Luceus v. Rhode Island

ERIKA LUCEUS v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, et al.

C.A. No. 15-489ML

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

December 13, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Lincoln D. Almond, United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before me for a report and recommendation (28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)) is Defendants State of Rhode Island and Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training's (the "State Defendants") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. (Document No. 31). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (Document No. 37). For the following reasons, I recommend that Defendants' Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as specified herein.

Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on November 17, 2015 by filing a two-count Complaint against the State Defendants alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Document No. 1). In Count I, Plaintiff alleged that the State Defendants' reliance on nepotism to make hiring and promotional decisions resulted in a "disparate impact on African Americans, such as Plaintiff." Id. at p. 5. In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that she was unlawfully retaliated against because of her complaints about the impact of such nepotism. Id. at pp. 6-7. The State Defendants answered the Complaint on December 29, 2015. (Document No. 4).

On May 25, 2016 and June 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed separate Motions to Amend her Complaint. (Document Nos. 11 and 16). The first Motion sought leave to add five individual Defendants employed by the State who were allegedly responsible decision makers. (Document No. 11 at p. 2). The second Motion sought leave to add additional claims of intentional race discrimination and a new count alleging entitlement to punitive damages. (Document Nos. 16 and 17). After hearing, Plaintiff was conditionally granted leave to file an Amended Complaint. See Text Order entered July 26, 2016. On August 19, 2016, the State Defendants answered Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.¹ (Document No. 25). The State Defendants subsequently filed the instant Motion for Judgment. (Document No. 31).

Standard of Review

The State Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion under Rule 12(c) will "ordinarily warrant the same treatment" as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Collier v. City of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601, 602 (1^st Cir. 1998); Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 750 F.3d 91, 96 (1^st Cir. 2014) (noting that "standard of review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)"). Thus, under Rule 12(c), the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1^st Cir. 1994); taking all well-pleadedallegations as true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, see Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18 (1^st Cir. 2002); Carreiro v. Rhodes Gill & Co., 68 F.3d 1443, 1446 (1^st Cir. 1995). If under any theory the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action in accordance with the law, the motion to dismiss must be denied. Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1^st Cir. 1994).

While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations in order to withstand dismissal, a plaintiff's "obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation omitted) see also Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 43 (1^st Cir. 2013) ("conclusory allegations that merely parrot the relevant legal standard are disregarded, as they are not entitled to the presumption of truth.").

"The complaint must allege 'a plausible entitlement to relief' in order to survive a motion to dismiss." Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1^st Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 ("[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief"). The Court of Appeals has cautioned that the "plausibility" requirement is not akin to a "standard of likely success on the merits," but instead, "the standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff's favor." Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1^st Cir. 2010).

Moreover, "[t]he court's assessment of the pleadings is context-specific, requiring the court 'to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.' ...Where the well-pleaded facts donot permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Camilo v. Nieves, Civ. No. 10-2150 (DRD), 2013 WL 6632801, * 6 (D.P.R. Dec. 16, 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Discussion

A. The July 26, 2016 Order

As previously noted, the Court conditionally granted Plaintiff's untimely Motions to Amend her Complaint on July 26, 2016. The conditions included a requirement that Plaintiff "file a revised Amended Complaint...which does not present any new claims beyond those asserted in the previously presented proposed amended pleadings and which complies with Rules 8(a) and 10 by clearly and plainly stating each distinct legal theory in a separate paragraph or count and clarifying the specific nature of relief sought from the State as opposed to the individual defendants;" and that Plaintiff "not reassert Count III which makes a general claim for punitive damages unless she pleads specific facts supporting a plausible claim for the award of punitive damages beyond the conclusory allegations previously asserted."

The State Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint violates the above-referenced Order "in nearly every respect" and that the Court should dismiss the case or strike the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety. (Document No. 31-1 at pp. 5-9). First, as to the punitive damages condition, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint does not contain a stand-alone count making a general and conclusory claim for punitive damages as did the earlier proposed versions. Rather, her prayer for relief seeks punitive damages as to the claims forintentional discrimination² and retaliation. (Document No. 24 at pp. 16-17). Plaintiff alleges statutory violations that may legally support an award of punitive or exemplary damages, and the Second Amended Complaint contains additional factual allegations which at least state a plausible claim for punitive damages. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently complied with the July 26, 2016 Order as to her claim for punitive damages.

Second, as to the pleading condition, Plaintiff has also sufficiently complied with one exception. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint references 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in its introductory paragraph and purports to bring a claim thereunder. (Document No. 24 at p. 1). However, neither of Plaintiff's previously presented proposed amended pleadings contain any claims brought under Section 1983. (See Document Nos. 11-1 and 17). Therefore, it is a "new claim" in contravention of the July 26, 2016 Order, and it is stricken from the Second Amended Complaint. The State Defendants also make a similar argument in support of striking Plaintiff's reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for the first time in her Second Amended Complaint. While technically accurate, the Court does not view the reference as a "new" claim. The previously presented proposed amended pleadings included a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and sought an award of "costs of litigation including reasonable attorney fees." Section 1988 does not provide a stand alone substantive cause of action. Rather, it is a remedial provision that gives this Court the discretion to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in certain actions including one brought under Section 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Accordingly, the Court only strikes from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint any claim for relief brought under Section 1983.

B. Failure to Exhaust

The State Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies as to disparate treatment discrimination claims under either Title VII or Rhode Island's Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA") and that such claims should be dismissed. It is undisputed that Plaintiff's initial Complaint in this Court alleged only disparate impact race discrimination and that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint now also includes claims of disparate treatment or intentional race discrimination. (See Document No. 1 at pp. 5-6; and Document No. 24 at pp. 13-14). The State Defendants also accurately point out that Plaintiff's counsel represented to the Court during the July 26, 2016 hearing on Plaintiff's Motions to Amend that the evidence of knowledge obtained during discovery "transformed the case from disparate impact into disparate treatment or at least entitled Plaintiff to argue dual theories." (Document No. 32 at p. 6). The State Defendants argue that this representation by counsel should judicially estop Plaintiff from now arguing that her initial administrative charge of discrimination included a claim of disparate treatment. (Document No. 31-1 at p. 13, n.5).

It is well established that Title VII requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to the commencement of a lawsuit in Federal Court. Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1^st Cir. 1990).³ The general purpose underlying the administrative exhaustion requirement is to provide the employer with prompt notice of the claim and an opportunity for early resolution. See ...