Macias v. Monterrey Concrete LLC

ARTURO ESPARZA MACIAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONTERREY CONCRETE LLC, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:19cv830

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

September 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on MONTERREY CONCRETE, LLC AND JOSE DE LA ROSA'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT (ECF No. 12) ("Motion to Dismiss"). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs will be granted leave to file an Amended Complaint.

Arturo Esparza Macias, Victor de los Reyes Rabanales, Cesar Ivan Esparza Aguilar, Jaime Marquez Esparza, Manuel Marquez Esparza, Jacobo Esparza Aguilar, Jose Luis Diaz Gomez, Ricardo Guadalupe Gomez Torres, Rodrigo Canales Salazar, Bladimir Guadalupe Macias Esparza, Catarino Odon Hernandez, Francisco Odon Hernandez, Reuel Eugenio Villagrana Canales, Alonso Cisneros Ayala, Leopoldo Gonzales, Luis Carlos Romero, and Uriel Cisneros (collectively the "Plaintiffs") filed this action against Defendants Monterrey Concrete, LLC ("Monterrey") and Defendant Jose De La Rosa ("De La Rosa" and with Monterrey the "Defendants"), seeking alleging damages incurred as a result of the Defendants' alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1589 et seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Virginia common law of contracts. The Complaint (ECF No. 1) asserts claims for forced labor, trafficking, failure to pay federal minimum wage and overtime, breach of contract, and quantum meruit. The facts reasonably and plausibly pled in the Complaint are recited below. In reciting the facts, the plaintiffs are given the benefits of all inferences that may be draw from the well-pleaded facts.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are Mexican nationals who came to the United States on H-2A and H-2B visas to work for Defendant Monterrey Concrete. Under the Department of Labor ("DOL")'s H-2B visa program, companies are allowed to hire foreign "unskilled workers" to perform nonagricultural work in the United States for temporary periods of time. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).

Monterrey is a concrete contracting business located in Henrico, Virginia, owned and overseen by Jose De La Rosa ("De La Rosa"). Between 2014 and 2018, Defendants successfully filed applications with the DOL to employ workers for periods of nine months. Compl. ¶¶ 28-32, ECF No. 1. To that end, De La Rosa allegedly travelled to Monterrey, Mexico, met with Plaintiffs, andagreed to provide them with 40-hour per week jobs in Virginia as concrete masons and cement finishers and to provide them with room and board, suitable meals, tools, and transportation from Mexico to-and-from Virginia.

Each plaintiff, though at different points in time, accepted Defendants' offer of employment under the terms verbally articulated to them and reported to the United States consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, where their visas were processed. Compl. ¶¶ 38-41, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that, "immediately after Plaintiffs arrived in the United States . . Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to vicious threats and intimidation, squalid conditions in their work environment and living conditions alike, and pay practice that constitute textbook violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")." Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 18.

Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that De La Rosa announced upon Plaintiffs' arrival that they would be required to work as much as De La Rosa required them to but would only be paid for forty hours of work per week. Compl. ¶¶ 42-44, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that De La Rosa "confiscated" passports from fourteen of the seventeen plaintiffs and took Social Security cards from six plaintiffs. Id. According to Plaintiffs, when they asked for their documents to be returned, De La Rosa refused. Id. Further, Plaintiffs allege that, contrary to the terms of theiroral contract to provide "adequate" housing, they were required to live in overcrowded and substandard housing.

Plaintiffs also allege that, during the pendency of their employment at Monterrey, they were required to work at least seventy to eighty hours each week, and sometimes more. In some instances, Plaintiffs claim that they were required to work overnight or up to twenty-four hours at a time. Compl. ¶¶ 43, 49, 55, ECF No. 1. It is alleged, as well, that Plaintiffs were rarely paid overtime but were instead paid a flat rate that amounted to a paycheck for forty hours a week at the hourly rate they were promised in their oral employment contracts. Id. In addition, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants typically did not give them lunch breaks or water while working. Id. ¶ 73-74.

The Complaint contains a litany of other abuses the Plaintiffs claim to have suffered at the hands of De La Rosa, who allegedly compelled the Plaintiffs to continue to work at Monterrey through threats and coercion. For example, Plaintiffs allege that De La Rosa threatened to suspend their visas, threatened to have Plaintiffs sent to jail, and threatened to report Plaintiffs to immigration authorities if they did not obey his orders. Further, Plaintiffs assert that De La Rosa threatened Plaintiffs by stating that Plaintiffs' families would be in danger if the Plaintiffs did not follow De La Rosa's demands. And, De La Rosa allegedly would tell the Plaintiffs had to "buy" their freedom if they wanted toleave. Compl. ¶¶ 61, 111, 156. More than once, Plaintiffs contend, in order to show off his dominance over his employees, "De La Rosa brought his associates into his garage, where Plaintiffs were sleeping, in the middle of the night. [] De La Rosa would wake-up Plaintiffs and order them to stand in a line, and then brag to his associates about how he had brought Plaintiffs under his command." Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 6, ECF No. 18. At other points, Defendants demanded several Plaintiffs overstay their visas and punished those who refused by firing them prematurely. Compl. ¶¶ 66, 98, 242, ECF No. 1.

Count I alleges a violation of the Forced Labor prohibition in violation of the TVPA against both Defendants. The gravamen of Count I is the allegation that Defendants knowingly provided or obtained Plaintiffs' labor in violation of the TVPA by, inter alia, "retaining Plaintiffs' passports and other documents; making threats of returning Plaintiffs to Mexico; firing and taking to the border individuals, including certain of the Plaintiffs, who questioned their working conditions; telling Plaintiffs that Defendant De La Rosa had connections to dangerous people in Mexico; and physically assaulting and/or restraining certain of Plaintiffs." Compl. ¶ 288, ECF No. 1.

Count II alleges a claim for Trafficking with Respect to Peonage, Slavery, Involuntary Servitude, or Forced Labor in violation of the TVPA. In support of Count II, Plaintiffs maintainthat Defendants "knowingly harbored, transported, provided for, and obtained Plaintiffs for labor in violation of numerous provisions" of the Act. Compl. ¶ 297, ECF No. 1.

Count III alleges a claim for failure to pay federal minimum wage and overtime, in violation of the FLSA. Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that they were not paid at least $7.25 for every hour of work in each workweek nor were they paid a time-and-a-half overtime premium for their weekly hours worked over forty.

Count IV alleges a breach of contract claim under Virginia common law against Monterrey. In Count IV, Plaintiffs state that an employment contract existed between each of the Plaintiffs and Monterrey by virtue of offers of employment made by Monterrey to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs' acceptance of the offers and beginning work for Monterrey. The Plaintiffs maintain that Monterrey first "breached the employment contracts with Plaintiffs by compensating Plaintiffs below the applicable rates set forth in their contracts, the prevailing wages, or the required overtime premiums for their work, both of which were additionally promised to Plaintiffs by Defendant De La Rosa acting as an agent for Defendant Monterrey Concrete." Compl. ¶ 317, ECF No. 1. They also claim that Monterrey breached the oral contracts by failing to provide Plaintiffs with adequate housing and failing to abide by applicable H-2B regulations.

Count V alleges, in the alternative to the breach of contract, a quantum meruit claim under Virginia common law. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that, "It is inequitable for Defendant Monterrey Concrete to retain the benefits of Plaintiffs' services without fully compensating them for the value of their services." Compl. ¶ 329, ECF No. 1.

Also, in the alternative to breach of contract, Count VI alleges an unjust enrichment claim under Virginia common law. There the Plaintiffs maintain that it is inequitable for Monterrey to retain the benefits that Plaintiffs conferred without paying for the value of the work that the Plaintiffs provided.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if "[it] appears to a certainty that the nonmoving party cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief." Chapman v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins., 299 F. Supp. 2d 559, 562 (E.D. Va. 2004). In considering Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, courts "must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, 891 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2018). To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim is plausible on its face if a plaintiff can demonstrate more than a...