Maclachlan v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc.

DONALD O. MACLACHLAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. A.W. CHESTERTON, INC., et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15CV10001

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

March 12, 2019

JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion (ECF DKT #81) of Defendant American Optical Corporation for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Donald O. MacLachlan and Pat S. MacLachlan filed the captioned lawsuit against numerous manufacturers claiming injury due to exposure to asbestos-containing products. The Complaint was filed originally in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court and was placed on the inactive docket for non-malignant cases between 2006 and 2014. Donald MacLachlan was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2014 and the case was re-activated.

At Plaintiff's deposition in May of 2015, he claimed exposure to a piece of military equipment manufactured by General Electric ("GE"), that is, a main propulsion steam turbine aboard the USS Kennedy, a United States Navy warship. GE raised the defense of acting under the direction and control of a federal officer or agency (Department of the Navy) in the manufacture of the marine turbines to which Plaintiff claimed exposure. Thus, the captioned case was properly removed to U.S. District Court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442.

As part of his work history, Plaintiff worked at Weirton Steel from 1971 until his retirement in 2008. His work in the blast furnace there necessitated the use of protective clothing to combat the extreme heat and to protect from the molten splash. In his preliminary product identification disclosure, Plaintiff stated that he wore American Optical clothing at some point at Weirton Steel.

At his depositions in September 2014 and May 2015, Plaintiff testified that as a cast house helper in the Weirton Steel blast furnace, he believed that he was exposed to asbestos via the thermal protective coats and gloves that he wore. Plaintiff worked as a cast house helper beginning approximately in 1979. In the May 2015 deposition, Plaintiff associated the protective coats he wore with Defendant American Optical.

Plaintiff recalled that his superintendent told him that American Optical "used to supply [their] cast house equipment," including "coats, mittens, and leggings, and hoods." When pressed as to which items of clothing contained asbestos, he responded: "The coat and mittens, I'm positive."

Plaintiff also remembered seeing the letters "AO" in large, black block letters "on theback of the coat up there on the collar." He described the coats as aluminized with a blue/gray leather or suede band around the collar. Plaintiff testified that he wore the coat every day in the blast furnace. On average, Plaintiff wore the coat four times a day for at least 45 minutes at a time. Plaintiff remembered that the "gray, fuzzy" lining of the coat would clump off in half-inch balls. Watching an asbestos training video years later, Plaintiff testified that asbestos pipe insulation reminded him of the lining of the coats. Every couple of years at Weirton, Plaintiff would receive replacement coats from his employer.

Defendant American Optical admits that it manufactured both asbestos- and non-asbestos-containing protective wear. However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's description does not match American Optical products nor identify asbestos-containing products. For example, Defendant's expert, Jeffrey O. Stull, President of International Personnel Protection, compared American Optical's clothing catalogs to Plaintiff's testimony and noted that American Optical's aluminized coats had a wool collar, not leather or suede. (Stull Affidavit, Exhibit D). Stull added that American Optical did not place its logo on the outside of the collar but had a tag on the inside of the back collar. Id. The materials in American Optical's protective coats were encapsulated so that loose asbestos would not be released under ordinary wearing conditions. Id. None of the materials in the linings looked like pipe insulation nor would flake into balls or clumps as Plaintiff described. Id.

Stull also noted that American Optical stopped making asbestos-containing clothing in 1976 and sold its protective clothing business to Racine Glove Company in 1977. Id. This would have been two years before Plaintiff was supplied aluminized asbestos protective coats at Weirton Steel.

In his Brief in Opposition, Plaintiff offers an affidavit he executed in 2018. (ECF DKT #88-2). He states that he was previously deposed over two eight-hour days and that he testified to the best of his ability at the time. Id. Plaintiff adds, upon reflection, that the approximate time period in which he worked in the Weirton Steel blast furnace actually included several occasions prior to 1977. Id. Plaintiff states that he was not presented any photographs or drawings of American Optical products at his depositions. Now, looking at the 1970 and 1973 American Optical Protective Clothing Catalogs, Plaintiff is able to identify the "very coat" worn during his employment at Weirton Steel. Id.

Defendant American Optical moves for judgment in its favor. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack colorable evidence of exposure to an asbestos-containing American Optical product. Defendant asserts that Donald MacLachlan's Affidavit should be excluded as subsequent contradictory testimony offered without reasonable explanation. In addition, Defendant submits that Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages (Count VI) is not a separate claim for relief under Ohio law and that Plaintiffs' common law claims (Counts I, II and IV) are abrogated or prohibited by the Ohio Product Liability Act, R.C. § 2307.71, et seq.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall be granted only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Lansing Dairy. Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). The moving party musteither point to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or show "that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts and all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Once the movant presents evidence to meet its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must come forward with some significant probative evidence to support its claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Lansing Dairy, 39 F.3d at 1347.

This Court does not have the responsibility to search the record sua sponte for genuine issues of material fact. Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Ass'n., 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996); Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404-06 (6th Cir. 1992). The burden falls upon the nonmoving party to "designate specific facts or evidence in dispute," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); and if the nonmoving party fails to make the necessary showing on an element upon which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Whether summary judgment is appropriate depends upon "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Amway Distributors Benefits Ass'n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).Abrogation of common law claims

Plaintiffs do not submit any response to Defendant's argument that the Ohio Product Liability Act abrogates their Negligence, Strict Liability and Implied Warranty Claims.

The district court's power to grant dispositive motions because they are unopposed is firmly settled. Demsey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2005 WL 1917934, *2 (N.D.Ohio 2005); Peacock v. Bayview Loan Serv, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10276, *9-10 (N.D.Ohio 2005) (both citing to Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.2000)). A party's "failure to respond" may be deemed a "confession" to the motion's merit. Cacevic, id. Any further review by this Court would be an inefficient use of the Court's limited resources. Thomas v. Arn, 728 F.2d 813 (6th Cir.1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).

Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' common law claims in Counts I, II and IV is granted.

Punitive Damages

Defendant asserts that Count VI of Plaintiffs' Complaint, titled "Punitive Damages", does not state a separate cause of action. State ex rel. Board of State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, 113 Ohio St.3d 410 (2007). In their Brief in Opposition (ECF DKT #88 at 12), Plaintiffs admit that under Ohio law, "punitive damages are not a separate claim but merely an issue in the overall claim for damages."

The Court agrees that Count VI does not recite a cause of action, but rather a form of potential recoverable damages. Defendant's Motion is granted in this regard also.Product Liability - Asbestos exposure

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence of exposure to an...