Loya v. Hickory Trail Hosp., L.P.

673 S.W.3d 1

Marvella LOYA, Appellant

v.HICKORY TRAIL HOSPITAL, L.P., Appellee

No. 05-20-00378-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Opinion Filed November 30, 2022

Amos Dwayne Pettis, Chamblee Ryan, P.C., Dallas, Daniel Lee Gus, Jennifer Graf, Gus & Gilbert, PC, Waxahachie, for Appellant.

Caleb Archer, Russell W. Schell, Casey C. Campbell, Schell Cooley Campbell Ryan LLP, Addison, for Appellee.

Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Goldstein

In thirteen issues, appellant Marvella Loya appeals the trial court's final summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Hickory Trail Hospital, L.P. (Hickory). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

The parties were previously before this Court on appeal from the denial of Hickory's motion to dismiss pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). See Hickory Trail Hosp., L.P. v. Loya , No. 05-16-00453-CV, 2016 WL 7376559 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ( Hickory I ). Because the parties are familiar with the facts and we recited them in Hickory I , we will not recite them at length here except as necessary for context and the disposition of this appeal.

On February 25, 2013, Loya went to an inpatient mental-health facility operated by Hickory seeking dosage advice and related counseling services regarding potential side effects of medication prescribed by her personal physician to treat depression. Loya completed intake paperwork and was assessed by Angela Marquart, an LPC-Intern.¹ Thereafter, Loya alleges, Hickory admitted her without her consent, and she was not permitted to leave the facility. Marquart proceeded to fill out and file a temporary application for court-ordered mental-health services that included a "Physician's Certificate of Medical Examination for Mental Illness." Dr. Rupinder Bhatia signed the certificate, which included a statement that he evaluated and examined Loya.

Based upon the application, the mental-health court issued an order detaining Loya at Hickory's facility pending a probable cause hearing. On February 28, 2013, at the probable cause hearing, the mental-health court found that Loya did not present a substantial risk of serious harm to herself and ordered her immediate release. Loya was returned to the facility and was released "against medical advice" several hours later.

Loya sued Hickory for false imprisonment and unconscionable conduct under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), alleging her detention was unlawful.

On remand after Hickory I , the parties continued with litigation and pre-trial proceedings. Hickory filed three motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted then vacated the judgment on the first two summary-judgment motions. Hickory then filed its third motion for summary judgment, which incorporated the grounds asserted in the first two motions and added additional grounds. The trial court granted the third motion in a final summary judgment, in which the court acknowledged that the motion encompassed Hickory's previous motions and stated that it considered Loya's response and her responses to the previous summary-judgment motions. The final summary judgment dismissed all of Loya's claims and causes of action against Hickory with prejudice. This appeal followed.²

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

We review summary judgments de novo. De La Cruz v. Kailer , 526 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. denied). When, as here, the trial court does not specify the basis for its ruling, a summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought is meritorious. Id.

After adequate time for discovery, a party may move for no-evidence summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must produce summary-judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. Id. We review no-evidence summary judgments under the same legal-sufficiency standard as directed verdicts. De La Cruz , 526 S.W.3d at 592. Under that standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulge all inferences in the nonmovant's favor, credit evidence that a reasonable jury could credit, and disregard contrary evidence and inferences unless a reasonable jury could not. Id. We sustain a no-evidence challenge when "(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact." Id.

Under the traditional summary-judgment standard, the movant has the burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Vince Poscente Int'l, Inc. v. Compass Bank , 460 S.W.3d 211, 213–14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). In deciding whether there is a disputed fact issue precluding summary judgment, we take evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant; we resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Id. at 214. Once the movant establishes its right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment. Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmovant produces more than a scintilla of probative evidence regarding the challenged element. Ward v. Stanford , 443 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). A defendant is entitled to traditional summary judgment if it conclusively disproves at least one essential element of the plaintiff's claim or conclusively establishes every element of an affirmative defense. Id.

When an appeal involves review of both traditional and no-evidence grounds challenging the same element, we consider the no-evidence challenge first because evidence that defeats the no-evidence challenge will defeat the traditional challenge as well. See Arredondo v. Techserv Consulting & Training, Ltd. , 567 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds , 612 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. 2020). If, however, the traditional motion challenges a cause of action on a ground independent of the elements of the cause of action, we consider that issue first because a review of the evidence is unnecessary if the claim is barred as a matter of law. Id.

II. ANALYSIS

Hickory asserted thirteen grounds for summary judgment in its three motions. Although Loya asserts thirteen issues on appeal,³ there is not a one-to-one correlation between her issues and Hickory's summary-judgment grounds. The following is a list of Hickory's asserted grounds for summary judgment, each followed in parentheses by the issue in which Loya addresses it:

(1) There was no evidence of willful detention, the first element of false imprisonment (no enumerated issue, but discussed in the body of Loya's brief);

(2) There was no evidence of lack of consent, the second element of false imprisonment (no enumerated issue, but discussed in the body of Loya's brief);

(3) There was no evidence of lack of authority or justification, the third element of false imprisonment (Issues 1–7); (4) There was no evidence of bad faith or unreasonable acts to overcome the presumption of Hickory's immunity under Section 571.019 of the Texas Mental Health Code (TMHC) (Issue 11);

(5) The TMLA bars Loya's false-imprisonment claim because it was improperly pleaded (Issue 8);

(6) The TMLA bars Loya's DTPA claim because it was improperly pleaded (Issue 8);

(7) Section 74.004 of the TMLA bars Loya's DTPA claim (Issue 9);

(8) Section 17.49 of the DTPA bars Loya's DTPA claim (Issue 10);

(9) Hickory conclusively negated lack of authority, the third element of false imprisonment, by complying with Chapter 572 of the TMHC (Issues 1–7);

(10) Hickory conclusively negated causation between its alleged breach and Loya's alleged damages (Issue 12);

(11) Hickory conclusively established the judicial-proceedings privilege, partially barring both of Loya's claims (Issue 13);

(12) Hickory conclusively negated lack of authority, the third element of false imprisonment, by complying with the order of protective custody (Issues 1–7); and

(13) Hickory conclusively established its immunity under Section 571.019 of the TMHC (Issue 11).

Because Issues 8–10 address traditional summary-judgment grounds (i.e., grounds 5–8 above) that are independent of the elements of any claim or defense, we will discuss them first. See Arredondo , 567 S.W.3d at 390. Subsection (A) will address whether Loya's DTPA claim is barred as a matter of law; Subsection (B) will address whether Loya's false-imprisonment claim is barred as a matter of law. We will then address the no-evidence challenge to the elements of Loya's false-imprisonment claim (grounds 1–3), with the understanding that some evidence on any element will defeat a corresponding traditional ground as well (i.e., grounds 9 & 12). See id. Thus, Subsection (C) will address Issues 1–7, which focus largely on the lack-of-authority element of false imprisonment. Next, in Subsection (D), we will address Issue 12 (ground 10), whether Hickory conclusively negated causation. Finally, we will discuss Hickory's affirmative defenses of immunity and the judicial-proceedings privilege. Subsection (E) will address Issue 11 (grounds 4 & 13), and Subsection (F) will address Issue 13 (ground 11).

A. Whether the TMLA Bars Loya's DTPA Claim as a Matter of Law (Issues 9-10)

Loya asserted a DTPA claim alleging that...