Macshane v. City of N.Y.

DERMOT J. MACSHANE, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY, Sergeant,

Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit, each being sued individually and in their official capacities

as employees of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

DEREK MILLER, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY,

Sergeant, Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit, each being sued individually and in their official capacities

as employees of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

ROBERT MCNAMARA, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY,

Sergeant, Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit, each being sued individually and in their official capacities

as employees of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

DONALD HERLIHY, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; DANIEL SWEENEY, Sergeant,

Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective, Counseling Services Unit,

SAM WILLIS, Counseling Services Unit; FRANK S. VALUZZI, Captain;

BRIAN P. DOHERTY, Lieutenant, PBMS Investigations Unit,

each being sued individually and in their official capacities as employees

of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

MICHAEL DIAMOND, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY,

Sergeant, Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit; DONNA MARIE GOMEZ, Lieutenant, Harbor Unit,

each being sued individually and in their official capacities as employees

of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

BETZAYDA FRATICELLI, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; ROBERT DE PUTRON,

Captain Patrol Borough Staten Island; THOMAS GLEAVY,

Captain 120

Precinct; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ, Deputy Chief Surgeon,

Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY, Sergeant, Counseling Services Unit;

SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective, Counseling Services Unit,

each being sued individually and in their official capacities as employees

of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

TAMMIE HALL ORDONEZ, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY,

Sergeant, Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit, each being sued individually and in their official capacities

as employees of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

JOHN SPACCAFORNO, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY,

Sergeant, Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit, each being sued individually and in their official capacities

as employees of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

PAUL SCHUBERT, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY,

Sergeant, Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit, each being sued individually and in their official capacities

as employees of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

LEERIC HAMPTON, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY, Sergeant,

Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit, each being sued individually and in their official capacities

as employees of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

UNA MCGEOUGH, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; CHARLES MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Deputy Chief Surgeon, Medical Division; DANIEL SWEENEY, Sergeant,

Counseling Services Unit; SUZANNE GIMBLET, Detective,

Counseling Services Unit; PETER HAMMER, Sergeant, Manhattan Warrants Squad;

JOHN SULLIVAN, Detective, Manhattan Warrants Squad;

JOHN ROMERO, Detective, Manhattan Warrants Squad,

each being sued individually and in their official capacities as employees

of the Police Department of the City of New York, Defendants.

05-CV-06021 (RRM)(RML)

05-CV-06024 (RRM)(RML)

05-CV-06025 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-407 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-4817 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-4933 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-4935 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-6175 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-6278 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-6279 (RRM)(RML)

06-CV-6732 (RRM)(RML)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 23, 2015

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.

A number of current and former police officers of the New York City Police Department (the "NYPD") filed separate actions against the City of New York (the "City") and individuals employed in the NYPD's Counseling Services Unit (the "CSU") (collectively, "defendants"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (the "NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296, et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law (the "NYCHRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107, et seq. Plaintiffs bring claims sounding in disability discrimination, hostile work environment related to that alleged disability discrimination, and retaliation. One plaintiff also alleges false arrest, and another alleges a hostile work environment claim based on gender. All eleven relatedcases were consolidated for purposes of defendants' summary judgment motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56.¹ (See 1/14/10 Minute Entry.)

Each of these lawsuits ultimately stems from the NYPD's decision to refer each plaintiff to the CSU for evaluation following alleged incidents of serious misconduct related to alcohol use - some involving criminal conduct - that the NYPD found the plaintiff-police officers to have committed. As a result of those incidents, the NYPD internally referred plaintiffs to the CSU for evaluation. Following individualized interviews and diagnostic assessments, the CSU concluded that plaintiffs suffered from alcohol abuse or dependence. The NYPD, consequently, required each plaintiff to undergo inpatient and/or outpatient alcohol abuse treatment as a condition of their continued employment. Most plaintiffs complied, successfully completing the treatment program and returning to full duty, while some plaintiffs refused to participate and were eventually suspended or even fired.

The common thread connecting plaintiffs' lawsuits is a cause of action for disability discrimination. Plaintiffs contend that the CSU, motivated in part by "myths, fears, and stereotypes" associated with alcoholism, illegitimately perceived them to be alcoholics by using diagnostic techniques that defendants knew, or should have known, were incomplete, unreliable, and biased toward findings of alcohol abuse or addiction. Plaintiffs expressly disclaim, furthermore, having engaged in the alcohol-fueled misconduct that led to their referral to the CSU. Indeed, plaintiffs insist that defendants' proffered evidence to that effect is either misleading or outright false - that is to say, a mere pretext or bad-faith "mechanism" for the CSUto effectuate its policy of unreasonably forcing officers into treatment programs based on flawed diagnoses.

For the reasons set forth at length below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have not made out an actionable claim that defendants discriminated against them on the basis of a perceived disability, and that plaintiffs' causes of action therefore fail to withstand summary judgment. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment (No. 05-CV-6024, Doc. Nos. 102-06, 111-12, 129-31) is hereby GRANTED and the complaints are dismissed.

PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LOCAL RULE 56.1

Under Local Rule 56.1, a movant is required to submit a "short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried" along with "citation[s] to evidence which would be admissible." Local Rule 56.1(a), (d). In response, the nonmoving party - here, plaintiffs - must provide the Court with "a correspondingly numbered paragraph responding to each numbered paragraph in the statement of the moving party," which includes citations to admissible evidence for "each statement controverting any statement of material fact." Local Rule 56.1(b), (d); see Individual Rules of Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf, Rule III(B)(3).

Plaintiffs (except for Miller, whose submission is separately addressed in connection with his claim) failed to comply substantially with their obligations under this rule. Although plaintiffs submitted a response to defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement, (see Pl's 56.1 (Doc. No. 124)), in the majority of instances, plaintiffs did not identify evidence that controverted defendants' statements. For example, in response to several statements, plaintiffs simply stated, "Deny." (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 392-401, 411-14, 420-33.) As to several others, plaintiffs admitted that the cited exhibit on which defendants relied was an "official NYPD document," but denied"the factual accuracy of the statement." (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 248-49, 251-53, 257-59, 268-70, 272-76, 353-56, 619-25, 627-29, 638-41.) Concerning several other statements, plaintiffs stated that they had "not been provided with sufficient information to admit or deny," but failed to offer an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(d) requesting additional discovery. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 6, 19, 24-29.)

Instead of directly addressing defendants' factual claims in their Local Rule 56.1 statement, plaintiffs submitted a separate document entitled "Rule 56.1 Consolidated Counterstatements," which contains approximately 92 pages and 709 paragraphs of purported factual statements unconnected to defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement. (See Pl's 56.1 Consolidated Counterstatements (Doc. No....