Lucero v. Holland

ALBERT ANDREW LUCERO, Petitioner, v. KIM HOLLAND, Warden, Respondent.

Case No. 1:10-cv-01714-AWI-SKO-HC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 10, 2014

ORDER SUBSTITUTING WARDEN KIM HOLLAND AS RESPONDENT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S STATE LAW CLAIMS, DENY THE FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 19), DENY PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, DIRECT THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT, AND DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE: THIRTY (30) DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. Pending before the Court is the first amended petition, which was filed on September 29, 2011. Respondent filed an answer on March 7, 2012, and Petitioner filed a traverse on June 15, 2012.

I. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, theeffective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).

The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Stanislaus (SCSC), located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(b), 2254(a), 2241(a), (d). Further, Petitioner claims that in the course of the proceedings resulting in his conviction, he suffered violations of his constitutional rights. The Court concludes it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and 2241(c)(3), which authorize a district court to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. - , -, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam).

An answer was filed on behalf of Respondent Mike McDonald, who, pursuant to the judgment, had custody of Petitioner at the High Desert State Prison, his institution of confinement when the initial petition and FAP were filed. (Docs. 19, 37.) Petitioner thus named as a respondent a person who had custody of Petitioner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules). See, Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). The fact that Petitioner was transferred to the California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi (CCIT) after the FAP was filed does not affect this Court's jurisdiction.Jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Smith v. Campbell, 450 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1971)).

Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the person of the Respondent. In view of the fact that the warden at CCIT is Kim Holland, it is ORDERED that Kim Holland, Warden of the California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, be SUBSTITUTED as Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25.¹

II. Procedural and Factual Summary

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). This presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from a stateappellate court's decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). The following statement of facts is taken from the opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District (CCA) in case number F054541, filed on June 24, 2009.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Armando Lopez (A.Lopez), Paul Anthony Lopez, Jr. (P. Lopez), and Albert Andrew Lucero (Lucero) were charged with the premeditated attempted murder (count 1) of Kenneth Lindsay, assault with a deadly weapon (count 2), possession of a shank while in jail or prison (count 3), and participation in a criminal street gang (count 4). The information also alleged that the three committed the offenses charged in counts 1, 2, and 3 for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code FN1 section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), and that the three personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a) ) and personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b) ) in the commission of the offenses charged. The information also alleged that A. Lopez had served a prior prison term and that Lucero had suffered two prior serious felony convictions and had served a prior prison term. The prosecutor ultimately decided not to seek the personal-use enhancement against P. Lopez and Lucero. A fourth man, Timothy McKenzie, was charged, but was acquitted by the jury.

FN1. All further references are to the Penal Code unless noted otherwise.

Following trial, the jury found all three defendants guilty on counts 1, 3, and 4, but acquitted them of assault with a deadly weapon. The jury found true the allegation that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that the three defendants had each personally inflicted great bodily injury. The jury also found that A. Lopez had personally used a weapon (the shank). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations concerning the prior prison terms and prior serious felony convictions.

Lucero was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 30 years to life on count 1 and a consecutive determinate term ofeight years on the remaining counts. P. Lopez was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life on count 1 and a consecutive determinate term of two years on the remaining counts. A. Lopez was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life on count 1 and a determinate term of two years on the remaining counts.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

All three defendants were inmates at Stanislaus County Jail and all were validated members of the Norteño gang. Lindsay, McKenzie, and the three defendants were housed together with other documented members of the Norteno gang FN2 in a 12-man cell. On October 19, 2006, the inmates were removed from their cell for cell maintenance. Four of the inmates, including Lindsay, temporarily were placed together in a holding cell. While in the cell, Lindsay found three balloons of heroin. Lindsay gave one balloon to a cellmate and secreted two of the balloons on his person. Later, Lindsay informed A. Lopez and P. Lopez about the heroin. Heroin is a valuable commodity in jail. Generally, gang members are required to share with other gang members any drugs that are found, not for consumption, but for use in gaining power and control within the jail. Lindsay kept his two balloons instead of passing them on to gang leaders. He began to barter the heroin for commodity items, which violates the gang's code of conduct. Inmates who engage in this behavior face punishment and "removal" by other gang members. Fatal removals involve the use of weapons.

FN2. The defendants are referred to in the record both by their names and by their gang monikers. P. Lopez is sometimes referred to as "Mugsy." A. Lopez is sometimes referred to as "Soldier," and Lucero is sometimes referred to as "Lil Man" or "Manos." McKenzie's moniker is "Scorpizi" or "Scorpion" and Lindsay's moniker is "Psycho" or "Psychs."

Later that evening, after Lindsay took his shower, he was invited to join in a game of cards. Seated at the table were the three defendants and McKenzie. While sitting at the table, Lindsay was hit from behind in the chest. He turned and saw A. Lopez. P. Lopez came to Lindsay's side. At first, Lindsay believed P. Lopez was coming to his aid, but instead P. Lopez punched Lindsay in the face and was grinning. Lindsay was hit from the other side but was notsure who hit him. He tried to grab hold of McKenzie but was unable to stay up. Lindsay fell to the floor. His assailants then kicked and hit him numerous times. Lindsay yelled "man down" in an attempt to summon deputies. P. Lopez told him to "shut up" and "close [his] eyes," a reference Lindsay understood as meaning to die. Lucero kicked him from behind. Lindsay could not say how many times he was kicked or hit or who inflicted what blows. He did not see McKenzie hit or kick him. Lindsay did not see any weapons. After A. Lopez hit him in the chest, Lindsay pushed A. Lopez off of him and A. Lopez scooted to the right and was gone.

Lindsay lost consciousness. As a result of the attack, Lindsay suffered wounds to the back of his head requiring stitches; a number of scratches, including one across his neck; a slice and scrape across his nipple; and a small puncture-like wound on his chest that did not require stitches. There was no mention of the puncture wound or stabbing in the medical reports.

When the deputies arrived at the cell, Lindsay was down and nonresponsive. There was blood on the floor and blood scattered about the cell. None of the inmates in the cell claimed to have seen what happened. The deputies segregated the inmates who had visible signs of trauma. P. Lopez, A. Lopez, and one other inmate were found to have redness, swelling, or cuts on their hands. A. Lopez was wearing a T-shirt that had a sleeve torn off, and blood was found on his boxer shorts. P. Lopez's boxers also had blood on them. There were no marks found on Lucero's hands. After the assault, the heroin was gone.

The next morning, Deputy Teso, a gang specialist

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