Luna v. Valdez

MIGUEL ANGEL LUNA, Plaintiff, v. LUPE VALDEZ, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-3520-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

February 2, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Miguel Angel Luna ("Luna"), a Mexican citizen, who alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when, following his arrest for a misdemeanor offense, he was denied pretrial release due to a U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") immigration detainer; he was detained based on the immigration detainer for up to 48 hours after he pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense; and he was subsequently detained for several months because his name was omitted from a list of prisoners to be released or transferred to immigration custody. Defendants Dallas County (the "County") and its then-sheriff, Lupe Valdez ("Sheriff Valdez"), move for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that Sheriff Valdez is entitled to qualified immunity as to all claims asserted against her, and that Dallas County is entitled to summary judgment as to all of Luna's claims except his Fourth Amendment claim that, due to an immigration detainer, he was denied release on bail from April 11 through April 27, 2015 while awaiting trial, and he was detained for up to 48 hours after he pleaded guilty on April 27, 2015. The court dismisses Luna's action against Sheriff Valdez by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) final judgment filed today.

I

On April 11, 2015 Luna was booked into the Dallas County Jail (the "Jail") on a misdemeanor charge of "display fictitious license plate."¹ That same day, the DHS² lodged an "Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action" ("Immigration Detainer"), stating that it had "[d]etermined that there is reason to believe [that Luna] is an alien subject to removal from the United States," and requesting that the recipient law enforcement agency³ "[m]aintain custody of [Luna] for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when [he] would have otherwise been released from . . . custody to allow DHS to take custody of [him]." Ds. App. 5 (bold font omitted). During the evening of April 11, 2015, Luna was arraigned and his bond was set at $2,500. Luna does not contend that he posted or attempted to post bond to secure his release. He maintainsinstead that doing so would have been futile considering defendants' policy of not allowing any release on bond for inmates against whom an immigration detainer had been filed.

On April 27, 2015 Luna pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against him and was sentenced to time served. His state criminal charges were disposed of and he was to be discharged, subject to the Immigration Detainer lodged against him. An email sent at 6:30 a.m. on April 28, 2015 contained a document entitled "INS Holds Pending Release" that listed Luna as ready for release to "U.S. Immigration/Detainee" as of April 27, 2015. Later that morning, however, a clerk in the Data Management Unit ("DMU") sent to various U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and DHS personnel a list of Dallas County inmates who, on April 29, 2015, would be ready for transfer to U.S. immigration officials, and Luna's name was omitted from the list. Consequently, Luna was neither released nor transferred.

According to Luna, he was forced during his confinement to work without pay and he was subjected to filthy, unsanitary conditions that included being forced to clean up human waste without proper clothing and being fed food that had gone bad, continuously making him ill. Luna contends that, during his confinement, he asked no fewer than five detention officers on at least twelve occasions when he would be released, but the detention officers were either unresponsive or told him he was being held because of an immigration detainer. When on several occasions he requested a "kite" to bring the issue to the attention of a Jail supervisor, his requests were denied.

On August 6, 2015 Luna filed an expedited petition for writ of habeas corpus infederal district court. The following day, Luna was released when it became apparent to the appropriate Jail authorities that he should have been discharged on April 27, 2015. Luna then filed this lawsuit against the County and Sheriff Valdez, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Luna's claims.⁴ Luna opposes the motion.

II

Defendants move for summary judgment on claims for which Luna will have the burden of proof at trial. Because Luna will have the burden of proof, defendants' burden at the summary judgment stage is to point the court to the absence of evidence of any essential element of Luna's claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once they do so, Luna must go beyond his pleadings and designate specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F. 3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The nonmovant's failure to produce proof as to any essential element renders all other facts immaterial. See TruGreen Landcare, L.L.C. v. Scott, 512 F.Supp.2d 613, 623 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Fitzwater, J.). Summary judgment is mandatory where the nonmovant fails to meet this burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.

These summary judgment standards apply as well to Sheriff Valdez's defense of qualified immunity. Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant is not protected because the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. See Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2005) (addressing qualified immunity). To prevail, the plaintiff must show "genuine issues of material fact [exist] concerning the reasonableness" of the defendant's conduct. Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2001). "Although nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the defense once properly raised." Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

III

"Section 1983 creates a private right of action for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law." Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 504 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984)). "Rather than creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for the rights that it designates. Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983." Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist.,869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Before the court considers whether the County or Sheriff Valdez can be held liable under § 1983 for violating Luna's constitutional rights, the court turns to defendants' contention that Luna cannot prove a deprivation of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights.⁵

A

The court begins with Luna's Fourth Amendment claim.

Defendants contend that, to recover on his Fourth Amendment-based claim, Luna must prove that he posted bail, or was otherwise eligible for release, but he was detained solely because of an ICE-issued request to detain; that there is no evidence that Luna, or anyone on his behalf, posted bond in the amount required for him to be eligible for release; that without that proof, Luna did not have a right to be released, regardless of the existence (or not) of an immigration detainer; and that the only inference that can be reasonably drawn is that Luna was held because of his failure to post bond, not because of an immigration detainer lodged against him.

Luna responds that the evidence demonstrates that defendants unlawfully detained him (1) during his pretrial period from April 11, 2015 through April 27, 2015 by refusing torelease him on bail due to the Immigration Detainer and (2) well beyond his court-adjudicated release date (April 27, 2015) without probable cause to believe he had committed another criminal offense. Regarding his failure to post bond, Luna contends that it would have been futile to attempt to post bail during the pretrial detention period because of defendants' policy of not allowing inmates with immigration detainers to be released on bail.

Under the Fourth Amendment,⁶ "a fair and reliable determination of probable cause" must be provided "as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (citation omitted); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("[W]e hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."). The Supreme Court has defined "probable cause" as "facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.'" Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). "Probable cause exists if, under the totality of circumstances, there is a fair probability that . . . an illegal act is taking place." United States v. Thompson, 2012 WL 1161609, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing United States v. Newman, 472 F.3d 233, 236-37 (5th Cir. 2006)).

To the extent Luna's Fourth Amendment claim rests on defendants' alleged failure to permit him to secure his pretrial release by posting bail, i.e., from April 11 through April 27, 2015,⁷ Luna has created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient...