Loupe v. O'Bannon

824 F.3d 534

Kristin Loupe, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Robin O'Bannon; Ricky Babin, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 15-30535

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 27, 2016

Amy Elizabeth Newsom, Esq., Newsom Law Firm, L.L.C., Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

William P. Gibbens, Esq., Maria Garcia Marks, Schonekas, Evans, McGoey & McEachin, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before DENNIS, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

The issues in this case are whether a state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from suit for money damages for (1) ordering a sheriff's deputy to make a warrantless arrest without probable cause of a witness in retaliation for the witness's refusal to testify that her boyfriend had struck her in the face during a domestic violence altercation, and (2) subsequently maliciously prosecuting the witness for making a false report of domestic violence. We conclude that the prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability for initiating an alleged malicious prosecution against the witness but not absolutely immune from liability for ordering the officer to make a warrantless arrest.

I

Plaintiff–Appellant Kristin Loupe filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and several Louisiana tort actions, against Ascension Parish District Attorney Ricky Babin, Assistant District Attorney Robin O'Bannon, Sheriff Jeffrey Wiley, and two sheriff's deputies. Defendants Babin and O'Bannon moved to dismiss Loupe's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss as to all claims against DA Babin and ADA O'Bannon. Plaintiff–Appellant Loupe appealed only the dismissal of her federal and state claims against O'Bannon on the grounds of absolute immunity.

We review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit , 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004). “In determining immunity, we accept the allegations of [the plaintiff's] complaint as true.” Kalina v. Fletcher , 522 U.S. 118, 122, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).

II

The facts alleged in Loupe's complaint are that: In January 2014, Kristin Loupe was called as a witness in state court to testify at a bond hearing for criminal defendant David Adams, Jr., who was her boyfriend at the time. Robin O'Bannon, the Ascension Parish Assistant District Attorney prosecuting the case, questioned Loupe about an incident that occurred approximately 18 months earlier, in which the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office responded to a report of a domestic dispute between Loupe and Adams. Loupe could not recall the incident in detail, but she did testify that “there was a dispute that went too far and that David hurt her arm.” When O'Bannon asked Loupe if Adams had hit her in the face, she answered, “No.” After further questioning, Loupe continued to deny that Adams had hit her in the face. As a result, O'Bannon asked the presiding judge to order that Loupe be arrested. The judge refused O'Bannon's request. O'Bannon then called Blake Prejean, the Sheriff's Deputy who completed the domestic dispute police report, to testify. Deputy Prejean stated that Loupe did not tell him that Adams hit her in the face. O'Bannon then ordered James Wolf, the Sheriff's Deputy on duty at the courthouse, to arrest Loupe for filing a false police report. Loupe was cuffed, escorted from the building, and placed in a police vehicle, then transported to the Ascension Parish Jail.

Loupe was placed in a “small shower cell,” an unheated room with cinderblock walls and a concrete floor that was covered with puddles of water. Loupe was left in the cell for at least an hour with no shoes and only a very thin jumpsuit. Loupe was eventually taken from the shower cell by another Deputy, who advised her that she was being released on her own recognizance. Loupe was finally released from the jail around 7:30 pm. Loupe was later treated for paresthesia and the beginning stages of frostbite caused by the conditions she experienced while in custody.

The Ascension Parish District Attorney's Office charged Loupe with criminal mischief for filing a false police report. Loupe pleaded not guilty. When the case went to trial, the District Attorney's Office stipulated that Loupe was not guilty of the charges, and Loupe was acquitted. On September 11, 2014, Loupe filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.

On May 19, 2015, the district court issued a ruling and order on Defendant–Appellee O'Bannon's motion to dismiss, which was based on a claimed entitlement to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court reasoned: “As reprehensible as the allegations of maliciousness may be, if true, ADA O'Bannon was acting within the broad purview of being an advocate for Ascension Parish in ordering the arrest of Plaintiff for filing a false police report, and subsequently pursuing the charges.” The court thus found that O'Bannon was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from civil liability in her individual capacity with respect to all claims against her. The district court therefore granted the motion to dismiss in full.

III

Section 1983 creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Yet despite its broad reach, the Supreme Court “has long recognized that the statute was not meant to effect a radical departure from ordinary tort law and the common-law immunities applicable in tort suits.” Rehberg v. Paulk , ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1502, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012). Sixty-five years ago, in Tenney v. Brandhove , 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), the Court held that § 1983 did not abrogate the absolute immunity enjoyed by legislators for actions taken within the legitimate sphere of legislative authority. Immunities “well grounded in history and reason,” the Court wrote, were not eliminated “by covert inclusion in the general language” of § 1983. Id. at 376, 71 S.Ct. 783. “This interpretation has been reaffirmed by the Court time and again and is now an entrenched feature of our § 1983 jurisprudence.” Rehberg , 132 S.Ct. at 1502 (citing, e.g., Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547, 554–555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (“The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. Accordingly, this Court held ... that the immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not abolished. The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.”)).

In Rehberg, the Supreme Court explained that because Congress intended § 1983 to be understood in light of common law principles, “the Court has looked to the common law for guidance in determining the scope of the immunities available in a § 1983 action.” Id . Yet the Court has made clear that, although the common law is used to determine the scope of the absolute immunity available under § 1983, the federal civil rights statute is not “simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common-law claims, an all-in-one federal claim encompassing the torts of assault, trespass, false arrest, defamation, malicious prosecution, and more.” Id. at 1504. Rather, “[t]he new federal claim created by § 1983 differs in important ways from those pre-existing torts. It is broader in that it reaches constitutional and statutory violations that do not correspond to any previously known tort.” Id. at 1504–1505 (citing Kalina , 522 U.S. at 123, 118 S.Ct. 502 ). “But it is narrower in that it applies only to tortfeasors who act under color of state law.” Id. at 1505 (citing Briscoe v. LaHue , 460 U.S. 325, 329, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) ). Section 1983 “ha[s] no precise counterpart in state law ... [I]t is the purest coincidence when state statutes or the common law provide for equivalent remedies; any analogies to those causes of action are bound to be imperfect.” Id . (citing Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 272, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “Thus, both the scope of the new tort and the scope of the absolute immunity available in § 1983 actions differ in some respects from the common law.” Id .¹

When determining who is entitled to absolute immunity, the Court has taken what has been termed a “functional approach.” Rehberg , 132 S.Ct. at 1503 (citing Forrester v. White , 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) ; Burns v. Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) ). The Court “consult[s] the common law to identify those governmental functions that were historically viewed as so important and vulnerable to interference by means of litigation that some form of absolute immunity from civil liability was needed to ensure that they are performed ‘with independence and without fear of consequences.’ ” Id . (quoting Pierson , 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 ). Following this approach, the Court has identified the following functions that are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983 : actions taken by legislators within the legitimate scope of legislative authority, Tenney , 341 U.S. at 397, 71 S.Ct. 783; actions taken by judges within the legitimate scope of judicial authority, Pierson , 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 ; the giving of testimony by witnesses at trial, Briscoe , 460 U.S. at 334, 103 S.Ct. 1108 ; and, relevant to this case, actions taken by prosecutors in their role as advocates in the judicial process, Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 430–431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).²

A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity when her actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase...