Lukes v. Nassau Cnty. Jail

STEVEN LUKES, Plaintiff,

v. NASSAU COUNTY JAIL, ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH, INC., JOHN DOE AND JANE DOEOF THE NASSAU COUNTY JAIL, JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE OF ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH, INC., Defendants.

12-CV-1139(SJF)(AKT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Date: May 29, 2012

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

I. Introduction

On March 7, 2012, pro se plaintiff Steven Lukes ("plaintiff") filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Subsequently, plaintiff also moved for the appointment of pro bono counsel to represent him in this case. Plaintiffs financial status, as set forth in the declaration in support of his application to proceed in forma pauperis, qualifies him to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. However, for the reasons set forth below, the complaint is sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) and plaintiffs application for the appointment of pro bono counsel is denied without prejudice.

II. The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the Nassau County Jail, he was denied "proper medical treatment" for injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of "police brutality," as well asfor his hepatitis C. (Compl. at ¶ IV). Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000.00). (Compl. at ¶ V).

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under both the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the in forma pauperis statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). See Abbas v. Dixon. 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding both Section 1915 and 1915A to be applicable to a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis).

It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius. 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), and to construe them '"to raise the strongest arguments that [they] suggest[].'" Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170 f quoting Harris v. City of New York. 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010)). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.. 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. Sept. 2010): see also Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education. 544 U.S. 167, 171, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005).

Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,1974, 167 L. Ed.2d 929 (2007). The pleading of specific facts is not required; rather a complaint need only give the defendant "fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197; see also Arista Records. LLC v. Doe 3. 604 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010)(accord). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id., (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. at 1959. The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was "committed by a person acting under color of state law," and (2) that such conduct "deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Corneio v. Bell. 592 F.3d 121,127 (2d Cir. 2010). cert, denied sub nomComejo v. Monn, 131 S. Ct. 158, 178 L. Ed. 2d. 243 (2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan. 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). Section 1983 does not create any independent substantive right; but rather is a vehicle to "redress...the deprivation of [federal] rights established elsewhere." Thomas v. Roach. 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999).

1. Claims Against the Nassau County Jail

"[U]nder New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued." Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't. 224 F. Supp.2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also In re Dayton. 786 F. Supp.2d 809, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Hawkins v. Nassau County Correctional Facility. 781 F. Supp.2d 107, 109 at n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Carthew v. County of Suffolk. 709 F. Supp.2d 188,195 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Since the Nassau County Jail is an administrative arm of Nassau County, without a legal identity separate and apart from the County, it lacks the capacity to be sued. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against the Nassau County Jail are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice. However, since plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his claims against the Nassau County Jail will be construed as claims against Nassau County.

a. Claims Against Nassau County

A municipality or municipal entity, such as Nassau County, cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York. 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Roe v. City of Waterbury. 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, aplaintiff must show "that 'action pursuant to official municipal policy' caused the alleged constitutional injury." Cash v. County of F.rie 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011), cert denied. 132 S. Ct. 1741, 182 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2012) (quoting Connick v. Thompson. 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011)); see also Monell. 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S. Ct. 2018. "Local governing bodies . .. may be sued for constitutional deprivations pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Monell. 436 U.S. at 690-691 (citations omitted). To establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality, see Connick. 131 S. Ct. at 1359; (2) actions taken or decisions made by municipal policymaking officials, i.e., officials with final decision making authority, which caused the alleged violation of plaintiffs civil rights, see Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford. 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Jeffes v. Barnes. 208 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000); (3) a practice "so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law," Connick. 131 S. Ct. at 1359: see also Green v. City of New York. 465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2006) (accord), or that "was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials," Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y.. 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted); or (4) that "a policymaking official exhibited] deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates," Cash. 654 F.3d at 334 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Okin v. Village of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Department. 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a municipal custom may be found when "faced with a pattern of misconduct, [the municipality] does nothing, compelling the conclusion that [it] has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its subordinates' unlawful actions."

(quotations and citations omitted), i.e., "a local government's decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights * * * amounting] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact," Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (quotations, alterations and citations omitted), or a policymaking official's failure to investigate or rectify a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct of which he or she had notice, evidencing deliberate indifference, "rather than mere negligence or bureaucratic inaction," Amnesty America. 361 F.3d at 128.

Even liberally construing the complaint, plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to state a Section 1983 cause of action against Nassau County. See, e.g., White v. St. Joseph's Hospital. 369 Fed. Appx. 225, 226 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 2010) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of Section 1983 claim for the plaintiffs failure "to allege that any of the allegedly unconstitutional actions were taken pursuant to an official policy or custom, as is required to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality."); see generally City of Waterbury. 542 F.3d at 37-41. Plaintiff has not alleged: (1) the existence of a formal policy which is...