Luna v. FCA U.S. LLC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND Re: Dkt. No. 18

LUCY H. KOH United States District Judge

Plaintiff Felipe Luna (“Plaintiff”) brings this lawsuit against Defendant FCA US, LLC (“FCA”), and Does 1 through 10 for claims arising from the sale of an allegedly defective vehicle. Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand. ECF No. 18. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a resident of Santa Clara County, California. ECF No. 1-2 (“Compl.”) ¶ 2. FCA, a Delaware corporation operating in California, designs, manufactures, constructs, assembles, markets, distributes, and sells automobiles. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 25, 2012 “Plaintiff purchased a 2012 Jeep Wrangler vehicle ... from [a dealership], which was manufactured and or distributed by Defendant FCA.” Id. ¶ 7. When Plaintiff purchased the 2012 Jeep Wrangler (the “Vehicle”), Plaintiff “received an express written warranty, including a 3 year/36, 000 miles bumper to bumper warranty and a 5 year/100, 000 miles powertrain warranty, which covers the engine and transmission.” Id. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff asserts that those warranties provided that “in the event a defect developed with the Vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiff could deliver the Vehicle for repair services to Defendant's representative and the Vehicle would be repaired.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that during the warranty period, the Vehicle developed “defects related to the electrical system; defects related to the totally integrated power module (TIPM); defects causing illumination of the check engine light ...; defects causing the storage of Diagnostic Trouble Codes ...; defects causing the Vehicle to surge above 2, 500 RPMs; defects causing the failure and/or replacement of the powertrain control module ...; defects requiring the reprogramming of the skim key; defects related to the transmission; defects causing rough running; defects causing the failure and/or replacement of the oil filter; defects requiring the performance of Recalls ...; defects causing cylinder(s) misfire; defects causing the failure and/or replacement of the left side cylinder head; defects causing the failure and/or replacement of the lifters; defects requiring the reprogramming of the key; and/or any other defects described in the Vehicle's repair history.” Id. ¶ 9.

Regarding the alleged defect related to the TIPM, Plaintiff states that FCA “had superior and exclusive knowledge of the TIPM defects, and knew or should have known that the defects were not known by or reasonably discoverable by Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that FCA “has never disclosed the TIPM defect to Plaintiff prior to the purchase of the Subject Vehicle or at

any point during ownership of the Subject Vehicle and Defendant FCA has never instructed its dealerships to disclose the TIPM defect to drivers or potential purchasers or lessees of vehicles equipped with the TIPM.” Id. ¶ 95.

According to Plaintiff, “Defendant [FCA] and its representatives in this state have been unable to service or repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable No. of opportunities.” Id. ¶ 119. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that when Plaintiff “presented the Vehicle to Defendant's representative, ” FCA “failed to commence the service or repairs within a reasonable time and failed to service or repair the Vehicle so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.” Id. ¶ 125.

B. Procedural History

On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed his complaint against FCA, Stevens Creek Chrysler Jeep Dodge (“Stevens Creek”), and Does 1-10 in California Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara. Compl. at 1. On November 18, 2019, Plaintiff served the complaint on the defendants. ECF No. 1, (“Notice of Removal”) ¶ 3.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged six causes of action, five of which arise from California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, California Civil Code §§ 1790-1795.8 (“Song-Beverly Act”): (1) violation of section 1793.2(d) against Defendant FCA, Compl. ¶¶ 118-23; (2) violation of section 1793.2(b) against Defendant FCA, Id. ¶¶ 124-28; (3) violation of section 1793.2(a)(3) against Defendant FCA, Id. ¶¶ 129-31; (4) breach of express written warranty in violation of sections 1791.2(a) and 1794 against Defendant FCA, Id. ¶¶ 132-35; (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of sections 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5 against Defendant FCA and Defendant Stevens Creek, Id. ¶¶ 136-40; and (6) common law fraudulent inducement/concealment, Id. ¶¶ 141-59.

On December 18, 2019, FCA and Stevens Creek removed Plaintiff's complaint to federal court alleging Plaintiff fraudulently joined Stevens Creek. See Luna v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 19-CV-08229-LHK, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019). On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. See id., ECF No. 13. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion to remand on July 2, 2020.

See Luna v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 19-CV-08229-LHK, 2020 WL 3605554, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2020).

On February 19, 2021 Defendant FCA removed Plaintiff's complaint to federal court, now alleging diversity jurisdiction existed after Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Stevens Creek from the suit on January 22, 2021. See Luna v. FCA U.S. LLC, 21-cv-01230-LHK, ECF No. 1, Notice of Removal (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2021).

On April 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present motion to remand alleging Defendant FCA failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy was less than $75, 000. See ECF No. 18 (“Mot.”). Defendant FCA opposed the motion on April 23, 2021. ECF No. 19 (“Opp'n”). Plaintiff did not file a reply brief.

Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of five court filings in other federal cases. ECF No. 18-4, at 5-26 (Ex. A-E). The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either “generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Public records, including judgments and other publicly filed documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). Each of these documents is a public court filing and is therefore the proper subject of judicial notice. Id. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for judicial notice of exhibits A-E. However, the Court does not take judicial notice of disputed facts therein. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record . . . But a court may not take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to reasonable dispute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).

On August 2, 2021, the Court concluded that this case was related to Luna v. FCA U.S. LLC¸ No. 19-CV-08229-LHK (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 18, 2019).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would

have had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). If it appears at any time before final judgment that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court must remand the action to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The party seeking removal “bears the burden of establishing” federal jurisdiction. Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). “The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists when a case presents diversity of citizenship between the parties or involves a claim arising under federal law. See Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). For the Court to have federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Generally speaking, “[a] cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” Hansen v. Blue Cross of Cal., 891 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1989).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The statute “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves to remand this action to state court arguing the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because FCA has not shown that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. Mot. at 1-9. Plaintiff also alleges FCA is barred from removing the action under § 1446(c)(1), which imposes a one-year time limit on removal based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 9-10. The Court first addresses whether FCA is statutorily barred from

removing the suit and then whether FCA has sufficiently shown that diversity jurisdiction exists.

A....