MacLean-Patterson v. Erie Cnty.

488 F.Supp.3d 581

Dawn MACLEAN-PATTERSON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ERIE COUNTY, OHIO, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:18 CV 2986

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

Signed September 22, 2020

John P. Colan, Sr., Thomas D. Robenalt, Robenalt Law, Westlake, OH, Eric H. Zagrans, Zagrans Law Firm, Elyria, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Justin D. Harris, Michael P. Murphy, Reminger Co., Sandusky, OH, Taylor C. Knight, Reminger Co., Toledo, OH, for Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

JACK ZOUHARY, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

In December 2016, Richard "David" MacLean was booked into the Erie County Jail (Doc. 1 at ¶ 23). Four days later, he was found hanging by his neck from a bedsheet tied to an air vent in his cell (id. at ¶ 40). This Court is tasked with parsing what happened during those three days, and which parties -- if any -- may be liable for this tragedy.

BACKGROUND

MacLean was arrested for breaking and entering on December 29 and booked into the Erie County Jail (id. at ¶ 23). During booking, he denied being suicidal (Doc. 73-7 at 3). On both of the next two days, MacLean called his father Richard MacLean, who made it very clear he no longer wanted contact with his son: "I'm not [going to] be taking phone calls like this ... don't call me no more .... I'm not coming to visit you ... I don't [want to] deal with you no more .... I don't think you're savable dude. I don't." (Doc. 53-1 at 2–3).

On December 31, three inmates informed Officer John Nolder that MacLean made comments about jumping off the top tier (Doc. 72 at 12). Nolder questioned MacLean, who claimed the inmates were just "messing with him" (id. at 14). Nolder was unsure if MacLean was telling the truth (id. ). He secured MacLean in a holding cell, and alerted his supervisor, Officer Brittany Hausman (id. ). Hausman directed Nolder to place MacLean on the phone with the suicide hotline that Erie County maintained through an "Affiliation Agreement" with Defendant Firelands Regional Hospital (id. at 14–15; Doc. 53-4). Nolder then took MacLean into a private office and called the hotline; Defendant Katharina Boyer, a Firelands employee, picked up (Doc. 72 at 15). Nolder informed her of the inmates’ allegations and that MacLean denied being suicidal (id. ). Boyer then spoke with MacLean (id. ). Boyer testified that MacLean was "cooperative" and "not distraught" (Doc. 71 at 8). MacLean expressed that "he was depressed with the situation" and "felt like he let his family down" but "was not going to kill himself" (id. ). He further stated that he "had a lot of life left to live," and that he had been to prison before and "kn[ew] how to deal with being incarcerated" (id. at 8, 10). In response, Boyer informed MacLean that he could sign up for "jail adjustment counseling" (id. at 10). The call lasted five minutes (id. at 13).

MacLean then handed the phone to Nolder, who had been sitting across the desk (Doc. 72 at 16). Boyer told Nolder "she had no safety concerns for MacLean" (id. ). After hanging up the phone, Nolder again asked MacLean if he planned to commit suicide (id. at 17). MacLean, who Nolder says was "handling the whole thing kind of in a joking manner," denied being suicidal and asked Nolder if he would bring him chewing tobacco (id. ). Nolder then informed Hausman that "Firelands had cleared" MacLean (id. ). Hausman instructed Nolder to take MacLean back to his cell, which he did (id. ). Later that night, Nolder returned and moved MacLean to a different pod because he believed MacLean was "being bullied" (id. at 8).

On January 2, MacLean called his father again (Doc. 53-1). MacLean asked for help with bail, to which Richard responded: "You're [going to] stay in prison and you're [going to] stay there for a while dude. There ain't no getting out .... I mean you don't understand David, it's over dude. You're a criminal" (id. at 2). MacLean told his father he "didn't think he was going to relapse" if he got out (id. at 3). Richard responded: "[L]isten, I'm not [going to] argue with some thief, heroin addict who is just [going to] get out and ruin more people's lives, that's not [going to] happen dude" (id. ). He went on: "Your life is over David ... you're a criminal ... you don't deserve a second chance" (id. ).

On his way back to his cell, MacLean asked another inmate for a piece of paper (Doc. 73-11 at 3). Approximately 30 minutes later, an officer discovered MacLean had hanged himself (id. ). A note left in MacLean's cell began: "First of all dad I love you and you afforded me every chance but you are right ..." (Doc. 53-3). He was pronounced dead at Firelands Regional Hospital two days later (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1).

MacLean's estate ("Plaintiffs") then sued Defendants Erie County Board of Commissioners ("Erie County"), Sheriff Paul Sigsworth, several Erie County corrections officers, Firelands Regional Hospital ("Firelands"), and Firelands employee Katharina Boyer (id. at ¶¶ 8–19). Opting for a kitchen-sink approach, Plaintiffs allege several constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous state-law torts (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 54–73). Plaintiffs’ briefing appears to advance (1) a failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against Sigsworth and (2) Monell claims against Erie County and Firelands under multiple theories. Plaintiffs also allege negligence against Erie County; as well as wrongful-death, survivorship, and loss-of-consortium claims against all remaining Defendants.

The parties exchanged letters (Docs. 56-1, 56-2) and this Court held a Record Hearing (Doc. 54). During that Hearing, Plaintiffs dismissed their claims against several individual Defendants (Tr. at 4).¹ This Court also ordered the submission of a joint statement of agreed-upon facts; the parties did not comply (see Docs. 57-1, 57-2, 58). Defendants move for summary judgment, now fully briefed (Docs. 65–70), which is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Federal Civil Rule 56(a). In viewing the evidence, this Court "draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Brandenburg v. Hous. Auth. of Irvine , 253 F.3d 891, 897 (6th Cir. 2001).

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Generally, claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under Section 1983 are based on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

Winkler v. Madison Cty. , 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th Cir. 2018). However, when "asserted on behalf of a pre-trial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper starting point." Id. (citation omitted). The claim has two parts: objective and subjective. Spears v. Ruth , 589 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2009). "For the objective component, the detainee must demonstrate the existence of a sufficiently serious medical need." Id. (citation omitted). In the context of prisoner-suicide, "proof of a prisoner's psychological needs manifesting themselves in suicidal tendencies with a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his own life are sufficiently serious for purposes of the objective component." Mantell v. Health Prof'ls Ltd. , 612 F. App'x 302, 306 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We will assume the objective element is satisfied, based on the reports made to Officer Nolder that MacLean had verbalized a plan to commit suicide.

The subjective component is Plaintiffs’ biggest hurdle. "Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The subjective component requires proof of three elements: (1) the prison official subjectively perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk to the prisoner; (2) the official did in fact draw the inference; and (3) the official disregarded that risk." Mantell , 612 F. App'x at 306 (citations omitted).

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY CLAIM AGAINST SIGSWORTH

Plaintiffs first assert a failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against Sigsworth in his individual capacity (Docs. 1 at ¶ 56; 56-2 at 9). In cases such as this, where the defendant is both supervisor and policymaker, individual-capacity claims "may appear indistinguishable" from official-capacity claims, which actually lie against the municipality. Essex v. Cty. of Livingston , 518 F. App'x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2013). Public officials are liable in their individual capacities only if they "know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). This means "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs must demonstrate Sigsworth "at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers." Phillips v. Roane Cnty. , 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs argue Sigsworth "knew that it would needlessly endanger the inmates if his policy was not followed ... [but] did nothing to ensure the policy was followed" (Doc. 68 at 3). At best, this is an allegation of inaction. "A mere failure to act will not suffice to establish supervisory liability." Essex , 518 F. App'x at 355 (citation omitted). See also Shehee v. Luttrell , 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[A] supervisory official's failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.") (citation omitted). Plaintiffs point to the suicide of an inmate five days prior as proof Sigsworth knew inmates were still at risk, but disregarded that risk ...