Madison v. Riter

355 F.3d 310

Ira W. MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R. RITER, a/k/a R. Ruter, CCS Chairman; Duncan Mills; D.J. Armstrong; Gary Bass, Chief of Operations, CCS; Commonwealth of Virginia; Lewis B. Cei, Special Programs Manager, Respondents-Appellees.

Aleph Institute; American Civil Liberties Union; The American Jewish Committee; The American Jewish Congress; The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs; The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty; The Christian Legal Society; People for the American Way, Amici Supporting Appellant.

United States of America, Intervenor-Appellant, v. R. Riter, a/k/a R. Ruter, CCS Chairman; Duncan Mills; D.J. Armstrong; Gary Bass, Chief of Operations, CCS; Commonwealth of Virginia; Lewis B. Cei, Special Programs Manager, Respondents-Appellees.

Aleph Institute; American Civil Liberties Union; The American Jewish Committee; The American Jewish Congress; The Baptist Joint Committee

on Public Affairs; The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty; The Christian Legal Society; People for the American Way, Amici Supporting Appellant.

No. 03-6362.

No. 03-6363.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 28, 2003.

Decided: December 8, 2003.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, James C. Turk, J.

ARGUED:

Gene C. Schaerr, Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Michael Scott Raab, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. William Eugene Thro, Deputy State Solicitor, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

Richard H. Menard, Jr., Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Stuart E. Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Mark B. Stern, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, William H. Hurd, State Solicitor, Maureen Riley Matsen, Deputy State Solicitor, Pamela A. Sargent, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Appellees. Kevin J. Hasson, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Roman P. Storzer, Derek L. Gaubatz, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Judge DUNCAN joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Ira W. Madison, a convict held in a Virginia Department of Corrections prison, was denied his requests for kosher meals that he claims his religious beliefs require. He sued the Commonwealth of Virginia and officials of the Virginia Department of Corrections, alleging among other claims a violation of section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The district court ruled that the provision had an impermissible effect of advancing religion under the second prong of the Lemon test. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). Because we find that Congress can accommodate religion in section 3 of RLUIPA without violating the Establishment Clause, we reverse. To hold otherwise and find an Establishment Clause violation would severely undermine the ability of our society to accommodate the most basic rights of conscience and belief in neutral yet constructive ways.

I.

A.

From 2000 to the present, Madison has claimed to be a member of the Church of God and Saints of Christ, a congregation founded in 1896 and headquartered at Temple Beth El in Suffolk, Virginia. Church members are commonly known as Hebrew Israelites, and they claim to be "followers of the anointed God" who honor but do not worship Jesus Christ. Most importantly for purposes of this case, Madison's church requires its members to abide by the dietary laws laid out in the Hebrew Scriptures.

The parties dispute the timing of Madison's conversion and his affiliation with a wide range of other religious groups during his incarceration. What is clear is that in July 2000 and again in March 2001, Madison informed correctional officials that his religious beliefs required him to receive a kosher diet, defined as a "common fare diet" by the Virginia Department of Corrections. Both requests were approved by local prison officials, but denied by Department of Corrections administrators in Richmond. The Commonwealth rejected Madison's requests because it determined that Madison already had adequate alternatives from the regular, vegetarian, and no pork daily menus; because it doubted the sincerity of Madison's religious beliefs; and because it considered Madison's history of disciplinary problems.

In August 2001, Madison challenged the denial of his request in district court, relying in part on section 3 of RLUIPA. Section 3(a) of RLUIPA states that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person — (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000). Section 3(b) of RLUIPA states that Section 3(a) applies whenever the substantial burden at issue "is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). In 2002 the Commonwealth Department of Corrections received $4.72 million — approximately 0.5% of its budget — from the federal government, thus triggering the statute's applicability. Madison's lawsuit relied on section 4(a) of RLUIPA, which creates a private right of action that allows any person to "assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding" and to "obtain appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).

The district court denied Madison's motion for summary judgment concerning his constitutional claims on August 23, 2002, and it deferred ruling on his RLUIPA claim pending briefing and argument on the statute's constitutionality. The district court also granted the United States leave to intervene to defend the statute, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a).

On January 23, 2003, the district court found that section 3 of RLUIPA impermissibly advanced religion by offering greater legislative protection to the religious rights of prisoners than to other fundamental rights that were similarly burdened. See Madison v. Riter, 240 F.Supp.2d 566, 577 (W.D.Va.2003). The district court therefore rejected Madison's statutory claim, and simultaneously certified the question of RLUIPA's constitutionality for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Madison and the United States filed timely petitions with this court to appeal the order, and their petitions were granted.

B.

The legislative and judicial background that led to RLUIPA's enactment are important for considering Madison's appeal. Congress crafted RLUIPA to conform to the Supreme Court's decisions in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). In Smith, the Court held that laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religious conduct do not offend the First Amendment. See 494 U.S. at 890. The neutrality principle in Smith largely complemented the traditional deference that courts afford to prison regulations that impose burdens on prisoners' rights. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).¹ At the same time, however, the Smith Court openly invited the political branches to provide greater protection to religious exercise through legislative action. See 494 U.S. at 890, 110 S.Ct. 1595.

In 1993, Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., which Congress claimed was premised on its remedial powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. RFRA prohibited federal and state governments from "substantially burden[ing]" a person's exercise of religion, even as the result of a law of general applicability, unless the government could demonstrate that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b).

The Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), invalidated RFRA as it applied to states and localities. The Court held that the scope of the statute exceeded Congress's remedial powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 521 U.S. at 532-36, 117 S.Ct. 2157.

While RFRA continued to apply to the federal government, see Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir.2002); O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 02-4012, 2003 WL 22533454, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov.10, 2003), in September 2000, Congress attempted to reinstate RFRA's protection against government burdens on religious exercise imposed by states and localities by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. This statute mirrored the provisions of RFRA, but its scope was limited to laws and regulations concerning land use and institutionalized persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA's enactment was premised on congressional findings similar to those made for RFRA, namely, that in the absence of federal legislation, prisoners, detainees, and institutionalized mental health patients faced substantial burdens in practicing their religious faiths. See Joint Statement of...