Lynch v. State Judicial Branch

DANIEL M. LYNCH, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH, Defendant.

No. 3:15-cv-01379 (MPS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

September 30, 2020

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Daniel Lynch brings this action against the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch ("the Judicial Branch"), alleging that it failed to accommodate his disability and otherwise discriminated and retaliated against him during two state court lawsuits, in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. ECF No. 62; see also ECF No. 71 at 7 ("Lynch's sole remaining claims are his claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act stemming from the foreclosure action and the small claims action."). The Judicial Branch has filed a motion for summary judgment as to all his claims. ECF No. 105. For the reasons set forth below, I GRANT that motion.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the parties' Local Rule 56(a) Statements and are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.¹

Lynch's claims relate to two different state court lawsuits in which he has been a defendant: (1) a property foreclosure action commenced on December 29, 2014 ("the foreclosure action"), ECF No. 119 ¶ 36; ECF No. 126 at 371; and (2) a small claims action commenced by his landlord on July 14, 2015 ("the small claims action"), ECF No. 119 ¶ 50; ECF No. 126 at 174. Lynch proceeded in both actions largely pro se. ECF No. 119 ¶ 59; see, e.g., ECF No. 126 at 184 (motion to dismiss small claims action filed by Lynch on August 18, 2015); id. at 372 (docket sheet noting that Lynch was self-represented from his appearance on April 6, 2015 until April 16, 2018, when Attorney Baird entered a limited appearance). Both before and after initiating this federal lawsuit, Lynch was actively involved in the foreclosure action. He filed at least 44 "written pleadings, affidavits, requests, motions, memoranda[, notices] and/or objections . . . ." ECF No. 119 ¶¶ 37, 42; ECF No. 126 at 372-79 (docket sheet in the foreclosure action). Lynch also filed several written pleadings, motions, or notices in the small claims action. ECF No. 119 ¶¶ 53, 55; ECF No. 126 at 174-227 (state court file in the small claims action). Lynch attended two hearings in the foreclosure action, on June 29 and July 8, 2015, prior to filing this federal action on September 16, 2015. ECF No. 119 ¶ 39.² He never appeared in court for the small claims action. ECF No. 119 ¶ 52. Judgment was rendered in the small claims action on September 25, 2015. ECF No. 126 at 214-15. The foreclosure action effectively ended with the sale of the property in April 2018. See ECF No. 77; ECF No. 126 at 378.

Lynch submitted at least 48 ADA accommodation requests to the Judicial Branch before filing the operative complaint in this action, ECF No. 119 ¶¶ 31, 34-35; ECF No. 126 at 143-45 (summarizing Lynch's ADA accommodation requests beginning April 23, 2014 and ending January 28, 2019); ECF No. 120-1 at 2-3 (listing at least 46 ADA accommodation requests or grievances beginning April 23, 2014 and ending January 3, 2019). Lynch's accommodation requests included those for: (1) audio recordings of court proceedings, ECF No. 119 ¶ 51; (2) a notetaker as an auxiliary aid, ECF No. 119 ¶ 76; and (3) breaks during court proceedings, ECF No. 119 ¶ 75.³ In his requests for accommodation, Lynch "indicated that accommodations were necessary because of his extreme depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD], legal abuse syndrome, and heart condition." ECF No. 119 ¶ 67; ECF No. 120-1 at 7. Lynch also claimed that the major life activities affected by his disabilities included: (1) sleep/sleep patterns/inability to sleep; (2) breathing/heart rate/elevated blood pressure; (3) inability to focus/concentrate/communicate; (4) reading/writing/note taking; and (5) digestive/eating. ECF No. 119 ¶ 68; ECF No. 126 at 79-84; ECF No. 120-1 at 1113-15. Lynch "does not experience issues with his breathing, heart rate, or blood pressure when engaging in athletic activities or with writing, research, or public speaking activities outside of the court context, even when he has tight deadlines." ECF No. 119 ¶ 71. By contrast, "when required to write, research, or speakin the court context, [Lynch] experiences increased heart rate, difficulty breathing, and an increase in blood pressure for several days before and after the court event or deadline." Id. ¶ 72; see also ECF No. 120-1 at 7. The Judicial Branch began providing Lynch with audio recording in September 2015. ECF No. 119 ¶ 26; ECF No. 120-1 at 1632; ECF No. 126 at 6-7, 17.⁴ Lynch was also authorized to bring an individual with him to court to take notes on his behalf, but he did not do so. ECF No. 119 ¶ 76.

Since April 2014, Lynch has relied on friends and family for a place to live. ECF No. 119 ¶¶ 48-49; Deposition of Daniel Lynch, ECF No. 126 at 40 ("I have been at the mercy of people who[] have put me up for free. And my brother in Granby, and my sister in Cheshire, a friend of a friend in Cheshire . . . . I have not had the capability to rent, nor have I rented any housing of any sort . . . since . . . March 2014 time-frame. And I have had temporary housing in some cases temporary as just a couple of days, and some cases several weeks . . . ."). Lynch's difficulties in the state court actions derived, at least in part, from his "lack of a stable home", ECF No. 119 ¶ 49; ECF No. 226 at 57-58, and his pro se status, ECF No. 119 ¶¶ 59-60, 80.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657-58 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In reviewing the summary judgment record, a court must "construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417, 427 (2d Cir.2013). "A genuine dispute of material fact exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could decide in that party's favor." Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden, "the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Judicial Branch has moved for summary judgment as to all of Lynch's claims, arguing that: (1) there is "a lack of evidence that [Lynch] is a qualified individual with a disability under either the ADA or the [Rehabilitation Act] . . .", ECF No. 105-1 at 1; (2) " even if he were [such a qualified individual], [Lynch] was not as a practical matter denied meaningful access to the state courts in either the foreclosure action or the small claims action, by reason of his disability or otherwise", id.; (3) Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars Lynch's ADA claims, id. at 34; and (4) Lynch cannot meet the Rehabilitation Act's causation or deliberate indifference standards, id. at 39. Lynch has responded by arguing that, based on the record evidence, a reasonable jury could decide that the Judicial Branch violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, ECF No. 118 at 1, and that sovereign immunity does not bar his claims under the ADA, id. at 27. I agree with the Judicial Branch and find that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Lynch's failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act cannot survive summary judgment.

A. The Legal Framework

1. ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

Title II of the ADA provides in relevant part that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act similarly provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). "[A]lthough there are subtle differences between these disability acts, the standards adopted by Title II of the ADA for State and local government services are generally the same as those required under section 504 of federally assisted programs and activities." Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless one of these "subtle differences" applies to a particular case, courts in the Second Circuit treat claims under the two statutes identically. Id.; see also Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 146 n.6 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Apart from the Rehabilitation Act's limitation to denials of benefits 'solely' by reason of disability and its reach of only federally funded—as opposed to 'public'—entities, the reach and requirements of both statutes are precisely the same."). Because none of these differences is relevant to the ruling that follows, I consider Lynch's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims together.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must...