M. T. v. Pa. State Police of Pa.

298 A.3d 466

M. T., Petitioner

v.The PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent

No. 94 M.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs March 24, 2023

Decided July 11, 2023

Jason Javie, Philadelphia, for Petitioner.

Melissa Zeigler, Deputy Attorney General, Philadelphia, for Respondent.

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge, HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge, HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE CEISLER

Before this Court are the Preliminary Objections filed by the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to M.T.’s First Amended Petition for Review for Declaratory Judgment and a Writ of Mandamus (Amended Petition), seeking to dismiss the Amended Petition under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4) for failure to state a legally sufficient claim for relief. In his Amended Petition, M.T. challenges PSP's imposition of a lifetime sex offender registration requirement based on his prior conviction for sex offenses in the State of Utah on numerous grounds. For the reasons that follow, we sustain PSP's Preliminary Objections and dismiss the Amended Petition.

Background

On June 17, 2014, following a jury trial, M.T. was convicted in Utah of eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under former Utah Code § 76-5a-3(1)(a). Am. Pet. ¶¶ 3-4; see M.T. Answer to Prelim. Objs., Ex. B. The Utah conviction was based on M.T.’s possession of child pornography, for which he was arrested in February 2011. See M.T. Answer to Prelim. Objs., Ex. B.¹ Three months after M.T.’s arrest, but before his conviction, the Utah legislature renumbered Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) of the Utah Code as Section 76-5b-201.² See PSP Br. in Support of Prelim. Objs., Ex. B.

M.T.’s criminal "conviction implicated sex offender registration requirements in Utah." Am. Pet. ¶ 5. M.T. avers that he subsequently moved to Pennsylvania, after which PSP informed him that he was subject to a 10-year sex offender registration requirement. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. However, on April 22, 2021, PSP notified M.T. that he would be subject to lifetime registration, allegedly without any explanation for the change in registration. Id. ¶ 9.³

On September 14, 2022, M.T. filed his Amended Petition in this Court's original jurisdiction, seeking a declaration "that [he] is subject to a registration period of 10 years pursuant to [Section 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A) of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II),] 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A) [,] as a matter of law" and a writ of mandamus compelling PSP to change his registration period to [10] years...." Id. ¶ 35. M.T. also seeks a declaration that "as applied to [him], [Section 9799.56 of SORNA II,] 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.56 [,] violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution" and "that the reclassification at issue ran afoul of [his] reliance expectations, his right to reputation and due process and was an illegal modification of his criminal justice sentence." Id.

On September 15, 2022, PSP filed its Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer to the Amended Petition. Specifically, PSP asserts that M.T. was convicted of sex offenses in Utah that, under Utah law, require lifetime registration as a sex offender. Thus, PSP asserts that M.T. is likewise subject to lifetime registration in Pennsylvania under Section 9799.56(b)(4)(i) and (iii) of SORNA II, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.56(b)(4)(i) and (iii). PSP further contends that M.T.’s constitutional claims are foreclosed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe , 660 Pa. 568, 234 A.3d 602 (2020).

On October 2, 2022, M.T. filed an Answer to the Preliminary Objections, asserting that because the criminal statute under which he was convicted, former Utah Code § 76-5a-3(1)(a), is no longer in effect, Utah law does not impose a reporting obligation for a conviction under that statute. M.T. asserts that he should instead be subject to a 10-year registration requirement, because his Utah conviction is similar to the Pennsylvania offense of possession of child pornography under Section 6312 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312,⁴ which carries a 10-year registration requirement. Thus, M.T. asserts that, under Section 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A) of SORNA II, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A), he is subject to a 10-year registration period. In the alternative, M.T. asserts that PSP's increase of his registration period from 10 years to lifetime violated the equal protection clause, his right to reputation, and the prohibition of ex post facto laws.

Both parties have also filed briefs with this Court in support of their respective positions.⁵

Analysis

1. Applicable Registration Period

PSP first asserts that the Amended Petition fails to state a legally sufficient claim because M.T.’s lifetime registration obligation under SORNA II is based on his Utah conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor, which requires lifetime registration in Utah. In response, M.T. asserts that the statute of conviction, former Utah Code § 76-5a-3(1)(a), has been "repeal[ed]" and, as a result, Utah's sex offender registration law does not impose a registration requirement on a person convicted under former Section 76-5a-3(1)(a). M.T. Answer to Prelim Objs. ¶ 11. Thus, M.T. contends that because Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) is "no longer on the books," PSP must impose the registration period applicable to the equivalent criminal offense under Pennsylvania law, which is 10 years. Id. ¶ 10. We disagree.

Subchapter I of SORNA II governs the continued registration of sex offenders who were convicted of a sex offense committed between April 22, 1996, and December 20, 2012, and whose period of registration had not expired at the time of SORNA II's enactment in 2018. See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.52(1) and 9799.54(a)(4). Section 9799.56(b) of Subchapter I applies to individuals, such as M.T., who were "convicted or sentenced by a court ... in jurisdictions outside this Commonwealth." Id. § 9799.56(b). In particular, Section 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) provides in relevant part:

[I ]f the individual has been convicted or sentenced by a court ... for an offense listed in [S ]ection 9799.55(a) or an equivalent offense, the individual shall be , notwithstanding [S]ection 9799.53, considered an offender and subject to registration under this subchapter. The individual shall also be subject to the provisions of this [S]ection and [S]ections 9799.60 and 9799.63(c)(2). The individual shall be subject to this subchapter for a period of 10 years or for a period of time equal to the time for which the individual was required to register in the other jurisdiction ..., whichever is greater , less any credit due to the individual as a result of prior compliance with registration requirements.

Id. § 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) (emphasis added). The list of offenses in Section 9799.55(a) of Subchapter I includes " 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children)," which criminalizes the possession of child pornography and carries a 10-year registration obligation. Id. § 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A) ; see id. § 9799.55(a)(3) (stating that the 10-year registration period applies to individuals who reside in Pennsylvania but "who have been convicted of offenses similar to the crimes" listed in Section 9799.55(a)(1) and (2) in another state).⁶

Pursuant to Section 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) of Subchapter I, we must look to Utah law to determine whether the registration obligations for the equivalent offenses in Utah and Pennsylvania differ. M.T. was convicted in Utah of sexual exploitation of a minor under former Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) of the Utah Code, renumbered as Section 76-5b-201. Under Utah law, a conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor requires lifetime registration. See Utah Code § 77-41-105(3)(c)(1) (West 2023) ("An offender convicted as an adult of an offense listed in Section 77-41-106 shall, for the offender's lifetime, register each year ....") (emphasis added); Utah Code § 77-41-106(11) (West 2023) (identifying Utah Code § 76-5b-201, sexual exploitation of a minor, as an offense subject to lifetime registration). Pennsylvania law, however, imposes a 10-year registration period for the equivalent offense of sexual abuse of children. Therefore, under Section 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) of Subchapter I, M.T. is subject to Utah's longer registration period, which is lifetime registration.⁷

Furthermore, PSP asserts that M.T. is also required to register for life under Section 9799.56(b)(4)(i) of Subchapter I, which provides in relevant part:

If the individual has been ... determined under the laws of the other jurisdiction ... to be subject to active notification and lifetime registration ... on the basis of a statute ... requiring active notification and lifetime registration based solely on the offense for which the individual was convicted , sentenced or court martialed, the individual shall, notwithstanding [S]ection 9799.53, be considered a sexually violent predator and subject to lifetime registration under [S ]ection 9799.55(b).

42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.56(b)(4)(i) (emphasis added). Again, the Utah Code imposed a lifetime registration obligation on M.T. based on his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor. Consequently, pursuant to Section 9799.56(b)(4)(i) of Subchapter I, M.T. is "considered a sexually violent predator and subject to lifetime registration" in Pennsylvania. Id. Therefore, we agree with PSP that under both subsections (i) and (iii) of Section 9799.56(b)(4), M.T. is required to register for life in Pennsylvania.

M.T.’s repeated assertion before this Court that the Utah offense of which he was convicted was "repealed" and is "no longer on the books" is erroneous. See M.T. Answer to Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 10-11; M.T. Suppl. Br. in Opp'n to Prelim. Objs. at 4-5, 10, 12. This Court's research reveals that the offense of sexual exploitation of a minor is still on the books in Utah; former Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) of the Utah Code was merely "renumbered" as ...