaintiff, by way of a qualified domestic relations order, 50 percent of the current value of his pension, which had accrued over the whole of his employment at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.¹¹ Finally, the court ordered him to pay $7500 of the plaintiff's attorney's fees, which totaled $10,000. The plaintiff was to be responsible for her own car loan and a credit card account.¹²

"With respect to alimony, the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $600 weekly for twelve years. The court explained that it set the alimony rate at an amount that essentially would cover the mortgage payment on the marital home and set its term for the amount of time left on the mortgage. It specified that the duration of the alimony would be nonmodifiable by either party. The court further ordered the defendant to obtain life insurance, initially naming the children as beneficiaries and then, once the children reached the age of twenty-three, naming the plaintiff as beneficiary for the duration of the alimony obligation and in a declining amount equal to the remaining alimony payments.

"The defendant thereafter filed motions to reargue and for articulation. In his motion to reargue, he took issue with the term of the alimony award, his failure to receive any interest in the marital residence, the awarding of one half of his pension to the plaintiff and the requirement that he pay a portion of her attorney's fees. A hearing on the motions was held on June 29, 2004, at which the court further articulated some of the reasoning underlying its orders. The court also issued a written articulation on September 30, 2004." Id., at 621-24, 889 A.2d 902.

The defendant then appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. The defendant first claimed that, in contravention of the criteria outlined in § § 46b-81 and 46b-82, the trial court improperly had relied on the total length of the relationship of the parties, including the first marriage and intervening cohabitation, rather than solely on the length of the second marriage, when it crafted its financial orders pursuant to the dissolution judgment. Id., at 625-26, 889 A.2d 902. Second, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had considered the presence of the parties' adult children and grandchild in the marital home in fashioning an alimony award to ensure that the plaintiff retain the home as a family residence.¹³ Id., at 632, 889 A.2d 902. Upon review of the record, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court had in fact considered the parties' entire relationship as well as their adult children and grandchild when fashioning its financial orders. Id., at 639-40, 889 A.2d 902. The Appellate Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the statutory scheme for alimony and support orders, Connecticut case law and case law from other jurisdictions and further determined that such considerations were improper. Id., at 634-40, 889 A.2d 902. The Appellate Court therefore concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion, and, accordingly, reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the property and financial awards only and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id., at 641, 889 A.2d 902. We thereafter granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

We begin with the plaintiff's claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court had relied on the total length of the parties' relationship in fashioning its financial orders. She contends that the trial court instead properly relied on the remaining term of the mortgage in setting the duration of its alimony order and reasonably offset the defendant's 401(k) award with the marital home when distributing property. The plaintiff further contends that the Appellate Court did not read the trial court's references to the "totality of the relationship" in context and that these references merely reflected the court's thinking. The defendant counters that the trial court's written articulation as well as its oral decision and comments throughout the trial clearly indicate that the court made its decision on the basis of the length of the prior marriage, the cohabitation and the second marriage.¹⁴ We conclude that the record supports the Appellate Court's conclusion that the trial court improperly relied on the total length of the parties' relationship in crafting its financial orders.

We note at the...