Lynch v. Mayor & Town Council of Colmar Manor

BRIAN D. LYNCH v. MAYOR AND TOWN COUNCIL OF COLMAR MANOR, ET AL.

No. 1419

No. 2674

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

September Term, 2018

February 21, 2020

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Case Nos. CAL-17-18471 and CAL-17-25521

UNREPORTED

(Consolidated)

Kehoe, Arthur, Wells, JJ.

Opinion by Kehoe, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. See Md. Rule 1-104.

In these consolidated appeals, we consider two judgments of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Both are related to the Colmar Manor Police Department's efforts to discharge one of its officers, Brian D. Lynch, after he allegedly made a false statement to an officer investigating whether Lynch had engaged in unauthorized secondary employment. Between the two appeals, Lynch raises the following issues, which we have reworded slightly and reordered:

1. Did the circuit court err when it declined to consider Lynch's show-cause petition alleging violations of rights guaranteed by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights?

2. Did the hearing board commit an error of law when it summarily denied Lynch's pre-hearing motion asserting that the charges were untimely and impermissibly vague and that the department had, by requesting "admissions" from Lynch, improperly shifted the burden of proof and biased the hearing board?

3. Did the hearing board deprive Lynch of his rights under Md. Code, § 3-104(n)(1)(ii) of the Public Safety Article ("Pub. Safety"), when it refused to take any action against the department upon discovering that the department had not turned over certain documents?

4. Did the hearing board err when it denied Lynch's motion for an acquittal after the department rested its case-in-chief?

5. Was the hearing board's finding that Lynch was guilty of making a false statement based upon substantial evidence?

6. Did the hearing board act arbitrarily and capriciously by "refus[ing] to consider" the testimony of a defense witness because she did not memorialize her investigation in a particular manner?

7. Did the circuit court err by failing to rule upon and grant Lynch's motion to strike the town's answering memorandum after the town failed to file a response to Lynch's petition for judicial review, as required by Md. Rule 7-204(a)?

Although the circuit court erred when it refused to consider the merits of Lynch's show-cause petition, Lynch failed to establish he was prejudiced by this mistake. And because his other contentions are without merit, we will affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

Background

The statutory scheme

Resolving the issues presented in Lynch's consolidated appeals turns in large part on the interpretation of the rights and procedures outlined in the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"), codified at Md. Code, §§ 3-101-3-113 of the Public Safety Article ("Pub. Safety"). We begin with some background.

The LEOBR provides procedural protections to officers during internal investigations and subsequent administrative hearings that could result in their discipline, demotion, or dismissal. Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Department, 369 Md. 108, 122 (2002). These protections include strict limits on the investigation and interrogation of officers, Pub. Safety § 3-104; a statute of limitations on administrative charges, generally requiring departments to bring the charges "within 1 year after the act that gives rise to the charges comes to the attention of the appropriate law enforcement agency official," Pub. Safety § 3-106(a); and a right to an administrative hearing by a hearing board when charges are brought and disputed, Pub. Safety § 3-107. The right to a hearing comes with several additional guarantees designed to ensure due process. The officer is entitled to notice ofthe right to a hearing, and that notice must also state "the time and place of the hearing and the issues involved." Pub. Safety § 3-107(b). The officer has a right to representation by counsel, Pub. Safety § 3-107(e)(3), and to compulsory process for the production of witnesses and relevant evidence, Pub. Safety § 3-107(d)(1)-(3).

When an officer believes he has been denied a right guaranteed to him by the LEOBR, the statute provides two remedial paths. First, the officer "may apply to the circuit court of the county where [he] is regularly employed for an order that directs the enforcement agency to show cause why the right [denied] should not be granted." Pub. Safety § 3-105(a). The aggrieved officer may apply for this show-cause petition at any time before he appears before a hearing board. Pub. Safety § 3-105(b). Second, if the administrative hearing leads to departmental disciplinary action, the officer may seek judicial review of that decision in the circuit court. Pub. Safety § 3-109(a). If he is aggrieved by the circuit court's decision, he may appeal to our Court. Pub. Safety § 3-109(b).

Lynch sought recourse to both of these mechanisms for judicial intervention after his department sought to dismiss him for the reasons we next explain.

The underlying incident

On July 25, 2015, Lynch, a police officer working for the town of Colmar Manor, was moonlighting as a security guard at an outdoor party at a home in Fort Washington. The party was rowdy, and officers from the Prince George's County Police Department were dispatched to respond to a noise complaint. At some point, Lynch got into an argument with the county officers, and they arrested him. Lynch was later released without anycriminal charges, but he was not completely out of the woods. The Colmar Manor police chief opened an investigation to determine whether Lynch had been properly authorized, in accord with departmental policy, to work at the party. Lynch was notified about this investigation by email on July 30, 2015.

The "unauthorized secondary employment" investigation was conducted by Detective Erik Reynolds of the Prince George's County Police Department. It was slow going. Reynolds did not interview Lynch about the cookout incident until almost a year later, on July 19, 2016. In this investigative interrogation, Reynolds asked Lynch about his run-in with the county officers and whether he had been authorized by his department to work the party in the first place. Lynch told the detective that a supervisor had given him the green light:

[Reynolds]: . . . For the part-time that you [were] working at the residence, is that approved through your department?

[Lynch]: Yes.

[Reynolds]: And who gave you the approval to work it?

[Lynch]: My sergeant.

[Reynolds]: And what is your sergeant's name?

[Lynch]: Sergeant Sims.

About ten months after this interview, on May 17, 2017, the Colmar Manor department served Lynch a notification of three charges against him. These alleged that Lynch had made a "false" or "untruthful" statement in violation of the town's personnel policy (which bars "[k]nowingly giving or making a false statement of a material nature in mattersrelative to employment") and specific rules of the police department (which require employees "to respond truthfully to questions asked by supervisors in connection with matters relating to the official business of the department," and forbid them from making "untruthful statements, either verbal or written, pertaining to official duties"). A fourth charge was added on June 30, 2017, alleging that Lynch's untruthful statement constituted "conduct unbecoming an employee," in violation of another department rule. None of these charges specified what the alleged false statement was; they told Lynch only that the false statement had been made to Reynolds "during the course of an official internal investigation."

Accompanying the notifications of charges received by Lynch were "disciplinary action recommendations." In these recommendations, Colmar Manor's police chief explained that the charges were based upon information in Reynolds's investigative report and that he proposed to fire Lynch for the alleged violations of town policy and department rules. The recommendations also explained that Lynch could contest the charges and the proposed punishment in a hearing before an administrative board.

Lynch did dispute the charges, and a hearing board was convened under Pub. Safety § 3-107. The hearing was scheduled for August 7, 2017. On July 13, 2017, while Lynch and the department were preparing for the hearing, counsel for the town emailed Lynch a "request for admission of facts." In it, the town asked Lynch to "admit," among other things, (1) that he had been working secondary employment on July 25, 2015, (2) that Lynch had told Reynolds he had been given permission to work this job, and (3) that therewas no record in the department's files of any request from Lynch to work the job or permission given from Lynch's superiors to do so. The email from the town's lawyer told Lynch that the town "expect[ed] a timely response . . . in 15 days."

The pre-hearing petition to show cause

On August 1, 2017, a few weeks after the town sent its request for admissions, Lynch filed a petition for a show-cause order in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The petition made clear that it was filed "pursuant to Md. Code, Public Safety § 3-105." In his petition, Lynch argued that the department had violated his rights under the LEOBR in three ways. First, he said, the administrative charges, brought in May and June of 2017, but related to the July 25, 2015, cookout incident, were time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in Pub. Safety § 3-106(a). Second, he argued, the charges were impermissibly vague, giving Lynch no way of knowing what exactly the department alleged to be a false statement. Third, he argued, the town's request for admissions had improperly shifted the burden of proof to Lynch, infringing on his right...