Macalla v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.

Gordon MACALLA et al. v. AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC.

No. CV176073273S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

December 31, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

James W. Abrams, Judge

The plaintiffs brought this matter by Complaint dated August 15 2017 against the defendant, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. On August 11, 2018, the defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that the present case is barred by the prior pending action doctrine. The plaintiffs filed an Objection to the Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 17, 2018, along with a supporting memorandum of law The matter was heard before the court at short calendar on September 24, 2018.

I FACTS

On September 5, 2017, the plaintiffs, Gordon MacCalla, Alexis Tomarelli, Tyler Grailich, John Cronin, Timothy Yurksaitis and Cate Sadlier, filed the present complaint against the defendant, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. alleging the following facts. The defendant made a clear and unambiguous promise to the plaintiffs that if they came to work for the defendant as emergency medical responders, the plaintiffs could retain simultaneous employment in the same basic capacity with Valley Emergency Service, Inc. and/or Danbury Ambulance Service, Inc. The defendant should have reasonably expected the plaintiffs to work for the defendant in reliance on said promise and the plaintiffs did come to work for the defendant in reliance on said promise. Enforcement of the defendant’s promise is essential to avoid injustice and detriment to the plaintiffs. The complaint sounds in six counts of promissory estoppel, brought by each of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs request money damages and such other relief as the court deems fair and equitable.

Previously on December 17, 2012, the same plaintiffs filed a 30-count complaint in this court against the defendant, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with business expectancies, and CUTPA. See MacCalla v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6035009-S (2013 case). After a number of substitutions and withdrawals, the only remaining counts in the 2013 case sounded in promissory estoppel (see # 125 and # 128). On September 6, 2016, the same plaintiffs filed another complaint in this court against the defendant, alleging that the defendant’s conduct violated the Connecticut Antitrust Act, General Statutes § 35-24 et seq. (CATA). See MacCalla v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-16-6064679-S (2016 case). The defendant filed a motion to consolidate the two cases, and the motion was granted by this court, Abrams, J., on April 19, 2017.

On August 2, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for entry of a nonsuit or default in the 2013 case, requesting a judgment of dismissal against the plaintiffs for failure to comply with discovery. The plaintiffs objected to this motion; however, on August 11, 2017, this court, Abrams, J., overruled the objection and dismissed the 2013 case. The plaintiffs have since filed an appeal from this court’s decision overruling their objection to motion for nonsuit and judgment of dismissal.

II DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standards

"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ... However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ... the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ... of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).

"The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ... When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ... Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, 322 Conn. 566, 573, 142 A.3d 1079 (2016). "To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts ... which contradict those stated in the movant’s affidavits and documents." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn.App. 347, 358, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).

B. Prior Pending Action Doctrine

"[T]he prior pending action doctrine permits the court to dismiss a second case that raises issues currently pending before the court. The pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the same parties, brought to obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good cause for abatement. It is so, because there cannot be any reason or necessity for bringing the second, and, therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious. This is a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and always, where the two suits are virtually alike, and in the same jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 395-96, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).

"The policy behind the prior pending action doctrine is to prevent unnecessary litigation that places a burden on our state’s already crowded court dockets ... The rule, however, is not one of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law ... Accordingly, the existence of claims that are virtually alike does not, in every case, require dismissal of a complaint ... We recognize that this statement of the scope of the doctrine’s application, on the one hand, provides that the existence of claims that are virtually alike does not require dismissal in every case ... while also suggesting that the doctrine is always applicable where the two actions are virtually alike, and in the same jurisdiction." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer, supra, 292 Conn. 396-97.

To determine whether the doctrine applies, "the trial court must determine in the first instance whether the two actions are: (1) exactly alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction; (2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights of the parties, but perhaps seeking different remedies; or (3) insufficiently similar to warrant the doctrine’s application. In order to determine whether the actions are virtually alike, we must examine the pleadings ... to ascertain whether the actions are brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights of the parties ... If the two actions are exactly alike or lacking in sufficient similarities, the trial court has no discretion. In the former case, the court must dismiss the second action, and in the latter instance, the court must allow both cases to proceed unabated. Where the actions are virtually, but not exactly alike, however, the trial court exercises discretion in determining whether the circumstances justify dismissal of the second action." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer, supra, 381 Conn. 397-98. 1) The defendant’s Motion raises two issues: 1) Are claims seeking to invoke the prior pending action doctrine properly raised in motions to dismiss rather than motions for summary judgment and; 2) Even if properly raised, does the prior action sited in this case meet the test for the invocations of the prior pending action doctrine?

1. Must the Prior Pending Action Doctrine be raised by a Motion to Dismiss?

In their objection to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant impermissibly raised the prior pending action doctrine in a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss. At short calendar, the defendant argued that the prior pending action doctrine does not necessarily have to be raised in a motion to dismiss.

"Any claim that the pendency of a prior suit between the same parties, for the same thing, will abate a latter suit formerly could be raised by a plea in abatement ... The plea in abatement; Practice Book, 1963, § 93; has, however, since been replaced by the motion to dismiss." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Halpern v. Board of Education, 196 Conn. 647, 652 n.4, 495 A.2d 264 (1985). Accordingly, our appellate authority is clear that "a motion to dismiss is the proper vehicle to raise the issue of a prior pending action, [although] the doctrine does not truly implicate subject...