M.T. v. Uniontown Area Sch. Dist.

M.T., a minor by and through Amber H., Plaintiff, v. UNIONTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT and ZACHARY DICE, Defendants.

Civil No. 20-614

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 3, 2021

OPINION

Plaintiff M.T., a minor by and through Amber H., filed suit against Defendants Uniontown Area School District and Zachary Dice alleging that Mr. Dice, a former teacher and assistant band director employed by the Uniontown Area School District, engaged in unlawful sexual activity with the minor M.T., on school property. Am. Compl., Aug. 6, 2020, ECF No. 12. Pending before the Court are the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 13 & 22. For the reasons that follow, the Uniontown Area School District's Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and Mr. Dice's Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND¹

The relevant time period of the events alleged in the Amended Complaint is from approximately April 2019 and continuing through the Fall of 2019. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 19, 24, 25. During this time period Plaintiff M.T. was a minor child under the age of 18, a student at the Uniontown Area High School, and a member of the High School band. Id. ¶¶ 5, 10. DefendantZachary Dice was employed by Defendant Uniontown Area School District as an elementary school teacher. Id. ¶ 9. In August 2018, Mr. Dice became the High School's assistant band director, which included the responsibility to supervise and instruct band members. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. In April 2019, Mr. Dice engaged in intimate and inappropriate text messaging with M.T., including repeated requests to engage in sex. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. On August 30, 2019, after the band returned from an away football game, Mr. Dice engaged in improper and illegal sexual activity with M.T. in an unmonitored school stairwell. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. Mr. Dice engaged in sexual activity with M.T. three additional times in the same unmonitored stairwell. Id. ¶ 24-25. Each subsequent sexual assault occurred after the band returned to the High School from attending an away football game during the Fall 2019 season. Id. ¶ 25. M.T. alleges that Mr. Dice chose the particular stairwell specifically because it was known to be unmonitored. Id. ¶¶ 21, 45. At all relevant times, M.T. was a minor child legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity with Mr. Dice. Id. ¶¶ 18, 23, 26.

With respect to the School District, M.T. alleges that it "had actual knowledge, through its agents and/or representatives, of previous sexual activities performed at the same location on its property as the location of the assaults committed by Defendant Dice." Id. ¶¶ 27, 42. M.T. alleges that the School District took no action to prevent further sexual activity from occurring in the unmonitored stairwell, despite having actual knowledge that sexual activity had occurred in that stairwell. Id. ¶ 28. M.T. alleges that by failing to act with respect to the unmonitored stairwell the School District increased the risk that a sexual assault would occur in the stairwell. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30, 46. The School District's "inaction incudes, but is not limited to, failing to monitor the [stairwell] with the use of security cameras." Id. ¶ 29. M.T. alleges that the "DefendantDistrict exposed the Plaintiff to foreseeable harm, i.e., an assault by Defendant Dice, and thereby willfully disregarded the safety of the Plaintiff." Id. ¶ 44. M.T. alleges that the School District's prior knowledge of sexual activities in the stairwell, and its failure to act to stop such sexual activities, "created the opportunity for injury and harm to the Plaintiff." Id. at 46. M.T. alleges that the School District acted with willful disregard in permitting a dangerous condition to persist, which constitutes deliberate indifference by the School District to M.T.'s rights. Id. ¶¶ 32, 47. Finally, M.T. specifically alleges that the School District's deliberate indifference resulted in the sexual assaults on M.T. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33, 46.

In Count I, M.T. asserts a Due Process constitutional claim against the School District pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count II, she claims that Mr. Dice violated her constitutional right to bodily integrity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, in Count III, asserts state law claims of assault and battery against Mr. Dice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008)). "To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Courtclarified that this plausibility standard should not be conflated with a higher probability standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff when determining if the complaint should be dismissed. Trzaska v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 865 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 22, 2017). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only "put forth allegations that 'raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].'" Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.2016). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000). If the court decides to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must next decide whether leave to amend the complaint must be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has "instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 states in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. s 1983. "Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, create substantive rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws." Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). Here, M.T. properly alleges a violation of her constitutional right to bodily integrity as a result of Mr. Dice's sexual assaults. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that students have a constitutional right to be free "from invasion of [their] personal security through sexual abuse." Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir.1989). Thus, M.T. "has a liberty interest in her bodily integrity that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, an interest that is violated by sexual molestation by a teacher." Douglas v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., No. 2:10-CV-1087, 2010 WL 5313448, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010) (citing Black v. Indiana Area School District, 985 F.2d 707, 709 n. 1 (3d Cir.1993)). The analysis of section 1983 claims differs with respect to each Defendant. The Court will first address the claim as to the School District and then, as to Mr. Dice.

1. The School District

M.T. alleges that the School District was deliberately indifferent to a dangerous condition that permitted Mr. Dice to sexually assault her. She alleges that the School District failed to take any action to address the dangerous condition in the unmonitored stairwell, even though the School District knew that sexual activities had occurred in the stairwell. There are potentially two theories under which a section 1983 claim may be brought against the School District: the "state created danger" theory and the municipal liability theory as set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).²

b. State-Created Danger

The "state-created danger" theory applies when 'the state's own actions create the very danger that causes the plaintiff's injury.'" Keener v. Hribal, 351 F. Supp. 3d 956, 970 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)). Under the state created danger theory a plaintiff must prove the following elements:

1. The harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;

2. A state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the

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