Maddock v. Higgins

307 A.3d 1104

Todd H. MADDOCK & a.

v.Michael J. HIGGINS

No. 2022-0234

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: May 11, 2023

Opinion Issued: August 23, 2023

Belknap

Steiner Law Offices, PLLC, of Concord (R. James Steiner on the brief and orally), and Law Offices of Stephan T. Nix, of Gilford (Stephan T. Nix on the brief), for the plaintiffs.

Normandin, Cheney & O’Neil, PLLC, of Laconia (William D. Woodbury on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

DONOVAN, J.

The plaintiffs, Todd arid Margaret Maddock, appeal an order of the Superior Court (O’Neill, J.) ruling in favor of the defendant, Michael Higgins, on the plaintiffs’ petition to quiet title and their request for declaratory judgment, equitable relief, and a temporary injunction. The plaintiffs argue that the court erred by: (1) failing to find that monuments in the field control over bearings or distances in a deed or plan; (2) finding that the plaintiffs did not establish title by adverse possession; (3) finding that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish a boundary by acquiescence; (4) dismissing the plaintiffs’ trespass claim; and (5) finding that the testimony of one of the defendant’s witnesses was credible.

We conclude that, based upon the record in this case, the trial court properly found that the field monuments do not control the boundaries established by the parties’ deeds, properly found that the plaintiffs did not establish a boundary by acquiescence, properly granted the plaintiffs a prescriptive easement over the limited adjacent area for the purposes of snow removal, and properly assessed the credibility of the witnesses. We further conclude that the trial court committed no error by dismissing the plaintiffs’ trespass claim but reverse, in part, the trial court’s adverse possession decision as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ claims concerning their driveway and parking area. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts

The plaintiffs own real property at 39 Barefoot Place (Maddock Property) in Gilford. The defendant owns abutting real property at 33 Barefoot Place (Higgins Property). The two properties are part of the Gunstock Acres development. The Guyers owned the Maddock Property for nearly twenty years prior to the plaintiffs’ purchase. Prior to the Guyers, the Halls owned the Maddock Property for sixteen years. Prior to the defendant, U.S. Bank Trust (Bank) owned the Higgins Property for approximately ten months, and prior to the Bank, the Ramsdells owned the Higgins Property for twenty-seven years.

The deed to the Maddock Property describes it as a five-sided property along Barefoot Place that abuts the Higgins Property. A surveyor in 2019 plotted the plaintiffs’ property boundary lines, and the results of the survey were similar to the deeded description. The surveyor produced a plan that depicts a mathematically reconstructed boundary (the Mathematical Line) of the plaintiffs’ property which cuts through portions of the plaintiffs’ driveway and parking area and extends to the back of the property, placing portions of the driveway and parking area, as well as a shed built by the Guyers, south of the Mathematical Line, and, thus, as part of the Higgins Property. The 2019 survey did not locate any monuments at the north or south end of the Mathematical Line.

Nevertheless, the 2019 survey found two monuments in the vicinity of the properties’ boundaries. Both parties were generally aware that there were monuments on the properties. Monument A is an iron rod next to a stump located near Barefoot Place road, and Monument B is an iron pipe surrounded by rocks that sits in the steep, wooded section of the properties. The plaintiffs concede that the origin of Monument A is unknown. The surveyor believed that Gunstock Acres set Monument B in the 1970s. Neither the map depicting Gunstock Acres nor the property deeds mention, or depict, any monuments.

The parties disagree on the location of the boundary between the two properties. The plaintiffs assert that their property extends to a line between monuments A and B (the A-B Line), and the defendant claims that his property extends to the Mathematical Line. The disputed property sits in the area between the A-B Line and the Mathematical Line (the Disputed Area). Parts of the plaintiffs’ driveway, parking area, and the shed built by the Guyers are located within the Disputed Area.

The driveway and parking area were constructed in 1978 and have remained in the same location since their construction. The driveway was paved with asphalt after the plaintiffs purchased the property. When the Ramsdells purchased the Higgins Property, Dr. Hall informed Ms. Ramsdell that the Halls’ driveway encroached onto the Higgins Property. The Ramsdells allowed the Halls to continue their use of the driveway and parking area as part of a "gentlemen’s agreement" between the neighbors. The Ramsdells never revoked that permission while, the Halls lived there.

When the Halls owned the Maddock Property, they filed multiple site plans With the Town of Gilford to improve the property, amend the use of the property, and appeal a prior zoning board decision. Some of the site plans had accompanying measurements while others did not. Every site plan consisted of a hand-drawn, four-sided sketch that depicted the house, driveway, and parking area within the boundaries of the plaintiffs’ property. The Ramsdells, when present for public meetings regarding those site plans, never objected to the depicted boundaries.

Ms. Ramsdell never witnessed the Halls perform any actions in the Disputed Area aside from their use of the driveway and parking area. After the Guyers obtained title to the Maddock Property, they occasionally cleared brush, raked leaves, and felled small trees within the Disputed Area. Mr. Guyer installed the shed in 2010. Additionally, Mr. Guyer occasionally walked a game trail in the Disputed Area. During trial, the Guyers mentioned a fire pit within the Disputed Area, but the approximate location given for the fire pit included land outside of the Disputed Area. At no point did the Guyers post signage or mark trees in the Disputed Area, nor did they conduct significant tree cutting in that area.

When the Ramsdells cut down trees on their property (which was subsequently acquired by Higgins), they refrained from cutting down any trees within the Disputed Area at the Guyers’ request. Ms. Ramsdell testified that she and her husband refrained from further cutting in an effort to be good neighbors and not because of a belief or recognition that the Guyers owned or controlled the Disputed Area. The Ramsdells occasionally entered the driveway to retrieve their dogs or talk to the Guyers. After acquiring ownership of the Maddock Property from the Guyers, plaintiff Todd Maddock cleared brush and occasionally walked in the Disputed Area with his dog. The plaintiffs did not post signage in the Disputed Area.

In 2019, after the survey, the defendant cut down several trees in the Disputed Area. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a petition to Quiet Title of the Disputed Area and later requested Declaratory Judgment, Equitable Relief, and a Temporary Injunction. The plaintiffs asserted causes of action for adverse possession, boundary by acquiescence, and timber trespass against the defendant. The superior court held a seven-day bench trial. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding there was no adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence, and, as a result, no timber trespass. The court also granted the plaintiffs a prescriptive easement covering the driveway and parking area, along with a limited adjacent area for the purpose of clearing snow. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, and this appeal followed.

II. Analysis

[1–5] When reviewing a trial court’s decision rendered after a trial on the merits, we will uphold the trial court’s factual findings arid rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. Loon Valley Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Pollock, 171 N.H. 75, 78, 189 A.3d 888 (2018). We do not decide whether we would have ruled differently than the trial court, but, rather, whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision based upon the same evidence. Id. We defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as measuring the credibility of witnesses and determining the weight to be given the evidence. Id. It is within the province of the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented. Id. We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

A. Control of Monuments Generally

[6] The plaintiffs maintain that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that monuments A and B established the boundary between the two properties. They rely upon case law from the nineteenth century that states "monuments control the language of a description, if named in the deed, and then existing on the ground; if named in the deed, and afterward erected on the ground; and, though not named in the deed, yet if subsequently erected by the parties on the ground." Colby v. Collins, 41 N.H. 301, 304 (1860) (citations omitted and emphasis added). The plaintiffs assert that Colby, and its progeny, establish that monuments on the ground control the boundary between two properties as a matter of law, regardless of what may be written in a deed. In other words, they argue that simply because monuments exist, they control. We disagree.

In Colby, we explained that monuments not described in a deed would control when, after a deed had been written, the adjoining landowners agreed to erect monuments to settle the property line between them and, in effect, change the description in the deed. Id. at 303-04 (holding that monuments can alter the property line in a deed "where a party has himself a title to land having a certain description,...