Lynn C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

LYNN C.,^[1] Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 21-CV-00112-LJV

United States District Court, W.D. New York

June 20, 2023

DECISION & ORDER

LAWRENCE J. VILARDO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On January 21, 2021, the plaintiff, Lynn C (“Lynn”), brought this action under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Docket Item 1. She seeks review of the determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) that she was not disabled.^[2] Id. On December 14, 2021 Lynn moved for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 7; on May 13, 2022, the Commissioner responded and cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 8; and on June 24 2022, Lynn replied, Docket Item 9.

For the reasons that follow, this Court denies Lynn's motion and grants the Commissioner's cross-motion.^[3]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The scope of review of a disability determination . . . involves two levels of inquiry.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). The court “must first decide whether [the Commissioner] applied the correct legal principles in making the determination.” Id. This includes ensuring “that the claimant has had a full hearing under the . . . regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Social Security Act.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (alterations omitted) (quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)). Then, the court “decide[s] whether the determination is supported by ‘substantial evidence.'” Johnson, 817 F.2d at 985 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). “Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles.” Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986.

DISCUSSION

I. THE ALJ'S DECISION

On March 5, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Lynn had not been under a disability between her alleged disability onset date, June 30, 2017, and the date of the decision. See Docket Item 5 at 18-32. The ALJ's decision was based on the five-step sequential evaluation process under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). See id.

At step one, the ALJ found that Lynn met the insured status requirements of the Act through March 31, 2023, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date. Id. at 20-21. At step two, the ALJ found that Lynn suffered from several severe, medically determinable impairments: fibromyalgia, inflammatory polyarthropathy, lumbar spine spondylosis with myelopathy, chronic pain syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder with panic attacks, obesity, left foot degenerative joint disease, and right foot first metatarsophalangeal joint osteoarthritis. Id. at 21.

At step three, the ALJ found that Lynn's severe, medically determinable impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See id. at 21-24. More specifically, the ALJ found that Lynn's physical impairments did not meet or medically equal listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint due to any cause), 1.04 (disorders of the spine), or 14.09 (inflammatory arthritis). Id. at 21. The ALJ likewise concluded that Lynn's mental impairments did not meet or medically equal listings 12.04 (depressive, bipolar, and related disorders), 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), and 12.15 (trauma- and stressor-related disorders). Id. at 22. In assessing Lynn's mental impairments, the ALJ found that Lynn was: (1) mildly impaired in understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) mildly impaired in interacting with others; (3) moderately impaired in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) moderately impaired in adapting or managing herself. Id. at 23-24.

The ALJ then found that Lynn had the RFC^[4] to perform “medium work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) with the following additional limitations:

[Lynn] can frequently operate hand controls, reach, push, pull, handle, finger, and feel with both upper extremities. [Lynn] can occasionally push or pull or operate foot controls with both lower extremities. [Lynn] can frequently kneel, crouch, stoop, balance, and crawl, and [she] can frequently climb stairs and ramps. [Lynn] can never climb ladders, ropes[,] and scaffolds, and [she] can never be exposed to unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts. [Lynn] can tolerate occasional exposure to vibration. In addition, [Lynn] is able to understand, carry-out, and remember simple instructions, and make simple[,] work[-]related decisions. [Lynn] can occasionally deal with changes in a routine work setting.

Id. at 24-25.

At step four, the ALJ found that Lynn was unable to perform her past relevant work as a senior credit analyst. Id. at 30; see Dictionary of Occupational Titles 241.267 022, 1991 WL 672242 (Jan. 1, 2016). But given Lynn's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found at step five that Lynn could perform substantial gainful activity as an assembler or a counter-supply worker. Docket Item 5 at 30-31; see Dictionary of Occupational Titles 806.684-010, 1991 WL 681470 (Jan. 1, 2016); id. at 319.687-010, 1991 WL 672772. Therefore, the ALJ found that Lynn was not entitled to DIB or SSI. Docket Item 5 at 31-32.

II. ALLEGATIONS

Lynn argues that the ALJ erred in two ways. See Docket Item 7-1. First, she argues that the ALJ's RFC determination did not account for the full extent of her impairment in mental work-related functioning as found by a consultative examiner, Agnes R. Jonas, Psy.D., and a state agency psychological consultant, M. Tatar, Ph.D. Id. at 11. Second, she argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints. Id. at 15. This Court disagrees and therefore affirms the Commissioner's finding of no disability.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Dr. Jonas's and Dr. Tartar's Findings

Lynn first argues that the ALJ's RFC determination did not account for Dr. Jonas's finding that Lynn was moderately impaired in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being or Dr. Tartar's finding that Lynn could handle routine work “that did not involve timed tasks.” See Docket Item 7-1 at 15.

An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 Fed.Appx. 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013); accord Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). But that does not mean that the RFC needs to “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in [the ALJ's] decision.” Matta, 508 Fed.Appx. at 56. As long as the ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately analyzes the medical opinions, an RFC consistent with the record is not error. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; see also Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that remand is not necessary “[w]here an ALJ's analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant's functional limitations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence”).

Dr. Jonas examined Lynn on May 23, 2018, and opined, among other things, that Lynn was moderately impaired in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being. See Docket Item 5 at 470. The ALJ found Dr. Jonas's opinion “somewhat persuasive” because it was consistent with the other medical evidence in the record and supported by Dr. Jonas's own examination of Lynn. Id. at 29.

Dr. Tartar assessed Lynn's mental residual functional capacity as a part of the initial disability determination. See id. at 57-58, 61-63, 70-71, 74-76. Dr. Tartar concluded that Lynn's “ability to handle stress and pressure in the work place [sic] [was] reduced but adequate to handle the stresses of routine work that did not involve timed tasks.” Id. at 63, 76. The ALJ found Dr. Tartar's opinion “persuasive.” Id. at 29.

Lynn says that the RFC did not account for either Dr. Jonas's finding of moderate impairment in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being or Dr. Tartar's finding that she could perform “routine work that did not involve timed tasks.” See Docket Item 7-1 at 15. This Court disagrees.

First the ALJ certainly addressed the extent to which Dr. Jonas and Dr. Tartar found Lynn to be impaired in her mental work-related functioning. The ability to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being-the basis for Dr. Jonas's finding that Lynn was moderately impaired-simply describes a claimant's ability to adapt or mange himself or herself. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1 § 12.00E(4). Along the same lines, Dr. Tartar's opinion that Lynn could “handle the stresses of routine work that did not involve timed tasks,” Docket Item 5 at 63, 76, was also related to Lynn's moderate impairment in adapting and managing herself, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x § 12.00E(4) (describing examples of a claimant's ability to adapt or manage oneself to include “[r]esponding to demands; adapting to changes; [and] managing [his or her] psychologically based symptoms”). And the ALJ agreed with Dr. Jonas and Dr. Tartar that Lynn's ability to adapt or...