Lupo v. Hargett

1

NICHOLAS LUPO, MATTHEW STONEMAN, and DAVID PRICE, Plaintiffs, v. TRE HARGETT in his official capacity as Tennessee Secretary of State, and MARK GOINS in his official capacity as Coordinator of Elections, Defendants.

No. 3:24-cv-01088

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

October 25, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is one of several related election cases filed in district courts across the country. Those cases allege that state election officials unconstitutionally excluded electors from the November 5, 2024 general election ballot merely because their pledged presidential candidate Dr. Shiva Ayyadurai, is not a “natural-born citizen” and is ineligible to serve as President.^[1] In this case, Plaintiffs Nicholas Lupo Matthew Stoneman, and David Price, proceeding pro se, have sued Tennessee Secretary of State Tre Hargett and Coordinator of Elections Mark Goins (collectively “Defendants”) in their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13), which is fully briefed and ripe for review (see Doc. Nos. 14, 18, 20, 24). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion will be granted.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND BACKGROUND^[2]

Plaintiffs are Tennessee residents who, along with eight other individuals (collectively, the “Elector Candidates”), submitted “Nomination Petitions” to the Tennessee Secretary of State “to be Electors of the President and Vice President of the United States for pledged independent candidate for President Dr. Shiva Ayyadurai.” (Doc. No. 8 ¶¶ 1, 4-6). The Complaint alleges that the Nomination Papers met all the necessary requirements under Tennessee law for the Elector Candidates “to be officially placed on the ballot to be Presidential Elector Candidates in the State of Tennessee.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 21-23). As part of the nomination process, each of the Elector Candidates pledged that: “If selected for the position of elector as a nominee of an unaffiliated presidential candidate, I agree to serve and to mark my ballot for [Dr. Ayyadurai] and for that candidate's vice-presidential running mate,” Crystal Ellis. (Id. ¶ 8).

On August 14, 2024, the Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State issued a “Receipt of Filing” letter confirming that it “received the nominating petition for Shiva Ayyadurai as a candidate for President of the United States in the general election to be held on November 5, 2024.” (Id. ¶ 23). The letter further provided that Dr. Ayyadurai “will be notified once it has been determined that all requirements have been met for placing the candidate's name on the ballot,” and “[i]f qualified, [Dr. Ayyadurai's] name will appear on the ballot[.]” (Id.). Plaintiff Lupo signed this letter. (Id.).

At some point thereafter, attorneys for the Tennessee Secretary of State determined that Dr. Ayyadurai was ineligible to serve as President because he was not “naturally born” in the United States.^[3] (Id. ¶¶ 25, 29). On September 4, 2024, Defendant Goins sent a letter to Dr. Ayyadurai informing him that he would not be placed on the Tennessee ballot. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 27). A different election official, Lena Russomanno, simultaneously informed Lupo and another Elector Candidate that Dr. Ayyadurai would not be on the ballot. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26). On September 5, 2024, Lupo responded to Russomanno that the Elector Candidates themselves “are running for the Office of Elector in the State of Tennessee,” and that the Tennessee Secretary of State “had no right to [] remove them from the ballot based on the ‘qualifications' of their Pledged Candidate for President.” (Id. ¶¶ 25, 28 (emphasis added)). Lupo called this decision an “ignorant and moronic ruling” and “demanded he and the [other] Elector Candidates be put back on the ballot immediately.” (Id. ¶ 28). Later that day, Goins emailed Lupo that: “The decision was made after attorneys within [the Tennessee Secretary of State's] office looked at the issue. I understand you intend to sue but the decision has been made.” (Id. ¶ 29). On September 6, 2024, Lupo responded that: “Your attorneys are either DUMB or intentionally violating the Law,” and “[y]our ignorance intentional or otherwise must be punished.” (Id. ¶ 30).

Plaintiffs then filed a three-count Complaint under § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against Goins and Hargett in their official capacities. The operative Complaint^[4] alleges that Defendants violated the Elector Candidates' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to place their names on the Tennessee general election ballot. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 9, 55). In terms of their request for relief, Plaintiffs have asked the Court to issue: (1) a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants lacked “subject matter jurisdiction” to reject Dr. Ayyadurai and the Elector Candidates from the November 5, 2024 general election ballot; and (2) an injunction against Defendants to both “nullify their decision to remove the Elector Candidates from the ballot,” and to “prevent Defendants from printing ballots for the November 5, 2024 general election” that do not include the Elector Candidates. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 78, 83). Defendants responded with the instant motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). (See Doc. Nos. 13-14).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

A defendant may move under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction[]” Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cnty., 847 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986)). “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can challenge the sufficiency of the pleading itself (facial attack) or the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction (factual attack).” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994)). In considering a facial attack, the Court must take all the allegations in the Complaint as true and determine “whether the plaintiff has alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added). But when the defendant makes a factual attack, the Court may consider and weigh evidence, including evidence outside of the pleadings, to determine whether the plaintiff has “carrie[d] the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ready for the World Inc. v. Riley, No. 19-10062, 2019 WL 4261137, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2019) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A defendant may also move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a case for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Complaint must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ryan v. Blackwell, 979 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). When determining whether the Complaint meets this standard, the Court must accept the Complaint's factual allegations as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and “take all of those facts and inferences and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Moreover, the Court must determine only whether “the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,” not whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)). “While the complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements[.]” Blackwell, 979 F.3d at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

III. ANALYSIS

It is difficult to discern the exact nature of Plaintiffs' allegations, but, as in other related cases, their “claims seem to hinge on the idea that they're the actual candidates, they're the ones who've been kept off the ballot, and their actual pledged candidate really doesn't have anything to do with it.” See Lauters, 2024 WL 4517911, at *3; see also (Doc. No. 18 at 6-8). Additionally, Plaintiffs appear to argue that they are entitled to run for the “office of Electors for president and vice president,” and that Defendants acted without jurisdiction and “went after the wrong person” when they excluded Plaintiffs' names from the Tennessee general election ballot. (Doc. No. 18 at 20).

Defendants respond that this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' claims because (1) this case is moot, (2) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by sovereign immunity, (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege a First or Fourteenth Amendment violation, and (4) issuing an injunction on the eve of an election would violate the Purcell principle. Because mootness and sovereign immunity relate to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is required to address those issues first before moving to the others. See Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e are bound to consider the 12(b)(1) motion first, since the Rule 12(b)(6) challenge becomes moot if this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”); see also KNC Invs LLC v. Lane's End Stallions,...