Luna v. Univ. of New Mexico Bd. of Regents

MANUEL A. LUNA, Jr., Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO BOARD OF REGENTS, ROBERT G. FRANK,President of the University of New Mexico, UNM CHIEF OF POLICE, CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC RECORDS,DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, And DIRECTOR OF OMBUDS Defendants.

Civ. No. 14-709 GBW/WPL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

February 2, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Dismissal (doc. 46) of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (doc. 12) and the parties' accompanying briefing on this matter (docs. 48, 51). Having reviewed the briefing and being fully advised, the Court will grant the Motion for Dismissal.

I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff Manuel Luna, proceeding pro se, is suing his former employer and various state officials for deprivation of his constitutional rights, through retaliatory discharge, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally doc. 12.

Plaintiff initiated suit in this Court on August 12, 2014. Doc. 1. On April 13 and April 14, 2015, Plaintiff twice amended his Complaint. See docs. 10, 12. On November 17, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim due to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Doc. 46. In his response to the motion, Plaintiff reiterated his assertions regarding his mistreatment and emphasized the veracity of these claims. See doc. 48. Defendants replied on December 21, 2015. Doc. 51.

II. COMPLAINT'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is a former Dispatch Supervisor for the University of New Mexico Police Department. Doc. 12 at 3-5. In the course of his duties, he was assigned to train a newly hired dispatcher, Edward Gonzales. Id. at 3. He alleges that he was instructed by his command staff to treat Gonzales unusually, assigning him to the "graveyard shift" prior to his departure to Santa Fe for additional training. Id. at 3-4. On May 1, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that several police officers and dispatchers "set up" Gonzales in order to coerce him into resigning prior to his departure to Santa Fe. Id. This was accomplished by intentionally assigning him to overlapping traffic stops while limiting his available tools, presumably to overwhelm him into performing his duties poorly. Id. Plaintiff complained to management about this perceived misconduct, and he alleges that he experienced retaliation for his complaints. Id. at 4. According to Plaintiff, his supervisors placed him on an unwarranted Performance Improvement Plan and began isolating him by excluding him from meetings and ostracizing him at office-widefunctions. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that his commanders intentionally kept the dispatch office understaffed to increase Plaintiff's workload and refused his requests to take necessary training courses. Id. at 4-5.

Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff was tasked with completing evaluations of dispatchers under his supervision. Id. at 5. In doing so, Plaintiff made what he contends to be accurate statements regarding the improper conduct of two dispatchers involved in the Gonzales incident. Id. His managers instructed that these evaluations be changed and repeatedly returned them to Plaintiff when he refused to do so. Id. Plaintiff claims that his managers threatened to discipline him for insubordination and provided him with a retaliatory evaluation of his own performance. Id.

Plaintiff complained of several additional retaliatory actions, including attempted intimidation by a police officer, further isolation, and exclusion from de-briefings. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff further alleged that this treatment sharply contrasted with management's treatment of certain dispatchers, who were shown favoritism and allowed to evade their job responsibilities without consequence. Id. at 6.

In December 2013, Plaintiff was confronted with an accusation of misconduct, allegedly supported by a document "signed by all part[ies]." Id. He was required to take human resources classes without being told of the nature of the accusation. Id. He was not allowed to view the document despite multiple requests to his managers, the Office of Equal Opportunity and the University Custodian of Public Records. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges in his Complaint that, on January 30, 2014, several University police officers attempted to "set up" Plaintiff in the same manner done to Gonzales, by manufacturing back-to-back traffic stops for Plaintiff to handle simultaneously. Id. at 7. Plaintiff responded by email on February 4, 2014, detailing the incident to management and later contacted the EEOC. Id. According to him, his supervisors reacted by continuing to under-allocate resources to dispatch and by placing him on administrative leave. Id. In April 2014, following a notice of contemplative action and Plaintiff's response, Plaintiff was discharged. Id. Plaintiff claims that the reasons given were retaliatory in nature and that university police continued to harass him by calling his wife's personal phone at odd hours of the night. Id. at 7-8.

Plaintiff now claims he is entitled to redress for these alleged harms.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants assert that Plaintiff's federal civil rights claims should be dismissed on the pleadings because each of the identified Defendants is immune from suit and does not constitute a person for purposes of a § 1983 claim. Doc. 46 at 1-5. Defendants further claim that any remaining causes of action outside the scope of § 1983 would involve only state law, and urge this Court to decline exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction over these issues. Plaintiff responds that the totality of the claims stated in his complaint are true and that he is entitled to relief for unjust discharge. Doc. 48.Ultimately, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, entitling Defendants to a judgment of dismissal on the pleadings.

A. Legal Standard

"After the pleadings are closed -- but early enough not to delay trial -- a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings if no material facts are in dispute and the dispute can be resolved on both the pleadings and any facts of which the Court can take judicial notice." Ramirez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 303, 304 (D.N.M. 2000).

The standard for deciding motions on the pleadings mirrors the applicable standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts only the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1125 (10th Cir. 2010). Thus, the Court need only evaluate allegations "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Following these principles, the Court considers whether the facts "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Barrett v. Orman, 373 F. App'x 823, 825 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78).

The Court notes that pleadings submitted by an individual proceeding pro se are held to a less stringent standard than those prepared by attorneys. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). "This liberal construction, however, will not relieve plaintiff of his burden of presenting sufficient facts to state a legally cognizable claim." White v. State of Colo., 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996).

B. Analysis

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff has brought a federal cause of action against several entities and state officials. See doc. 12 at 1-2. Plaintiff does not specify whether he seeks injunctive relief, such as reinstatement, or compensatory relief including monetary damages. Id. at 8. In both their Answer to his Second Amended Complaint and current Motion for Dismissal, Defendants have raised the defense of sovereign immunity stemming from the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. See doc. 21 at 1, 3; doc. 46 at 2-4.

The Eleventh Amendment states: "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. This provision creates an immunity which "applies to any action brought against a state in federal court, including suits initiated by a state's own citizens," regardless of the relief sought. Steadfast Ins. Co. v.Agricultural Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007). "[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that precludes unconsented suits in federal court against a state and arms of the state." Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). This immunity thus extends to the states themselves as well as any entity functioning as an "arm of the state." Duke v. Grady Mun. Sch., 127 F.3d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 1997). To determine whether a specific body functions as an arm of the state, the Tenth Circuit put forth a two-part inquiry:

[T]he court first examines the degree of autonomy given to the agency, as determined by the characterization of the agency by state law and the extent of guidance and control exercised by the state. Second, the court examines the extent of financing the agency receives independent of the state treasury and its ability to provide for its own financing. The governmental entity is immune from suit if the money judgment sought is to be satisfied out of the state treasury.

Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr, 75 F.3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Applying these standards, our jurisdiction has previously found both the University of New Mexico and its Board of Regents to be arms of...