Macias v. Filippini

CLAUDIA MACIAS, Plaintiff v. LISA FILIPPINI; BILL MORONES; and BRIAN MILLER,each in his/her individual capacity, Defendants

CASE NO. 1:17-CV-1251 AWI EPG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 17, 2018

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) FROM DEFENDANT MILLER AND FROM DEFENDANTS FILIPPINI AND MORONES

(Doc. No.'s 12, 13)

Are allegations that school district officials "indefinitely banned" a parent from entering her child's elementary-school campus sufficient to state claims for free-speech retaliation and due-process infringement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? In her first amended complaint ("1AC"), Plaintiff claims that by imposing the indefinite ban without a hearing, and in retaliation for her advocating for her son's educational needs, Defendants violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants now move to dismiss each cause of action for failure to state a claim under which relief might be granted. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds:

(I) In light of California law, an alleged "indefinite ban" from a school campus is unreasonable, even respecting the school's status as a non-public forum, and imposing such a ban indicates a retaliatory motive;

(II) California law provides a sufficiently concrete right allowing for parents to participate in their child's education, such that an alleged "indefinite ban" cannot be imposed without a hearing; and

(III) Qualified immunity cannot attach, as the language of state law makes the unlawfulness of Defendants' ban sufficiently obvious.

Defendants' motions will be denied.

Background¹

In August of 2015, Plaintiff enrolled her son M.S. in the fourth grade at Romero Elementary School (part of the Gustine Unified School District in Gustine, California). See 1AC. Shortly after classes began, M.S. began experiencing "heightened anxiety issues because of his teacher's treatment of him." Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff met with Defendants Lisa Filippini, Principal of Romero Elementary School, and Bill Morones, Gustine School District Superintendent, requesting M.S. be transferred to a different classroom. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. The two school officials refused to order the transfer, but encouraged Plaintiff to observe M.S.'s classroom. Id. at ¶ 12. Thereafter, Plaintiff attempted to schedule an observation, but Principal Filippini responded with "shifting explanations of the school's parent-visitation policies." Id. at ¶ 13.

On September 18, 2015, Plaintiff and her husband arrived at the school for their appointment to observe in M.S.'s classroom, but were told by Principal Filippini "they could not visit the school without prior approval." Id. at ¶ 15. Principal Filippini accused Plaintiff of harassing the school's teachers, and told Plaintiff and her husband they could no longer come to the school. Id. at ¶ 14. Principal Filippini "refused to allow Plaintiff or her husband to tell their side of the events that occurred." Id. at ¶ 16. Sheriff's Deputy Brian Miller, the school resource officer, told Plaintiff that Principal Filippini "had the authority to ban her from the school," and said "he would arrest her if she ever returned to the school." Id. at ¶¶ 14, 17. Deputy Miller then escorted Plaintiff and her husband from school grounds. Id. at ¶ 18. Superintendent Morones "had knowledge of the ban, ratified the ban, did nothing to remedy the situation," "knew or should have known of Principal Filippini's wrongful and intentional conduct," and "banned Plaintiff consistent with the policy or custom of denying due process to parents." Id. at ¶ 22.

Plaintiff eventually transferred M.S. to a school in a different town and district because Defendants' actions "prevented her from participating in her son's education." Id. at ¶ 20.

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Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015).

In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must also "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Mollett, 795 F.3d at 1065. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "Plausibility" means "more than a sheer possibility," but less than a probability, and facts that are "merely consistent" with liability fall short of "plausibility." Id. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Ninth Circuit has distilled the following principles courts are to apply to Rule 12(b)(6) motions:

First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.

Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.

Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014).

If a motion to dismiss is granted, "[the] district court should grant leave to amend, even if no request to amend the pleading was made," unless amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).Analysis

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" against a person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980); Pittman v. Oregon, Employment Dep't, 509 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; rather it provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394 (1989). Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, the Plaintiffs must plead two essential elements: (1) that the Defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) that the Defendant caused them to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009).

"[I]f a [constitutional] violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established" at the time of the deprivation. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 2007). "Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). To be clearly established, the "[c]ontours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). This means the parties generally must identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as the defendant officer was held to have violated the plaintiff's constitutional right. Shafer v. County of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing White, 137 S. Ct. at 552). However, an exception to the 'case-on-point' rule exists for situations where the constitutional misconduct is "sufficiently obvious," such that the question is beyond debate. Id. at 1118, fn. 3. The salient question is whether, at the time of the encounter, "the state of the law ... gave [the officers] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional." Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481. "The plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly established[.]" Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014).

I. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges a claim of First Amendment retaliation against Principal Filippini and Deputy Miller. To establish such a claim, Plaintiff must have pleaded sufficient facts to show (1) she engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendants' actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendants' conduct. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006).

Defendants challenge Plaintiff's assertion that her actions leading up to the ban constitute protected speech.² Plaintiff has alleged that both she and her husband met and communicated multiple times with Principal Filippini in order to advocate for M.S.'s educational needs:

- "On or around August 2015, Plaintiff and her husband asked [] Principal Filippini to transfer their fourth-grade son to a different classroom at the School, and communicated their concerns about their son's assigned classroom and the manner in which his teacher treated him."

- "Plaintiff and her husband had meetings at the School with []

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