Lucas v. U.S.

305 A.3d 774

Antonio LUCAS, Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 22-CM-0878

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued September 21, 2023

Decided December 7, 2023

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2020-CMD-008561), (Hon. Robert I. Richter, Hon. Frederick H. Weisberg, Trial Judges)

Timothy Cone, Esq., New York, NY, for appellant.

Lauren Winer, Assistant United States Attorney, for appellee. Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman, Courtney Scholz, Anthony Cocuzza, and Valerie Tsesarenko, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Beckwith, AliKhan, and Shanker, Associate Judges.

AliKhan, Associate Judge:

Antonio Lucas robbed Xavier Scott in Maryland, boarded a Metro train, and traveled into the District of Columbia. Less than thirty minutes later, Mr. Lucas was arrested in the District with Mr. Scott’s property in his possession. We consider whether Mr. Lucas was properly convicted of receiving stolen property ("RSP") under D.C. Code § 22-3232. We hold that Mr. Lucas "possess[ed]" stolen property in the District within the meaning of the statute, and therefore affirm.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

The following facts are undisputed on appeal. On November 7, 2020, at approximately 7:55 p.m., Antonio Lucas and Rasheed Ashton robbed Xavier Scott outside the Addison Road Metro station in Maryland. Mr. Scott was waiting at a bus stop when Mr. Lucas and Mr. Ashton approached him. Mr. Lucas instructed Mr. Scott, "empty out your pockets. I got that thing on me." Mr. Scott understood "that thing" to be a gun and told Mr. Lucas to take what he needed. Mr. Ashton took Mr. Scott’s headphones, wallet, cell phone, and jacket. When Mr. Scott tried to stand up, Mr. Lucas struck Mr. Scott in the face and asked him whether he wanted to get shot. Mr. Lucas and Mr. Ashton then entered the Addison Road Metro station, where they were caught on video boarding a District-bound train. In the video footage, Mr. Lucas is carrying a black jacket, which Mr. Scott later identified as his.

After the robbery, Mr. Scott entered the Metro and asked the station manager to call the police. Around 8:20 p.m. at the L’Enfant Plaza Metro station in the District, Sergeant Anthony Weaver detained two individuals who matched Mr. Scott’s description of the individuals who had robbed him. Detective Brett Chavis drove Mr. Scott from Addison Road to L’Enfant Plaza, and Mr. Scott identified Mr. Lucas and Mr. Ashton as the men who had robbed him. Police found Mr. Scott’s credit cards and cell phone in Mr. Lucas’s pocket, and Mr. Lucas had Mr. Scott’s black jacket draped over his arm.

Mr. Lucas was charged with one count of RSP in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3232. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the alleged offense took place in Maryland, not the District. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Section 22-3232 does not require that the property have been stolen in the District. Instead, the court explained that Mr. Lucas could be convicted under the statute if the government proved that he possessed the stolen property in the District and knew or should have known that the property was stolen.

After a bench trial, the trial court found Mr. Lucas guilty of RSP under Section 22-3232. The court sentenced Mr. Lucas to a 180-day term of incarceration, with all but thirty days suspended, followed by a one-year term of supervised probation, and ordered him to make a $50 payment to the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Fund. Mr. Lucas timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

[1] This case presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Reese v. Newman, 131 A.3d 880, 884 (D.C. 2016). To the extent that the question implicates the trial court’s subject-matter or territorial jurisdiction, we also review such questions de novo. Dobyns v. United States, 30 A.3d 155, 157 (D.C. 2011); Dyson v. United States, 848 A.2d 603, 609 (D.C. 2004).

III. Discussion

Mr. Lucas was convicted of violating D.C. Code § 22-3232, an offense entitled "Receiving Stolen Property." A person commits the offense of RSP if that person "buys, receives, possesses, or obtains control of stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe that the property was stolen." D.C. Code § 22-3232(a). The central issue before us is whether Mr. Lucas "possess[ed]" stolen property in the District within the meaning of the statute.

The parties offer competing readings of Section 22-3232. Mr. Lucas argues that "possesses" means "takes possession"—and because he took possession of Mr. Scott’s property in Maryland, he committed no offense in the District. The govern- ment maintains that "possesses" refers to the act of being in possession of stolen property, regardless of where that possession began. Statutory text, legislative history, and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions convince us that "possesses," in this context, is not limited to the moment of taking possession but includes the entire period during which the defendant is in possession of the stolen property. Mr. Lucas indisputably possessed Mr. Scott’s property in the District while knowing that it was stolen, and he therefore committed the offense of RSP under Section 22-3232.

A. Statutory Text and Context

[2] When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, "[o]ur analysis starts with the plain language of the statute" and assumes "‘that the intent of the lawmaker[s] is to be found in the language that [they] used.’" Reese, 131 A.3d at 884 (quoting Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. 2010)). The plain language of Section 22-3232 indicates that "possesses" refers to the act of being in possession of stolen property rather than the momentary act of taking possession of the property.

[3] The D.C. Code does not define "possesses." See D.C. Code §§ 22-1801, 1802 (defining terms used in Title 22, but not defining "possesses"). When the statute does not define the term in question, "it is appropriate for us to look to dictionary definitions to determine [its] ordinary meaning." Tippett, 10 A.3d at 1127; see Wynn v. United States, 80 A.3d 211, 218 (D.C. 2013) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979))). Black’s Law Dictionary defines "possess" as "[t]o have in one’s actual control; to have possession of." Possess, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The Oxford English Dictionary defines "possess," for legal purposes, as "[t]o have possession of, as distinct from ownership." Possess, Oxford English Dictionary 171, 2(b) (2d ed. 1989). Both definitions suggest that the ordinary meaning of "possesses" is to have possession, rather than to take possession. Reese, 131 A.3d at 884 (quoting Tippett, 10 A.3d at 1126). The term had the same meaning when the modern RSP statute was enacted.¹ See Possess, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (defining "possess," in relevant part, as "to have in one’s actual and physical control … to have and hold as property"); see also Tilley v. United States, 238 A.3d 961, 970 (D.C. 2020) (looking to definition of term at the time of the statute’s enactment).

[4] Mr. Lucas resists the ordinary meaning, invoking the principle of noscitur a sociis—the idea that "a word [or phrase] is known by the company it keeps." Burke v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C., 26 A.3d 292, 302 n.8 (D.C. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961)). Because the other three acts that Section 22-3232 prohibits—"buys, receives … or obtains control"—refer to the moment of acquisition, he argues that "possesses" should similarly be read to mean "takes possession." D.C. Code § 22-3232(a). But noscitur a sociis is "not an inescapable rule," Burke, 26 A.3d at 302 n.8 (quoting Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579), and need not be applied where, as here, a plain-meaning approach resolves the meaning of statutory language, see Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603-04, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010) (declining to apply noscitur a sociis where the statutory term at issue was unambiguous); Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 520, 43 S.Ct. 428, 67 L.Ed. 778 (1923) (declining to apply noscitur a sociis where the terms at issue were not "of obscure or doubtful meaning"); see also Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 564, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen words have a clear definition, and all other contextual clues support that meaning, the canons cannot properly defeat [the lawmakers’] decision to draft broad legislation."). We therefore decline to apply noscitur a sociis here.

[5, 6] Looking to statutory context, Mr. Lucas argues that the statute’s title, "Receiving Stolen Property," confirms that the statute criminalizes only the act of taking possession of stolen property. D.C. Code § 22-3232. But "titles are of limited utility when weighed against plain statutory language," Facebook, Inc. v. Wint, 199 A.3d 625, 629 (D.C. 2019). A statute’s title "may be a ‘useful aid in resolving an ambiguity,’" but it "cannot limit the plain meaning of the text." Mitchell v. United States, 64 A.3d 154, 156 (D.C. 2013) (first quoting F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959); then quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998)). Here, the statutory text strongly suggests that "possesses" refers to the act of being in possession. The statute’s title does not override that plain meaning. Cf. Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 5.301 (5th ed. 2021) (referring, in a comment to the relevant jury...