Loves Express Trucking LLC v. Cent. Transp., LLC

LOVES EXPRESS TRUCKING LLC, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL TRANSPORT, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 14-14453

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

August 26, 2016

Paul D. Borman United States District Judge

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 28)

In this action, Plaintiff Loves Express Trucking LLC seeks money damages for the loss and/or damage to its personal property that occurred while Defendant Central Transport, LLC was transporting the property from Ohio to Illinois. Plaintiff's single claim is brought pursuant to the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 29 U.S.C. § 14706, et seq.

Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff filed a timely response and Defendant then filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 30, 31.) A hearing on this matter was held on Wednesday, August 3, 2016. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a Florida trucking company. (Compl., at ¶ 1.) In November 2013, Plaintiff's truck broke down in Illinois and was towed to the I-70 Truck Center in Effingham, Illinois. (Id., at ¶ 6; Pl.'s Resp., Ex. D, Love Dep., at 14.) The shop manger at the I-70 Truck Center advised Plaintiff's president, Nathaniel Love, that the truck had a hole in the engine block. (Love Dep., at 14.)

To repair the truck, Love purchased a new Detroit 60 Series 14.0 engine ("Engine") from non-party Chicago Truck Parts, Inc. ("Chicago Truck") for the amount of $24,150. (Id., at ¶ 7; Pl's. Resp., Ex. C, Soraghan Dep., at 42.) Chicago Truck did not have the Engine in stock so it purchased the Engine from an Ohio company, Stour II, for $18,000. (Soraghan Dep., at 23; Def.'s Ex. 7, Bill of Lading.) Chicago Truck's former president, Kenny J. Soraghan, testified that he contacted Chicago Truck's exclusive freight broker, non-party Blue Grace, to transport the Engine from Ohio to the I-70 Truck Center in Effingham. (Soraghan Dep., at 63.) Blue Grace, in turn, subcontracted the transport of the Engine to Defendant.

Defendant picked up the Engine in Toledo, Ohio on November 15, 2013 and issued a Bill of Lading acknowledging Defendant's receipt of the Engine. (Ex. 7, Bill of Lading; Pl.'s Ex. A, Andrea Bouchard Dep., at 42.) The Bill of Ladingprovided that the Engine was being shipped from "Stour II," to "I 70 Truck Center" and the "3^rd Party Freight Charges Bill to" Blue Grace. (Id.) The Bill of Lading further provided that it was "Subject to: NMFC 100; CTII 100 Rules Tariff; 49 USC 14706 and 49 CFR 370." (Id.)

The Engine arrived at I-70 Truck Center in a damaged condition. (Love Dep., at 24.) Defendant's representative, Andrea Bouchard, testified that at some point during the shipment a freight handler discovered the Engine was damaged. (Bouchard Dep., at 54-59.) On December 9, 2013, Defendant sent Stour II a "Notice of on Hand Freight" which provided that the Engine was not delivered because of "Potential Dmg." (Pl.'s Ex. B, PGID 466.) Blue Grace also received a copy of this letter. (Id., "CC: Blue Grace Logistics.") The On Hand Notice advised Stour II that it had five days from the date of the letter to relay instructions to Defendant regarding the disposition of the Engine or the Engine would be returned to its original shipping location, and if refused there, Defendant would "auction or dispose the material." (Id.)

Around this same time, Defendant also contacted Blue Grace, who had hired Defendant; Blue Grace requested via email that the Engine be shipped to Chicago Truck. (Bouchard Dep., 65, 70-71; see also Pl.'s Ex. B, 12/16/13, 12/17/13 Emails, Blue Grace representative inquiring if "it is possible to send this freightback to the original manufacturer in Chicago? Please let me know as that is what the customer is asking.") Defendant then created a Receipt of Delivery that incorporated the previous Bill of Lading, included the "pro number" which identified the shipment, and provided that Stour Limited was "Shipper" and that Chicago Truck was consignee of the shipment. (Pl.'s Ex. B, Central Transport Delivery Receipt, PGID 461.¹) Chicago Truck received the Engine on December 19, 2013 and an employee signed the Receipt of Delivery. (Id., Bouchard Dep., at 72; Love Dep., at 47-48.)

Soraghan attempted to speak with Defendant regarding the damaged Engine just once on the phone. Soraghan explained:

I called their claims hotline and they asked me for my Central Transport account number. When I couldn't provide one - because we don't have an account through them; we only use logistics brokers - they told me that they can't do anything. I need to go through my logistics broker.

(Soraghan Dep., at 60-61.) Thereafter, Soraghan only corresponded with Blue Grace regarding the Engine. (Id., at 61.) Soraghan testified that Blue Grace represented to him that it and Defendant were disputing who was responsible: Soraghan described it as a "blame game." (Id. at 33.) Soraghan further testifiedthat Blue Grace sent him Defendant's claim form and advised him to complete the form. (Id.) Soraghan testified that because he could not determine the price estimate for fixing the Engine, he did not complete the form or submit anything to Defendant or Blue Grace. (Id.) It is undisputed that Defendant never received a written claim for damages regarding the Engine.

During this time period, late November 2013 and through December 2013, Love repeatedly called and emailed Soraghan regarding the status of the damage claim and sought a refund for the Engine. (Love Dep., at 43-44.) Soraghan admitted he was "very much avoiding" Love, and did not answer the bulk of Love's calls or emails during this time. (Soraghan Dep., at 59.) Soraghan and Plaintiff did speak on December 16, 2013, and Soraghan advised Love that Defendant was responsible for the damage and that he had submitted the damage claim to Defendant. (Love Dep., at 49.) Soraghan also emailed Love the "completed" claim form at some point during December 2013 to bolster his claim that he was working on the issue. (Id., at 59, 65; Soraghan Dep., at 59.) Around this time, Love also received a copy of the Bill of Lading. (Id., at 71.) On December 24, 2013, Soraghan advised Plaintiff that he had received the damaged Engine and that he was going to fix it and get the Engine back to Love afterChristmas and "not to worry."² (Love Dep., at 25, 31, 51.) This was their last conversation.

Despite his representations to Love, Soraghan never submitted the damage claim to Blue Grace or Defendant. In December 2013, Chicago Truck was struggling financially and Soraghan did not have money to fix the Engine. (Soraghan Dep., at 47-48.) Soraghan never tracked down replacement parts and never determined an estimated cost to fix the Engine. After closing for the Christmas holiday, Soraghan never reopened Chicago Truck. (Id., at 48-49.) In January 2014, Soraghan sold the Engine for $16,000, but did not give any of the proceeds of the sale to Love. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed suit against Chicago Truck in Illinois Circuit Court. (Love Dep., at 62.) On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff received a default judgment against Chicago Truck in the amount of $57,168.85, this amount included "compensatory damages for the contractual amount of $24,150.00." (Def.'s Ex. 8, Default Judgment.) Love could not collect on his judgment, however, because Chicago Truck was out of business. (Love Dep., at 62.)

On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant in Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. In its original complaint, Plaintiff asserted a third party beneficiary claim based upon a breach of contract between Defendant and Chicago Truck. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant was served with the complaint on October 7, 2014 and thereafter removed the action to United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois (case no. 1:14-cv-08344) claiming that Plaintiff's claim was completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. On November 7, 2014, Defendant's motion to transfer venue was granted and the case was transferred to this Court.

On December 11, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and argued that Plaintiff's claim was preempted by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. (ECF No. 7.) In lieu of filing a response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a request to amend its complaint to assert a claim pursuant to the Carmack Amendment. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff's request to amend was granted and it filed its Amended Complaint on May 5, 2015. (ECF No. 17.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant has moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "Summary judgment is proper where 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment asa matter of law.'" Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 131 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). "There is no genuine issue for trial where the record 'taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.'" Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 471 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). "Of course, [the moving party] always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In making this evaluation, however, the court must always examine the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 332 (6th Cir. 2008).

If this burden is met by the moving party, the non-moving party's failure to make a showing that is "sufficient to establish the...