Mack v. City of Chi.

KIONTAE MACK, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO; DETECTIVE W. DAVIS; STAR NO. 21157;DETECTIVE PAUL P. MADERER, STAR NO. 21246;SGT. K. WILLIAMS, STAR NO. 847; DETECTIVE DAVID ROBERTS, STAR NO. 20764;SGT. HOOVER, STAR NO. 2346; P.O. BARNES, STAR NO. 8426;P.O. RAY, STAR NO. 6817, P.O. JACKSON, STAR NO. 14986,and P.O. ROBINSON, STAR NO. 8153, Defendants.

No. 19 C 4001

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

November 30, 2020

Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kiontae Mack, charged but ultimately acquitted of murder, alleges that Chicago police officers used unduly suggestive and coercive interrogation techniques, resulting in his falsely confessing to involvement in the shooting, and that the City is liable under the Monell doctrine. Mack was held in custody for five years before being acquitted by a jury in June 2017. His amended complaint names nine individual Defendants and alleges claims of wrongful pretrial detention (Count I); denial of due process (Count II); a claim of coerced confession in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count III); conspiracy (Count IV); a failure to intervene (Count V); a Monell claim against the City (Count VI); and a claim for indemnification of the officers (Count VII). Defendants, the City and nine Defendant officers (Detective Davis, Detective Maderer, Sergeant Williams, Detective Roberts, Sergeant Hoover, P.O. Barnes, P.O. Ray, P.O. Jackson, and P.O. Robinson) have moved to dismiss. Defendant Officers argue that Counts II and III do not state claims for relief, and that the Officers are entitled to dismissal of all Counts in which they are named. The City moves to dismiss the Monell claim (Count VI). As explained here, the Defendant Officers' motion [57] is granted in part and denied in part. The City's motion [61] is denied.

BACKGROUND

On August 25, 2012, Stephin Williams was shot to death in a parked car on Chicago's south side while eating a meal with a co-worker, Breonna Clausell. (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [35] ¶¶ 41-46.) Plaintiff Kiontae Mack, a 17-year-old male, was sitting on the steps outside of the Operation PUSH headquarters at 4955 South Drexel Boulevard with other young people when shots rang out. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21, 51, 52.) On hearing gunshots, Plaintiff and other youths scattered. (Id. ¶ 52.) "Several minutes later," University of Chicago police detained Mack, and returned him to the scene of the shooting, where he was placed in the custody of Defendant officers. (Id. ¶ 53.) One of those officers, Sergeant Hoover, conducted a "show up" with Breonna Clausell, the victim's co-worker who had been in the car with the victim of the shooting. Clausell could not positively identify Mack as an accomplice to the shooting. (Id. ¶¶ 41-46, 55-56.)

Mack, who suffers from a learning disability, was taken to Area Central Chicago Police Headquarters located at 51st & Wentworth. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 59.) There, his clothing tested negative for gun-shot residue. (Id. ¶ 60.) Despite this, and despite his age and limited mental development, Mack was detained for ten to 14 hours in a cold holding cell wearing only a smock, and was subjected to highly suggestive and coercive interrogation techniques by Detectives Roberts and Maderer. (Id. ¶ 62.) At the time they conducted the interrogation, Mack alleges, Detectives Roberts and Maderer were aware that there was no physical evidence connecting Mack to the shooting death of Williams and that the individual who fired the gun, Michael Tucker, had not identified Mack as involved in or even present at the shooting. (Id. ¶¶ 64, 65.) Although he initially denied involvement and made some equivocal statements, Mack confessed to being Tucker's accomplice. (Id. ¶ 69-71.) After approximately five years, on June 16, 2017, the case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Mack not guilty. (Id. ¶ 87.)

Plaintiff's acquittal, Defendants contend, requires dismissal of Count II of the complaint, in which he alleges he was denied of his due process right to a fair trial. (Defendant Officer's Motion to Dismiss [58] ¶ 3].) Defendants contend that Count III, in which he alleges his confession was coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment, must also be dismissed because Mack has not alleged that the confession was used against him in any criminal trial proceeding. (Id.) Defendants claim that Sergeant Williams should be dismissed from the case because although Plaintiff named him in the caption of the complaint, no allegations of wrongdoing by Williams appear in the Amended Complaint. (Id.) Finally, Defendants argue that Defendants Detective Davis, P.O. Barnes, P.O. Ray, P.O. Jackson, P.O. Robinson, and Sgt. Hoover should also be dismissed from the case because Mack failed to allege particularized conduct on the part of each of the Defendants.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard

The standards that govern this motion are familiar. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of a complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules require that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F. 3d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1996). The complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter," accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (plaintiff must allege "grounds" for "entitlement to relief," which requires more than labels, conclusions and a formulaic recitation of elements). A claim is plausible when the alleged facts allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court "construe[s] the . . . complaint in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], accepting as true all well-pled facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in [the Plaintiff's] favor." Simpson v. Brown Cty., 860 F. 3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2017). See Int'l Mktg.,Ltd. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 192 F. 3d 724, 730 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is a truism that fact-finding has no part in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.").

Though the pleading standard is a generous one, allegations that are nothing more than conclusions are not entitled to deference. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679-80. The plausibility standard requires that non-conclusory, factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F. 3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). The plausibility standard is not a probability requirement, but asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Boucher v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F. 3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018).

Count II: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Defendants argue, first, that Mack's acquittal at trial defeats his due process claim as a matter of law. (Defendant Officer's Motion to Dismiss [58] ¶ 3].) Because Mack challenges the fabrication of evidence that led to his pretrial detention, not any deprivation of liberty stemming from a conviction after trial, Defendants contend, his claim of wrongful pretrial detention is governed exclusively by the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth.

Plaintiff urges that the due process claim in Count II does not require a conviction; a police officer who manufactures false evidence has violated due process, he contends, if the evidence is then used to deprive an individual of his liberty "in some way." Whitlock v. Brueggeman, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012), quoted in Anderson v. City of Rockford, 932 F. 3d 494, 510 (7th Cir. 2019) ("It is well-established that a police officer who manufactures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due process if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant of [his] liberty in some way"). More recent case law suggests such a claim arises under the Fourth Amendment only, not under the due process clause of the Fourteenth. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2018), a pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action, alleging that his arrest and subsequent detention were based on fabricated evidence. Reversing a dismissal of his claim, the Seventh Circuit followed Supreme Court authority in concluding that it is the FourthAmendment, not the due process clause, that supports a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, and that the Fourth Amendment claim did not accrue until the plaintiff was released from custody. See also Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 2019) recognizing that after Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017) (Manuel I), and (Manuel II), "the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the right in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention."; see also id. at 478 ("It's now clear that a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention rests exclusively on the Fourth Amendment.") (emphasis in original). Applying Lewis, courts in this Circuit have dismissed wrongful pretrial detention claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by persons like Mack, who were acquitted at trial and did not allege any post-trial deprivation of liberty. See, e.g., Henderson v. Rangel, No. 18 C 6380, 2020 WL 5642943 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2020); Young v. City of Chicago, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1033-34 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Moorer v. Platt, No. 18 CV 3796, 2020 WL 814924, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2020); Hallom v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 4856, 2019 WL 1762912, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2019).

Mack contends, as other plaintiffs have, that Lewis is no longer good law. He cites McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019) where, in addressing the question of when a claim for fabrication of evidence accrues, the Supreme Court "assume[d] without deciding" that the Second...