Loyd v. State

379 So.3d 1080

Markeith D. LOYD, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. SC2022-0378

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 16, 2023

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Leticia J. Marques, Judge, Case No. 482017CF000826000AOX

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, and Robert Jackson Pearce, III, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant

PER CURIAM.

Markeith Demangzlo Loyd was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, carjacking with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He appeals these convictions and his death sentence for the first-degree murder.¹ We affirm all convictions and his death sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Guilt Phase

Early on January 9, 2017, Loyd—on the run for the murders of his girlfriend, Sade Dixon, and their unborn baby²—entered a Walmart where a witness familiar with Loyd and his previously committed murders spotted Loyd in the checkout line wearing a bulletproof vest. This witness immediately exited the store and alerted a uniformed police officer that Loyd was inside. The officer was Lieutenant Debra Clayton. Soon after, Lieutenant Clayton confronted Loyd as he exited the store into the parking lot. Lieutenant Clayton commanded that he "get on the ground." Loyd responded by rushing behind a pillar and then hastily reemerged with his gun drawn. Loyd fired at Lieutenant Clayton, and she returned fire. Lieutenant Clayton was shot and fell to the ground. Loyd then moved towards Lieutenant Clayton until he stood over her and delivered a fatal shot into her neck.

Loyd then fled the Walmart parking lot in his vehicle. After dispatch radioed the news of Lieutenant Clayton’s shooting, Captain Joseph Carter pursued Loyd into the parking lot of an apartment complex. As Captain Carter emerged from his vehicle, Loyd shot at him twice, but hit only his hubcap. Captain Carter then maneuvered his vehicle to block in Loyd’s vehicle, and Loyd took off running. Loyd then approached a resident of the apartment complex, Antwyne Thomas, and pointed his gun at Thomas’s face. Loyd demanded that Thomas hand over his car keys. Frightened, Thomas threw his keys into the air and ran into his apartment.

Loyd evaded arrest until law enforcement officers found him inside a house on January 17, 2017. At the scene of the arrest, law enforcement recovered a bullet-proof vest, the gun used to murder Sade Dixon, her unborn child, and Lieutenant Clayton, and the gun used in the attempted murder of Captain Carter.

At trial, the State proved its case largely through eyewitness testimony. In his defense, Loyd offered alternative theories of self-defense and insanity. Loyd testified about his upbringing and history of mental health issues. He then presented his version of the Walmart shooting and confrontation with Captain Carter. Finally, a clinical and forensic psychologist testified that Loyd met the legal definition of insanity at the time of the charged offenses.

On rebuttal, the State offered Loyd’s Facebook posts that stressed Loyd’s critical and hateful views on race and the police. The Facebook posts revealed that Loyd believes there is tension between the police and members of his race, and that physical violence against the police is justified. The State then called two experts to rebut Loyd’s assertion that he was insane at the time of the charged offenses.

The jury found Loyd guilty as charged as to each of the five counts of the indictment.

Penalty Phase

During the penalty phase, the State relied on evidence from the guilt phase and presented new evidence about Loyd’s history of criminal convictions. The State also presented victim impact evidence through four witnesses and a slide presentation with photographs of Lieutenant Clayton.

After the State rested, the defense called Loyd’s friends and family members to discuss Loyd’s generosity and devotion to family. Then the defense presented evidence of injuries Loyd sustained during his arrest. Finally, the defense called four experts to opine on Loyd’s mental condition. The State, on rebuttal, called a neuroradiologist who questioned the observations of one of Loyd’s experts.

The jury heard closing arguments and, after deliberation, returned with a unanimous recommendation for death. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of all the proposed aggravating factors.

Spencer³ Hearing & Sentencing

After holding a Spencer hearing and considering all of the testimony and evidence, the trial court sentenced Loyd to death,⁴ finding three aggravators: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony and on felony probation when the first-degree murder was committed (slight weight); (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (great weight); and (3) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest/the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or enforcement of laws/the victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of her official duties (merged) (great weight). Regarding the statutory age mitigator, the court found that the defendant did prove the defendant’s age at the time of the crime (forty-one years old) but gave the mitigator no weight. The court found five nonstatutory mitigators: the defendant’s psychological and psychiatric mitigators (moderate weight); the defendant’s childhood trauma (moderate weight); the defendant’s trauma as an adult (some weight); the trauma of racism (minimal weight); and circumstances related to defendant’s offer to surrender and his arrest (minimal weight).

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Loyd raises thirteen challenges to his convictions and death sentence. No challenge warrants reversal. The State raises one challenge on cross-appeal, which is moot based on this decision. We will address the claims in the order presented.

Loyd’s Challenges

Issue I: Venire Members Removed for Cause. Before voir dire, the court, in response to a motion in limine filed by the State, excluded during the guilt phase and limited during the penalty phase any evidence of law enforcement’s use of force during Loyd’s arrest. Then, during voir dire, the trial judge granted three of the State’s cause challenges to prospective jurors who were "in possession of information that ha[d] been ruled inadmissible," referring to the evidence of the use of force. The court mentioned that it was aware of a "long line of cases" establishing that it is reversible error to deny cause challenges to prospective jurors who know of facts that the court excluded.

Loyd argues that this was error, relying on Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 2003), and Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). According to Loyd, these cases hold that there is no basis to strike a prospective juror for cause if the prospective juror affirms that he or she could set aside any bias and render a verdict impartially. Because two of the excluded venire members affirmed that they could do so here and Loyd was precluded from asking the third whether he could do so, Loyd believes that the trial court manifestly erred by striking them for cause. The State responds that Ault and Gray are not on point and that the trial court properly excluded the prospective jurors. We agree with the State; the trial court did not err by excluding these potential jurors.

[1–3] We defer to a trial judge’s decision to exclude a prospective juror. Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 946 (Fla. 2007). Indeed, we will overturn a trial court’s ruling on a cause challenge only for manifest error, which is tantamount to an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the judge adopts a view that no other reasonable person would take. Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. 2001).

[4–6] A reasonable judge should excuse a prospective juror for cause "if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the [prospective] juror possesses an impartial state of mind." Ault, 866 So. 2d at 683. "[E]xposure to inadmissible and prejudicial information through pretrial publicity is a classic example of a valid ground for a cause challenge." Hamdeh v. State, 762 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The trial court’s decision to exclude the three prospective jurors here fits within this standard. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Loyd’s reliance on Ault and Gray is misplaced. These cases address the rules for excluding a juror who has a preformed belief about the death penalty. In Gray, the trial court removed a potential juror for cause despite her statement that she could ultimately impose the death sentence. 481 U.S. at 654, 107 S.Ct. 2045. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred, and this error is not subject to a harmless error analysis. Id. at 659, 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045. Ault addressed the same issue and relied on Gray to conclude that "it is reversible error to exclude for cause a juror who can follow the instructions and oath in regard to the death penalty." Ault, 866 So. 2d at 686. The situation in Gray and Ault is not present here—the trial court did not excuse the jurors for their views on the death penalty. Instead, the trial court excused the jurors for their knowledge of inadmissible information.

For these reasons, we deny this claim.

[7] Issue II: Jury Instruction on Insanity. Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 3.6(a) states: "[c]lear and convincing evidence is evidence that is...