M.Y. v. Copeland

M.Y., et al., Plaintiffs, v. DON COPELAND, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:21-cv-00530-CDP

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

September 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CAHRINC PERRY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Bernard Hooks^[1] for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No 2). Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1). Additionally for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8^th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8^th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8^th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8^th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8^thCir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action on behalf of himself, as well as Maggie Cotton and M.Y. He names six defendants: (1) Don Copeland, President of Fisher & Co. Real Estate Services; (2) Yalima Holdings LLC; (3) the St. Louis County Police Department; (4) the St. Louis County Government; (5) Julia M. Lutovich; and (6) Solid Real Estate Group LLC. (Docket No. 1 at 2-3). Plaintiff asserts that this Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction because of an “Executive Order regarding [the] pandemic” that provided a “moratorium [on the] adverse possession laws for the State of Missouri.” (Docket No. 1 at 4). Further, he states that this case involves his civil rights, his Missouri squatter's rights, maritime and admiralty laws, and “the rights of the Native[] Americans and Moorish American aboriginal rights to land and possession of land.”

The complaint concerns plaintiff's physical removal from the property at 1470 Villa Lago Drive in St. Louis Missouri. According to plaintiff, the “defendants committed a criminal offense by violating [his] civil rights and engaging in a civil matter” when a police sergeant ordered “his officers on duty to assist a landowner in removing [him] and [his] family as squatters.. .out of the land owner[']s property.” (Docket No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff states that this occurred on April 26, 2021 at 9:30 a.m., and that the St. Louis County Police sergeant gave “6 police officer[s] the order to enter the premises that [he] and [his] family were currently in adverse possession with drawn guns.”

Plaintiff contends that the actions of the St. Louis County Police Department were taken “in favor of the landowner who was aware of [his] adverse possession of 1470 Villa Lago.” He also states that the police assisted the landowner by “drilling holes in locks in order to regain possession.” Plaintiff further alleges that his fourteen year-old daughter was run out of the property “with guns, ” and that his family was left on the streets without their personal property.

As a result of this incident, plaintiff seeks $25 million for physical damage to the property and for mental harm caused by the violation of his “civil and human rights.” (Docket No. 1 at 5).

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges that his civil rights were violated when he was removed from property over which he claims he had “adverse possession.” Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court must dismiss this action without prejudice.

A. Construction of Complaint as Arising Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to decide a certain class of cases. LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8^th Cir. 2006). “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). See also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”). The presence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8^th Cir. 1990). See also Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8^th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in every federal case is jurisdiction and we have admonished the district court to be attentive to a satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”). As such, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982 (8^th Cir. 2009).

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over both federal question cases and diversity of citizenship cases. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian Reservation, 495 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8^th Cir. 2007) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking if neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction applies); and McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8^th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress has directed that district courts shall have jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity cases). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8^th Cir. 2000).

In this case, while plaintiff has filled out the section of the form complaint alleging diversity of citizenship, he has not shown that diversity exists among the parties. “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over civil actions when the matter in controversy exceeds $75, 000, without considering interest and costs, and when the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from the citizenship of each defendant.” Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8^th Cir. 2001).

With regard to diversity of the parties, “[c]omplete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8^th Cir. 2007). For purposes of diversity, state citizenship requires an individual's physical presence in the state coupled with an indefinite intention there to remain. Blakemore v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 789 F.2d 616, 618 (8^th Cir. 1986).

As to the jurisdictional amount, plaintiff has alleged $25 million, which is above the $75, 000 threshold. However, several of the defendants appear to be Missouri citizens, just like plaintiff. Since he has not shown that his citizenship is different from that of each defendant, plaintiff has not carried his burden of establishing diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Plaintiff also asserts that there is federal question jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction gives district courts “original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1188 (8^th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff's complaint must establish “either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 702 (8^th Cir. 1998). See also Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8^th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[a] non-frivolous claim...