Lynch v. United States

1

DANIEL LANE LYNCH, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Criminal Action No. 4:20-CR-0223

Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-4148

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

April 3, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Christina A. Bryan, United States Magistrate Judge

Petitioner Daniel Lane Lynch, a federal inmate who is proceeding pro se filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody.^[1] ECF 62. As ordered by the Court, the Government has filed a response in the form of a Motion for Summary Judgment.^[2] ECF 71. Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the law, the Court recommends that the Government's motion be GRANTED and Lynch's Petition pursuant to § 2255 be DENIED with prejudice.

I. Background

On May 27, 2020, a grand jury in the Southern District of Texas indicted Lynch, a former officer with the Harris County Precinct 4 Constable and Montgomery County Precinct Three Constable, on three counts of distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. ECF 12. Pursuant to a September 1, 2021 signed plea agreement, Lynch pleaded guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography. ECF 35, 56. On November 23, 2021, the Court sentenced Lynch to 151 months of incarceration for receipt and 120 months of incarceration for possession of child pornography, to be followed by 10-years concurrent supervised release. ECF 56. The Court dismissed the distribution count on the Government's motion. Id. Judgment was entered on December 3, 2021. Id. As part of the plea agreement, Lynch waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence for any reason other than ineffective assistance of counsel. ECF 35 at 4. Lynch's judgment and sentence became final on December 17, 2021. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (a defendant in a criminal case must file a notice of appeal within 14 days of entry of judgment).

Lynch timely filed his § 2255 Petition on November 28,2022, within one year of his sentence becoming final. Lynch asserts that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that his counsel was ineffective by not advising him of grounds for a Fourth Amendment challenge before he decided to accept a plea agreement. See ECF 62 at 13-15. The Government moves for summary judgment, arguing that: Lynch waived his Fourth Amendment claims; Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable in a § 2255 action; and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit. ECF 71.

II. Summary Judgment Standards

The Government's summary judgment motion is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. United States v. Zuniga, No. CIV.A. H-14-0456, 2014 WL 6982290, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2014) (noting that under Rule 12 of the Rules governing § 2255 motions, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is generally applicable to such motions). Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). Dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 2002). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and must present evidence such as affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file to show “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

III. Relief under Section 2255

“Section 2255 provides the primary means of collaterally attacking a federal conviction and sentence.” Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir.2000)). Generally, there are four grounds upon which a defendant may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or law of the United States; (2) the district court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

The scope of collateral challenges under § 2255 is extremely limited. United States v. Smith, 32 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1994). If the error complained of is not of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, the movant must show the error could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice. Id. Section 2255 is not meant to serve as a vehicle for appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982).

The pleadings of a pro se prisoner are reviewed under a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney and are provided a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is still required to provide sufficient facts to support his claims, and “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.” United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22,23 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). A § 2255 motion may be resolved without an evidentiary hearing where the files, the motion, and the record of the case conclusively show that no relief is appropriate. United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983). A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if the existing record proves the likely merit of a petitioner's specific allegations. United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1111 (5th Cir. 1998).

IV. Analysis

A. Lynch waived his Fourth Amendment claims and they are not cognizable under § 2255.

Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable in § 2255 proceedings because they can be brought at the trial court level. United States v. Ishmael, 343 F.3d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to reach the merits of a Fourth Amendment issue on collateral review under § 2255 because the claim was barred by the holding in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). In Stone, the Supreme Court held that where the “State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,” a state prisoner cannot be granted habeas relief based on an unconstitutional search or seizure. 428 U.S. at 494. The Fifth Circuit recognized in Ishmael that the holding in Stone also applies to bar a Fourth Amendment claim under § 2255 by a defendant who had the opportunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim in a federal court. Ishmael, 343 F.3d at 742. The Fifth Circuit has “interpreted an ‘opportunity for full and fair litigation' to mean just that: ‘an opportunity.'” Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Carver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978)). Regardless of whether Lynch actually litigated his Fourth Amendment claims in the federal trial court, he had the opportunity to do so.

Additionally, by entering into an unconditional, voluntary guilty plea, Lynch waived the right to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge. United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 286 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating a guilty plea waives all objections that a search and seizure violates the Fourth Amendment). An express waiver of the right to appeal or to file a collateral attack contained in a plea agreement is enforceable. United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2012). A federal court will uphold a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. The critical issue is whether the defendant understood the nature and substance of the charges and the consequences of his plea, not necessarily the “technical legal effect.” James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995).

A petitioner's attestation of voluntariness at the time of the plea does not operate as an absolute bar to relief but imposes a heavy burden on him to show that his plea was “the product of. . . misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others”. United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977). Lynch does not claim misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation and the record demonstrates that he entered his guilty plea knowingly, freely, and voluntarily. Nothing in the record indicates that he lacked an understanding of the charges, the plea agreement, or the consequences of the plea. See ECF 69 at 1-37. In fact, Lynch was specifically informed that he was giving up the right to complain about any search or seizure as part of his guilty plea and, while under oath, clearly expressed his understanding. ECF 69 at 10-11. A defendant cannot contradict his sworn statements in court by conclusory statements in a § 2255 motion. United States v. Sanderson, 595 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1979).

Because Lynch's Fourth Amendment claims are both waived and barred from collateral review pursuant to the holdings in Stone v. Powell and United States v. Ishmael, Lynch cannot succeed on his Motion to vacate based on a Fourth Amendment violation. Thus, the United States is entitled to summary judgment on Lynch's Motion with respect to his claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

B. Lynch cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.

Lynch makes the following...