Madison v. Blount

TAYLOR MADISON, Plaintiff, v. NANCY M. BLOUNT, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-11424

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

August 3, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING SANCTIONS

SEAN F. COX U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

I.

The origins of this case date back to 2010, and the history has been well-summarized elsewhere. See, e.g., Madison ex rel. Dickens v. AAA of Mich., No. 10-101514-NF, 2017 WL 11459401 (Wayne Cty. Cir. Ct., July 18, 2017). The parties have briefed the issues and the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary. Thus, the Court orders that the motion will be decided without a hearing. See E.D Mich. LR 7.1(f).

As this Court recalled in its last opinion:

The Michigan Supreme Court requested a study of the 36th District Court and issued an order appointing Hon. Michael Talbot Judge of the Court of Appeals as Special Judicial Administrator of the court. One part of the study related to cases brought by attorney Michael Fortner, who had filed more than 100 cases in that court between 2010 and 2013. Talbot and Chief Judge Nancy M. Blount identified a need for assistance in designing and implementing an effective caseflow management plan for the newly created civil division. This restructuring included consolidating the 49 pending cases filed by Fortner and assigning them to a single docket. Ultimately, Judge Talbot assigned those pending cases to Judge Pamela Harwood. Harwood, who was a visiting judge started her appointment on September 11, 2013. The Michigan Supreme Court ended Judge Talbot's appointment as a special judicial administrator for the 36th District Court on September 18, 2014. The state court administrative office extended Harwood's assignment as visiting judge periodically through December 31, 2017.

(ECF No. 24, PageID.1109-10 (citations and quotation marks omitted).)

Taylor Madison, who was a 10-year-old child struck by an automobile in 2004, filed a nofault insurance suit in Michigan's 36th District Court. (ECF No. 24, PageID.1110.) Represented by attorney Michael Fortner, Madison obtained a jury verdict in the amount of $46, 233 in 2011. (Id.) But the case did not end there:

An appeal in Madison's case was held in abeyance while the Michigan Supreme Court considered a “virtually identical” case filed by Fortner. Ultimately, the state high court held that the district court was not divested of subject-matter jurisdiction. On remand, Madison's case was heard by Judge Harwood, who dismissed Madison's case in 2017. But the state circuit court reversed that opinion and the state court of appeals affirmed. In July 2020 the case again returned to the 36th District Court, where it was assigned to Chief Judge William McConico.

(ECF No. 24, PageID.1110-11.)

Represented by attorney Dionne E. Webster-Cox, Madison filed a federal suit against Judge Blount and the 36th District Court on June 1, 2020.^[1] Seeking damages of $2 million, she brought claims for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 as well as a Monell claim. Madison alleged that Judge Blount “reassigned this case to Pamela Harwood (Caucasian), a non-36th District Judge, who was hand-picked by Defendant Blount.” (ECF No. 24, PageID.1111.) Madison alleged that “Defendant Blount assigned only Taylor Madison's case to Judge Harwood” and that “Defendant Blount did not assign any Caucasian litigants to Harwood, only Taylor Madison.” (Id.) Furthermore, she said she never received an order explaining the reassignment of her case to a new judge on remand. (Id.) Madison accused Judge Harwood of being Judge Blount's “hand-picked ‘private judge.'” (Id.)

After holding a hearing, this Court proceeded Madison's federal case against Judge Blount.^[2] First, the Court held that Madison's complaint failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which states that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts.” (ECF No. 24, PageID.1112.) Madison never identified a contractual relationship or explained how she could sue a state actor under that law. (Id.) Next, the Court dismissed Madison's conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, holding that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applied. (Id. (citing Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 817 (6th Cir. 2019).)

Third, this Court dismissed the claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The complaint's “threadbare allegations [were] conclusory, speculative, and devoid of supporting facts” and “offer[ed] little more evidence of discrimination than the facts that she is Black and Judge Harwood is white.” (ECF No. 24, PageID.1114.) In fact, “the public record indicate[d] that cases filed by Michael Fortner on behalf of dozens of other plaintiffs-not just hers-were reassigned to Judge Harwood.” (ECF No. 24, PageID.1113.) And “Judge Harwood was not ‘handpicked' by Judge Blount; rather, Judge Talbot was the person who assigned the 49 pending cases to Judge Harwood.” (Id.) So Madison failed to adequately plead disparate treatment compared to a similarly situated person of a different race. (Id.) The Court also held that Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), was inapplicable since Judge Blount was not an arm of the State of Michigan. (ECF No. 24, PageID.1114.)^[3]

Finally, the Court considered Judge Blount's argument that Madison's claims were barred by judicial immunity. “‘Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion,' a judge must be able to exercise his judicial authority ‘without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'” Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991)). Judges are immune from suits seeking damages as long as their actions were “judicial.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Courts must consider both “the nature of the act” and “the expectations of the parties.” DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 784 (6th Cir. 1999).

The Court considered whether the nature of Judge Blount's acts were, indeed, “judicial.” In her brief, Madison asserted that judicial immunity did not apply “because the allegations were not part of a court decision, but rather part of Defendant Blount's administrative duties as Chief Justice.” The Court disagreed since “the assignment of cases is still a judicial function in the sense that it concerns the case deciding process.” Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 258 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985)); accord Cameron, 38 F.3d at 272; Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 104 (6th Cir. 1994). (ECF No. 24, PageID.1115.) Based on the case law, Judge Blount was entitled to judicial immunity because she performed acts that were judicial in function.

At oral argument, Madison's co-counsel Robert Higbee (who filed his appearance on the day of the hearing) made a completely different argument from the one that was briefed. As the transcript shows, he argued that Judge Blount should not be entitled to judicial immunity because she failed to follow state-court rules related to transferring cases:

THE COURT: [C]ase reassignment, how is that not a function normally performed by a judge?

MR. HIGBEE: I think what we're dealing with here is that in the normal course, and even in the Coleman case, ^[4] for example, you had a court issuing an order, and the Sixth Circuit says that's in the normal course of what a judge does. Here, we have a distinguishing factor where you have Judge Blount, who never issued an order to reassign this case, and the defendant relies upon [Mich. Ct. R.] 8.111(c) in support of its argument that this is a judicial function, and the problem is Judge Blount didn't follow that rule. She never issued an order reassigning this case. There's none attached to their motion.

THE COURT: Do you dispute the fact that the case was reassigned or assigned to Judge Harwood-

MR. HIGBEE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -by Judge Blount?

MR. HIGBEE: We don't dispute that it-

THE COURT: So again, answer my question. How is the reassignment of a case, in particular by a chief judge to another judge of that court, a visiting judge, not part of a function normally performed by a judge?

MR. HIGBEE: Because the function normally performed by a judge would be done pursuant to an order stating a reason and served upon the parties, and that never happened in this case. So we don't think reassignment in the manner that it happened in this case is a function normally performed by a judge, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you're telling me you agree with the proposition that it's within the functions normally performed by a judge, from one judge, in particular the chief judge, to reassign a case to another judge of that court?

MR. HIGBEE: Certainly agree that [Mich. Ct. R.] 8.111 vests the chief judge with that authority. We argue in this case that she did not act consistent at all with that authority and it was not done under that rule, Your Honor.

(ECF No. 33, PageID.1246-48.)

As this dialogue makes clear, co-counsel for Madison essentially conceded that a chief judge's reassignment of a case is a function normally performed by a judge. So the Court granted the motion to dismiss, reiterating that Judge Blount, even if she allegedly did not follow the statecourt rule regarding reassignment, was immune from suit. (ECF No. 24, PageID.1116 n.1).^[5]

II.

A.

Judge Blount filed this Rule 11 motion on May 10, 2021. (ECF No 26.) First, she argues that Madison's claims were legally frivolous. (ECF No. 26, PageID.1127.) Second, Judge Blount claims that Madison's counsel filed the suit with the purpose of harassing her. (Id. at PageID.1129.) Finally, she asks the Court to impose a “significant monetary sanction” on Madison's counsel as a deterrent. (Id. at...