Lovelace v. Ameriprise Fin.

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Tiwanda Lovelace, Plaintiff, v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., Defendant.

CIVIL No. 23-3386 (DWF/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

July 3, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN W. FRANK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ameriprise Financial's motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 10.) Pro se Plaintiff Tiwanda Lovelace opposes the motion (Doc Nos. 17, 24) and also moves to amend her complaint (Doc. No 26).^[1] For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Ameriprise's motion to dismiss and grants in part and denies in part Lovelace's motion to amend.

BACKGROUND

Lovelace brings this action against her former employer, Ameriprise alleging that Ameriprise discriminated against her and terminated her employment due to her race, color, sex, age, and disability. (Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”).) Lovelace filed a charge with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission that was cross-filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. No. 1-4 at 2.) On February 3, 2023, the EEOC decided to not proceed further and issued Lovelace a notice of right to sue. (Id. at 7.) Lovelace received the notice on February 10. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.) On May 4, 2023, Lovelace filed a complaint in the District of Utah. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 7.) The court dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Id. at 29.) On November 3, 2023, Lovelace filed this action against Ameriprise. (Compl.) Ameriprise now moves to dismiss the action, arguing that the claims are time-barred. (Doc. No. 10.)

Separately, Lovelace moves to amend her complaint and add claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Doc. No. 26.) Ameriprise opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 28.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). A court may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.

In addition, the Court notes that pro se complaints are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Even so, a pro se complaint must allege facts, and not just bare, unsupported, legal conclusions. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

Ameriprise argues that Lovelace's complaint should be dismissed as untimely. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee based on the individual's “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The EEOC enforces Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). Before filing an action under Title VII in federal court, a plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies. Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996). “To exhaust her remedies, a Title VII plaintiff must timely file her charges with the EEOC and receive, from the EEOC, a ‘right to sue' letter.” Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (e).

Once a person receives the right-to-sue letter, they have 90 days to file a lawsuit against their employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). A lawsuit filed after the 90-day window must be dismissed as untimely. Brinkman v. Nasseff Mech. Contractors Inc., 251 F.Supp.3d 1266, 1271 (D. Minn. 2017). The fact that a lawsuit was timely filed “based on the same EEOC charge of discrimination” but then dismissed without prejudice “does not toll the 90-day statute of limitations.” Strickland v. Sun Country Airlines, No. 17-cv-5072, 2018 WL 7050675, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 235647 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2019). “A dismissal without prejudice does not toll a statute of limitation” because when a court dismisses an action without prejudice, “it is as if no suit had ever been filed.” Garfield v. J.C. Nichols Real Est., 57 F.3d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1995).

Lovelace received the notice of right to sue on February 10, 2023, so she had until May 11, 2023, to file an action. Her action in the District of Utah did not toll the statute of limitations, as the case was dismissed without prejudice. Because Lovelace filed this action after the May 11 deadline, the action is untimely.

Lovelace argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled for two reasons. First, she asserts that Ameriprise misrepresented facts and deceived the court when arguing that the court in the District of Utah lacked personal jurisdiction. And second, Lovelace argues that Ameriprise's discrimination during her employment and conduct throughout litigation has caused her extreme emotional and financial harm that has made it nearly impossible for her to litigate this matter.

As to Lovelace's first argument, the Court will not review the decision of the court in the Utah action. Arguments related to that court's decision do not justify equitable tolling here. Lovelace has also not demonstrated an extraordinary circumstance that would warrant equitable tolling in this case. General assertions about mental and physical health are usually not enough to justify equitable tolling. See Strickland, 2018 WL 7050675, at *4 (“Though the Court is sympathetic to Strickland's situation, a person cannot typically invoke the equitable tolling doctrine based on a claim that poor health prevented her from pursuing her lawsuit.”). The Court does not find a basis to equitably toll the statute of limitations here.

In addition, Lovelace asserts a claim of sex discrimination in her complaint. In order to pursue a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and to do so a plaintiff's charge must “be sufficient to give the employer notice of the subject matter of the charge and identify generally the basis for a claim.” Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 697 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Administrative complaints are interpreted liberally. Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988). “The allegations in a subsequently filed lawsuit must relate to the same conduct and individuals as charged with the EEOC; put another way, the civil claim must grow out of or be reasonably related to the administrative charge.” Catlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 123 F.Supp.3d 1123, 1133 (D. Minn. 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Because Lovelace did not assert any facts related to sex discrimination in her charge with the EEOC, the Court dismisses this claim for failure to exhaust remedies.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Lovelace's claims against Ameriprise under Title VII related to age, race, and disability discrimination, harassment, and retaliation are time barred and her claim of sex discrimination is dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies.

II. Motion to Amend

Lovelace also moves to amend her complaint to add claims under the FMLA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.^[2] Because more than 21 days have passed since Ameriprise served its motion to dismiss, Lovelace can only amend her pleadings “with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The Court may deny a motion to amend when there is undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment. Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir.2008).

Ameriprise argues that the Court should deny Lovelace's motion to amend because Lovelace fails to allege facts to support plausible claims under the FMLA or § 1981.^[3]

A. Section 1981 Claims

Lovelace moves to amend her Complaint to add claims of race discrimination and retaliation under § 1981. (See Doc. No. 27-4 (“Am. Compl.”).) Section 1981 provides that all persons have the right to “the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b). To bring a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff “must identify injuries flowing from a racially motivated breach of their own contractual relationship.” Domino's Pizza v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 480 (2006).

1. Race Discrimination

“A plaintiff may prove unlawful racial discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Lucke v. Solsvig, 912 F.3d 1084, 1087 (8th Cir. 2019). Lovelace's allegations relate only to circumstantial evidence of discrimination so Lovelace must proceed under the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Lucke, 912 F.3d at 1087-88 (noting that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is applied for § 1981 claims).

To establish a prima facie case, Lovelace must show (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) she met Ameriprise's legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination (“for example,...