Lowe v. Lancaster Cnty. Children & Youth Soc. Servs.

MELANIE LOWE and Z.C., A MINOR,BY AND THROUGH HIS MOTHER, MELANIE LOWE, Plaintiffs, v. LANCASTER COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SOCIAL SERVICES;KAITLIN GEISS; KAREN GARBER; and JOHN DOE, Defendants.

No. 5:20-cv-1413

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 8, 2020

OPINION

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5 - Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Melanie Lowe on behalf of herself and her minor son, Z.C., for the alleged constitutional violations Defendant Lancaster County Child and Youth Social Services ("LCCYS") committed in removing Z.C. from his mother's care. Defendants Kaitlin Geiss, Karen Garber, and John Doe are social workers employed by LCCYS. The named Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted, but Plaintiffs are given leave to amend.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The Complaint alleges as follows:

Lowe is the mother and primary caregiver of five minor children, including Z.C., who was ten years of age at the time of the events giving rise to this action. See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16, ECF No. 1. At that time, Z.C. spent alternate weekends with his father, James F. Campbell, in Lancaster County. Id. ¶ 17.

On or about August 5, 2018, when Z.C. was staying with his father, Campbell called the police to report that Z.C. molested his nine-year-old daughter and that he "want[ed Z.C.] out of his house." Id. ¶¶ 18-20. The police reported the incident to LCCYS, and both responded to Campbell's house. Id. Lowe also responded, but was prevented from taking custody of, or talking to, Z.C. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. LCCYS, after having been made aware that Lowe was the primary caregiver and that Z.C. was merely visiting his father's house, took custody of Z.C. Id. ¶ 23.

Lowe repeatedly contacted LCCYS to inquire about her son's wellbeing, but LCCYS did not answer or return any of her telephone calls. Id. ¶ 24. LCCYS did not notify Lowe of the emergency hearing in the Juvenile Court of Lancaster County on August 6, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 23, 24. At this hearing, the court granted temporary custody of Z.C. to LCCYS. Id. ¶ 24.

On August 8, 2018, Lowe and Campbell attended a shelter care hearing, during which LCCYS falsely represented to the court that Z.C. was living with his father, not his mother, and that Z.C. had informed his mother of a prior incident of sexual abuse about which she had not informed Campbell or the authorities. Id. ¶ 27. After the hearing, the court granted legal and physical custody of Z.C. to LCCYS pending a disposition hearing on October 22, 2018. Id. ¶ 27. Z.C. was thereafter moved to Bethany Children's Home, which was fifty miles away from Lowe's home. Id. ¶ 28. LCCYS permanency caseworker, Defendant Geiss, and permanency supervisor, Defendant Garber, initiated an investigation of Lowe. Id. ¶ 31.

On or about August 27, 2018, Z.C.'s aunt, Tiffany Zellers, delivered a "kinship care" application to Geiss, in an effort to take custody of Z.C.; however, Geiss never responded to the application. Id. ¶ 33. LCCYS again misrepresented facts to the court at an adjudicatory hearingin the Lancaster County Juvenile Court held on August 27, 2018, including the fact that Ms. Zeller's submitted an application for "kinship care." Id. ¶ 33.

The investigation determined that the allegations were unfounded. Id. ¶¶ 30, 34. On September 26, 2018, Garber informed Lowe of the same; however, LCCYS did not file a petition to withdraw its petition for temporary custody of Z.C. until October 9, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. On October 10, 2018, Z.C. was returned to the custody of Lowe, fourteen days after the investigation was concluded. Id. ¶ 36. In total, Z.C. was separated from his mother for sixty-six days. Id. ¶ 48.

LCCYS asked Chester County Children and Youth Social Services to open a case for Lowe and continue monitoring her and her family. Id. ¶ 37. Chester County Children and Youth Social Services closed the case on Lowe and her family on December 28, 2018. Id. ¶ 39.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs commenced this action on March 13, 2020. The Complaint asserts: (1) all Defendants violated Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights by removing Z.C. from his mother's custody and retaining custody without reasonable suspicion of abuse or imminent danger of abuse; (2) LCCYS, Geiss, and Garber violated Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights by failing to advise Lowe of the same and, also, by putting false information in the petition filed with the court seeking custody of Z.C. and by failing to include relevant exculpatory and explanatory information in the petition thereby denying Lowe the right to an informal ruling by the court; and (3) LCCYS violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by developing and maintaining policies or customs of removing children from their natural families and placing them in institutions, as well as failing to properly supervise and train caseworkers. See Compl. ¶¶ 46-47, 52, 56-58 (Monell claim).

LCCYS, Geiss, and Garber filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs failed to assert a cause of action upon which relief may be granted and, additionally, that Defendants Geiss and Garber are entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity. The Motion has been fully briefed. To date, Defendant John Doe has not been identified or served with the Complaint.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, this Court must "accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if "the '[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'" has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. ("[W]hether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

B. Section 1983 Claims for Civil Rights Violations

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege:

1. violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States;¹ and

2. that the violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To determine if a person is "acting under color of state law" (a state actor), the court looks at whether there is "such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'" Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).

A "defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability [under § 1983] cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior." See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). "[B]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

C. Due Process Claims

"The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). The Due Process Clause "prohibits the government from interfering in familial relationships unless the government adheres to the requirements of procedural and substantive due process." Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125.

1. Substantive Due Process

To state a claim for a violation of substantive due process rights, a plaintiff must show:

1. the interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause; and

2. "the government's deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience."

Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2018). As to the first element, there is a "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). As to the second element, the defendant's conduct "must exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed 'shocks the conscience.'" Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the shocks-the-conscious standard to substantive due process claims against a child welfare agency). In cases against a child welfare agency or its workers, that "standard is met only if they lacked 'reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that [the minor had] been abused or [was] in imminent danger of abuse' at the time of the challenged action." See A.J. v. Lancaster Cty., No. 20-1154, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29451, at *3 (3d Cir. Sep. 16, 2020) (quoting Mulholland v. Gov't Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 241 (3d Cir. 2013)). "'[O]nly the most egregious official conduct' violates substantive due process." J.R. v. Lehigh Cty., 534 F. App'x...