Lucy v. Siddiq

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WILLIAM N. LUCY, AIS #204880 Plaintiff, v. TAHIR SIDDIQ, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:19-CV-498-MHT-CSC

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

July 29, 2022

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff William Lucy, who is currently confined in the Elmore Correctional Facility, in Elmore, Alabama, filed the instant pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief for certain claimed violations of his federally protected rights while confined in the Bullock Correctional Facility (“BCF”), in Union Springs, Alabama. Docs. 27 46.^[1] Plaintiff brings suit against: (1) “Medical Defendants,” (a) Dr. Tahir Siddiq, (b) “R.N D.O.N.” Treasa Ann Krauel (“Hakel”),^[2] (c) Dr. Hugh Hood, (d) Nurse Tewanda Appling, and (e) Wexford Health Sources, Inc.; and (2) “ADOC Defendants,” (a) BCF Warden Patrice Richie and (b) Business Office Supervisor Laquanda Harris, for their alleged actions in connection with Plaintiff's medical care. See Docs. 13, 27, 46, 52. For relief Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. Doc. 27 at 4.

Pursuant to the Court's Orders, Medical Defendants filed an answer, special report, supplemental special reports, and supporting evidentiary material addressing Plaintiff's claims for relief. Docs. 13, 21, 23, 32, 37, 38, 4352,^[3] 59. ADOC Defendants likewise filed an answer, special report, and supporting evidentiary material addressing Plaintiff's claims. Docs. 14, 39, 43. The Court informed Plaintiff that Defendants' special reports, as supplemented, may, at any time, be treated as motions to dismiss or as motions for summary judgment, and the Court explained to Plaintiff the proper manner to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Doc. 45. The Court further directed Plaintiff to respond to Medical Defendants' claim that Plaintiff's claims are due to be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 1. Plaintiff filed his response to Defendants' special reports and supplemental special reports. Doc. 55. This case is now pending on Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Upon consideration of such motions, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and Plaintiff's opposition, the Court concludes that Medical Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docs 21, 32^[4]), and ADOC Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39), are due to be GRANTED.^[5]

I. Standard

“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence to support some element on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

When defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as Defendants have here, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact [by citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials], the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it ....”); see also Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the court should consider facts pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering summary judgment). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. The evidence must be admissible at trial, and if the nonmoving party's evidence “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “A mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice ” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Only disputes involving material facts are relevant, materiality is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005).

To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. At the summary judgment stage, this Court should accept as true “statements in [Plaintiff's] verified complaint, [any] sworn response to the [Defendants'] motion for summary judgment, and sworn affidavit attached to that response[.]” Sears v. Roberts, 2019 WL 1785355, *3 (11th Cir. April 24, 2019); see also United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff's self-serving and uncorroborated, but not conclusory, statements in an affidavit or deposition may create an issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (“To be sure, [plaintiff's] sworn statements are self-serving, but that alone does not permit us to disregard them at the summary judgment stage. . . . ‘Courts routinely and properly deny summary judgment on the basis of a party's sworn testimony even though it is self-serving.'”). However, general, blatantly contradicted and merely “[c]onclusory, uncorroborated allegations by a plaintiff in [his verified complaint or] an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue of fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well-supported summary judgment motion.” Solliday v. Fed. Officers, 413 Fed.Appx. 206, 207 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the court, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of sufficiently establishing a genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, a plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court disregard elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. Here, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact to preclude summary judgment on his claims against all Defendants. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

II. Statement of Facts

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges, after being transferred from Fountain Correctional Facility (“FCF”) to BCF, Defendants conspired to defraud Plaintiff when they wrongfully confiscated his medications and then fraudulently demanded Plaintiff pay high co-pays to reacquire his prescribed pain medication. Doc. 27 at 3. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants caused Plaintiff emotional distress and, after being directed by the Court to file a supplemental report, Medical Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by changing his order from deodorant to aspirin and by withholding blood pressure medication for two days. Id.

Plaintiff's claims stem from the following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff:

Plaintiff was transferred from FCF to BCF on March 27, 2019. Doc. 21-1 at 2.^[6] On the dates relevant to Plaintiff's claims, Defendant Richie was Warden of BCF (Doc. 39-1 at 1),^[7]Defendant Harris was acting business manager at BCF (Doc. 39-2 at 2), and Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc., held the contract with the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) to provide healthcare related services to Alabama state inmates incarcerated at the Alabama state correctional facilities, including BCF. Doc. 23-2 at 1-2. Pursuant to ADOC Administrative Regulation Number 703, which was in force when Plaintiff arrived at BCF:

It is the policy of the ADOC for all

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