Lundstrom v. Township of Florence

980 N.W.2d 189

Ross R. LUNDSTROM, et al., Appellants,

v.TOWNSHIP OF FLORENCE, Respondent,State of Minnesota, Defendant.

A21-1714

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed September 6, 2022

Review Granted November 23, 2022

Review Stayed November 23, 2022

Charles O. Richardson, Richardson & Richardson, Red Wing, Minnesota (for appellants)

Jessica E. Schwie, Joshua P. Devaney, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant landowners challenge the district court's summary-judgment dismissal of their declaratory-judgment action regarding the parties’ respective interests in the portions of two platted, unopened streets that abut appellants’ lots: Barton Street and Bay Street (the disputed streets). The district court dismissed appellants’ claim that respondent township's interest in the disputed streets was extinguished by the Minnesota Marketable Title Act (MTA), Minn. Stat. § 541.023 (2020), reasoning that the deeds conveying appellants’ lots are not a "source of title" to the abutting streets under the MTA. The district court also granted the township's summary-judgment motion seeking a declaration that the disputed streets are platted, public, unopened roads; ordered appellants to remove all "structures, objects, and things" on Barton Street; and ordered the township to mark, and post signs identifying, the boundaries of the disputed streets.

Appellants argue that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining that their deeds do not provide a source of title for purposes of the MTA and that they are otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law. By notice of related appeal, respondent challenges the district court's denial of its request for costs and disbursements as the prevailing party. Because the district court erred in determining that the deeds conveying appellants’ lots do not provide a source of title to the disputed streets for purposes of the MTA, and because there is no genuine issue of material fact, we reverse in part and remand for entry of judgment for appellants. In view of this reversal, we affirm the district court's denial of costs and disbursements because the township is not the prevailing party.

FACTS

This appeal regards platted, unopened streets that abut appellants’ lots in respondent Florence Township on the western shore of Lake Pepin.¹ The parties stipulated that appellants Ross Lundstrom and Jean Pontzer own a fee simple interest in lots described by deed as:

Lot 1, Block 7, and that part of vacated Bay Street lying easterly thereof, of the Town of Frontenac, according to the plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the County Recorder in and for Goodhue County, Minnesota. Said premises being situate upon Government Lot One of Section 12, in Township 112 North, of Range 13 West of the Fifth Principal Meridian; and

Lot 1, Block 3 in the Town of Frontenac, and that part of the easterly half of vacated Bay Street, which accrues to said Lot by virtue of said vacation thereof, according to the recorded plat thereof, on file in the Goodhue County Recorder's Office, Goodhue County, Minnesota.

The parties also stipulated that appellant Bruce Hansen owns a fee simple interest in lots described by deed as:

Lots 3 and 4, in Block 8 in the Town of Frontenac, according to the plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the County Recorder for Goodhue County, Minnesota.²

The approximate layout of the lots and disputed streets is shown below. Appellants use the disputed streets as a garden and yard. The township contends that an electrical utility pole and lines are located in the Barton Street right-of-way.

Barton Street and Bay Street run perpendicular to each other and intersect at Lake Pepin. The portion of Barton Street at issue lies between the Lundstrom-Pontzer and Hansen properties and ends at Lake Pepin. The portion of Bay Street at issue lies between Hansen's property and Lake Pepin. The township's interest in the disputed streets is based on the Plat of Westervelt, which was recorded in 1857 and renamed the Plat of Frontenac in 1859. The Plat of Frontenac "dedicate[d] to public use the streets and alleys as laid out" in the plat. Since 1857, some of the platted streets have been vacated in whole or in part, including the portion of Bay Street located between the two Lundstrom-Pontzer lots, which was vacated in 1920. The parties stipulated that when platted streets were vacated, "the land accrued to adjacent lots." The stipulation states that the disputed portion of Barton Street has not been vacated; it does not state whether the disputed portion of Bay Street has been vacated.

Appellants sued the township and the State of Minnesota, seeking a declaration that appellants are the fee owners of the disputed streets "free of any interest in Defendants herein except those proprietary and sovereign rights of the State of Minnesota."³ In its answer, the township denied that its interest in the disputed streets was extinguished by operation of the MTA, as appellants had alleged, and asked the district court to order appellants to remove all structures, objects and things (including trees) on Barton Street "for their respective shares which is up to the middle of the right of way."

Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the township's motion and denied appellants’ motion. The district court recognized that "Minnesota case law has held that landowners own the fee title to the center of abutting, abandoned streets" and reasoned that, "based on this case law, it would seem [appellants] have a source of title to" the disputed streets. Yet the district court concluded that "under the MTA, landowners do not have a source of title in abutting roads when those roads are not [expressly described] in the deed." Given its ruling, the district court did not determine whether the township was "conclusively presumed," under the MTA, to have abandoned its interest. The district court's order denied the township's request for costs and disbursements without explanation.

Lundstrom, Pontzer, and Hansen appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment to the township. By notice of related appeal, the township challenges the denial of its request for costs and disbursements.

ISSUES

I. Is a deed or other instrument that conveys fee title to part of a platted street along with the abutting lot a source of title to the street under Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1 ?

II. Does a utility pole, together with electrical lines, establish the township's possession of the disputed streets under Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 6 ?

ANALYSIS

This appeal involves application of the MTA to the township's interest in platted, unopened streets. "The declared policy of the Marketable Title Act is to prevent restrictions on uses [of land] that have not been reasserted as a matter of record within the last 40 years from ‘fettering the marketability of title.’ " State v. Hess , 684 N.W.2d 414, 422 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2002) ). "The MTA applies to every property interest ‘founded by any instrument, event or transaction that is at least 40 years old.’ " Sampair v. Village of Birchwood , 784 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 2(a) (2008) ). Specifically, the MTA applies to town roads established by order of the town board. Township of Sterling v. Griffin , 309 Minn. 230, 244 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1976) ("[T]own roads are not exempt from the application of the [MTA]."). The MTA also applies to town roads established by statutory dedication. Ravenna Township v. Grunseth , 314 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn. 1981) (applying Minn. Stat. § 160.05, subd. 1 (1980) ). And the MTA applies to streets—like those at issue here—dedicated to the public by plat. In re Application of Moratzka , 974 N.W.2d 266, 269, 273 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. granted (Minn. June 29, 2022).

Generally, for the MTA to extinguish an interest in real property: (1) the party invoking the MTA must have a "claim of title based upon a source of title, which source has then been of record at least 40 years," and (2) the person against whom the MTA is invoked must be "conclusively presumed" to have abandoned all interest in the property. Wichelman v. Messner , 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1957) (quotation omitted) (syllabus by the court). As explained by our supreme court:

By operation of the MTA, when X holds property in fee simple that has been of record for over 40 years, and Y claims an interest in that property that is also at least 40 years old, then Y, or Y's predecessors in interest, must have filed the statutorily prescribed notice of Y's claim within 40 years of the creation of the interest Y now claims.

Sampair , 784 N.W.2d at 68 (citing Minn. Stat. § 541.023 ; Wichelman , 83 N.W.2d at 811-13, 819-20 ). An exception to the notice requirement provides that the MTA does not "bar the rights of any person ... in possession of real estate." Id. at 69 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 6 (2008) ).

The issue in this case is whether, under the MTA, a deed conveying a fee simple interest in a platted lot can serve as a "source of title" to the abutting street and if so, whether utility fixtures can support the township's claim to possession of the disputed streets. The issue is presented in the context of a summary judgment ruling. On appeal from summary judgment, appellate courts "review de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law." Id. at 68. We view evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Id.

I.

Appellants contend that the district court erred by concluding that their deeds do not provide a "source of title" to the disputed streets within the...