Madej v. Yale Univ.

JAKUB JONASZ MADEJ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YALE UNIVERSITY, MARVIN CHUN, MARK SCHENKER, PETER SALOVEY, JESSIE ROYCE HILL, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-353

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

March 10, 2022

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10^th day of March, two thousand twenty-two.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.).

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jakub Madej, pro se, Milford, CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Patrick M. Noonan, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, PC, Guilford, CT PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, MICHAEL H. PARK, MYRNA PEREZ Circuit Judges.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Jakub Madej, a former Yale College student proceeding pro se, sued Yale University, as well as its president and various deans (together, "Defendants"), after he was involuntarily withdrawn from Yale's undergraduate program for failing a class while on Academic Warning. In his suit, Madej asserted claims of fraudulent misrepresentation fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and interference with contract, all stemming from his involuntary withdrawal from Yale. The district court permitted Madej to amend his complaint twice, but eventually granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Madej did not ask to amend his complaint for a third time. The district court then dismissed Madej's claims with prejudice because he had already amended twice and because Defendants would be prejudiced by further delay. On appeal, Madej argues that the district court (1) erred by dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim, (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant him leave to amend a third time, and (3) abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice sua sponte. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

I. Failure to State a Claim

First the district court did not err by dismissing Madej's complaint for failure to state a claim. We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2021). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("[Although] a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint," this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action . . . do not suffice.").

Madej's second amended complaint contained five causes of action: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, (2) fraud, (3) breach of contract, (4) negligence, and (5) interference with contract. We agree with the district court that Madej failed to plausibly allege these claims.

A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraud Claims

The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraud under Connecticut law are essentially identical: "(1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon the false representation to his injury." Manzo-Ill v. Schoonmaker, 204 A.3d 1207, 1211 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (citation omitted) (fraudulent misrepresentation); accord Longbottom v. Longbottom, 231 A.3d 310, 316 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020) (fraud).

Madej alleged that Mark Schenker, Chairman of the Committee on Honors and Academic Standing (the "Committee"), made the following false statements in emails and a letter informing Madej that the Committee had denied his petition appealing his involuntary withdrawal: (1) "the Committee on Honors and Academic Standing met on January 13, 2020 and voted without dissent not to approve Madej's petition," App'x 36; (2) "the Committee . . . is made up of tenured and non-tenured members of the Yale College Faculty, representatives of the Yale College Dean's Office, and undergraduate students," id. at 37; and (3) "each of the members of the Committee received requisite documents before the alleged meeting," id. Madej also alleged that Yale made the following fraudulent statements on its website: (1) "matters related . . . to withdrawals from Yale College were considered and adjudicated by [the] Committee on Honors and Academic Standing, a deliberative body within Yale College," id. at 40; (2) "the Committee meets about twice a month during the regular academic year," id. (internal quotation marks omitted); and (3) "the Committee is composed of representatives of the Yale College Dean's Office, tenured and non-tenured faculty members, as well as undergraduate students," id.

Madej asserted that these statements "created a misleading impression that a collective body existed within Yale College that was charged with adjudicating Madej's application" and that they were made to prevent Madej from discovering that Schenker was actually the only Committee member. Id. at 38. According to Madej, Schenker repeated the false statements to Yale's registrar and knew that Madej would not be able to challenge the statements because he had to leave the country after being withdrawn. ^[1] As a result, Madej suffered unspecified "damages in an amount to be proven at trial." Id. at 39.

The district court did not err in dismissing these claims. Even assuming that these statements about the Committee's make-up and decision process were untrue and that Defendants knew they were untrue, Madej failed to plausibly allege how the statements induced him to act or injured him. See Manzo-Ill, 204 A.3d at 1211 n.5; Longbottom, 231 A.3d at 316. Although Madej alleged that the statements prevented him from contesting his withdrawal earlier, that claim is in tension with Madej's own claim that he acted expediently to contest his withdrawal as soon as he became aware of it and availed himself of the Committee's processes. He did not allege what other action he could have taken but for the alleged falsities. Moreover, Madej's claim that he suffered money damages was conclusory-he offered no explanation how the statements caused any such injury. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action . . . do not suffice" to state a claim.). Thus, Madej failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraud.

B. Breach of Contract Claim

Connecticut law recognizes "a cause of action for institutional breach of a contract for educational services" where the plaintiff makes a showing that "the educational institution failed to fulfil[l] a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program." Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 119-20 (Conn. 1996).

Madej alleged that Yale breached a contract that had purportedly been formed upon his enrollment by "not implement[ing] any procedures or policies to provide procedural safeguards to student[s] who have been in the process of being involuntarily withdrawn from Yale." App'x 42. Madej alleged that Yale further breached that contract by "not following or disclosing guidelines for protecting [Madej's] fundamental rights," which breached "the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 42-43. Finally, Madej asserted that Yale breached by "failing to provide [Madej] with timely information he needed to make reasonable decisions regarding his academic choices," "creating [a] hostile atmosphere in his residential college, where he felt alienated and unwelcome by his college dean," "providing conflicting, illogical answers to all questions regarding his [involuntary withdrawal] situation, and refusing to provide reasonable support," and "refusing to consider whether the Committee's decision [wa]s arbitrary, [or] supported by the evidence, and not providing any way to request such action." Id.

Even accepting these allegations as true, they fail to state a breach of contract claim under Connecticut law because Madej did not allege that his contract with Yale included a specific promise that the school would provide such information or processes. Instead, he merely alleged that "[i]t is well-settled that a relationship between a student and a university in which he enrolls is contractual in nature," and "[a] material part of that contract is the conditions, procedures, and policies in which a student may be involuntarily withdrawn from the university." App'x 42. Madej points to no specific contractual promise that Yale allegedly breached, so his breach of contract claim fails. See, e.g., Faigel v. Fairfield Univ., 815 A.2d 140, 144 (Conn. 2003) (holding alleged promise that plaintiff "would be allowed 'many credits' from her prior engineering studies . . . is too imprecise to qualify for consideration as a 'specific contractual promise'").

C. Negligence Claim

"The essential...