Madison v. State

163 P.3d 757

161 Wn.2d 85

Daniel MADISON, Beverly Dubois, and Dannielle Garner, Respondents Sebrina Moore and Larence Bolden, Plaintiffs, v. STATE of Washington; Christine O. Gregoire, Governor; and Sam Reed, Secretary of State, in their official capacities, Appellants.

No. 78598-8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued June 27, 2006.

Decided July 26, 2007.

Robert M. McKenna, Jeffrey Todd Even, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Appellants.

Peter Anthony Danelo, Darin M. Sands, Leonard J. Feldman, Heller Erhman LLP, Aaron Hugh Caplan, Neil T. Bradley, ACLU of Washington, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.

William Gleeson, Jay S. Carlson, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis, Seattle, WA, for African American/Jewish Coalition for Justice (Amicus Curiae), Friends Committee on Washington State Public Policy (Amicus Curiae), Justice Works! (Amicus Curiae), Legacy for Equality (Amicus Curiae), National Association of Social Worker (Amicus Curiae), People of Color against AIDS Network (Amicus Curiae), Statewide Poverty Action Network (Amicus Curiae), Washington Defender Association (Amicus Curiae), Washington State Safe Communities Collaborative (Amicus Curiae), Western Prison Project (Amicus Curiae), Western Washington Fellowship of Reconciliation (Amicus Curiae).

Shankar Narayan, Hate Free Zone Washington, Seattle, WA, Kirsten D. Levingston, Catherine Weiss, Erika Wood, Brennan Center for Justice NY University, New York, NY, for Brennan Center for Justice at New York University of Law (Amicus Curiae), Hate Free zone Washington (Amicus Curiae), Latina/O Bar Association of Washington (Amicus Curiae), Loren Miller Bar Association (Amicus Curiae), South Asian Bar Association of Washington (Amicus Curiae), The Defender Association's Racial Disparity Project (Amicus Curiae), The Sentencing Project (Amicus Curiae).

William John Crittenden, Patrick Denis Brown, Seattle, WA, for League of Women Voters of Seattle (Amicus Curiae), League of Women Voters of Washington (Amicus Curiae).

FAIRHURST, J.

¶ 1 Respondents/cross-appellants Daniel Madison, Beverly DuBois, and Dannielle Garner (respondents) are convicted felons seeking reinstatement of their voting rights. Respondents challenge the constitutionality of Washington's disenfranchisement scheme because it denies the right to vote to convicted felons who have not completed all of the terms of their sentences, including full payment of their legal financial obligations (LFOs).¹ Respondents argue that the scheme violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it denies them the right to vote based on wealth. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the scheme is unconstitutional as to felons who, due to their financial statuses, are unable to pay their LFOs immediately. The State sought direct review and requests that this court reverse the trial court's order and enforce Washington's Constitution and statutes as written. Respondents cross-appeal and ask this court to hold that all felons who have satisfied all the terms of their sentences except for full payment of their LFOs be allowed to vote, regardless of their financial statuses.

¶ 2 We hold that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. We also hold that respondents lack standing to bring their cross-appeal, and we deny respondents' request for attorney fees because they are not the prevailing party. We reverse the trial court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 The facts are undisputed. Daniel Madison was convicted of third degree assault in King County Superior Court in 1996. His sentence included an order to pay $483.25 in restitution, $200.00 in victim assessment fees, and $100.00 in court costs, for a total of $783.25 in LFOs. Madison is disabled due to mental illness, and his social security payments constitute his only regular monthly income. A court order set his monthly payment at $15, which he regularly makes. The court waived the payment of interest. Although Madison has paid at least $530.00 toward his LFOs, he still owes approximately $245.25. Madison has satisfied all of the terms of his sentence, with the exception of full payment of his LFOs.

¶ 4 Beverly DuBois was convicted of manufacturing and delivering marijuana in Stevens County Superior Court in 2002. Her sentence included an order to pay $1000 to the Stevens County Drug Enforcement Fund, a $500 victim assessment fee, and $110 in court costs, for a total of $1,610 in LFOs. DuBois sustained a permanent disability from a 2000 car accident and her social security payments, disability payments, and food stamps constitute her only monthly income. In compliance with the court's payment plan, she regularly makes $10 payments toward her LFOs. Although she has paid at least $190.00, DuBois now owes approximately $1,895.69 due to interest accrual. DuBois has satisfied all of the terms of her sentence, with the exception of full payment of her LFOs.

¶ 5 Dannielle Garner was convicted of forgery in Skagit County Superior Court in 2003. Her sentence included an order to pay a $500 victim assessment fee and $110 in court fees, for a total of $610 in LFOs. Garner is permanently disabled due to mental illness, and her social security payments constitute her only monthly income. Garner regularly makes $10 payments toward her LFOs in compliance with a court order. The court also noted that once Garner pays the principal in full, the court may waive interest. Although she has paid at least $250 toward her LFOs, she still owes approximately $360. Garner has satisfied all of the terms of her sentence, with the exception of full payment of her LFOs.²

¶ 6 Respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief in King County Superior Court arguing that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the privileges and immunities clause and article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme "is invalid as to all felons who have satisfied the terms of their sentences except for paying legal financial obligations, and who, due to their financial status, are unable to pay their legal financial obligations immediately." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 433. The court granted respondents' summary judgment motion, denied the State's summary judgment motion, and ordered that Madison, DuBois, and Garner were "entitled to register to vote." CP at 434.

¶ 7 The Commissioner granted direct review on an accelerated basis and denied the State's motion to stay the trial court's order pending appeal without prejudice. The State did not move for reconsideration or appeal the denial of the stay.

II. ISSUES

A. Whether Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution.

B. Whether Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

C. On cross-appeal, whether the trial court erred by limiting its order to only individuals who could not pay their LFOs immediately.

D. Whether the respondents are entitled to attorney fees.

III. ANALYSIS

Challenged Provisions and Standard of Review

¶ 8 Article VI, section 3 of the Washington Constitution disqualifies from the franchise or the right to vote, "[a]ll persons convicted of infamous crimes unless restored to their civil rights." The Washington Legislature has defined "`infamous crime'" as "a crime punishable by death in the state penitentiary or imprisonment in a state correctional facility," or in other words, any felony offense. RCW 29A.04.079. Once disenfranchised, felons may seek to restore their civil rights through a governor's pardon. RCW 9.96.010. Additionally, felons may also seek to restore their civil rights through the issuance of a certificate of discharge. RCW 9.94A.637. A court may issue a certificate of discharge only when the felon has completed "all requirements of the sentence, including any and all legal financial obligations." RCW 9.94A.637(1)(a). In order to register to vote, a felon must take an oath that states that he or she is "not presently denied [his or her] civil rights as a result of being convicted of a felony." RCW 29A.08.230.³

¶ 9 The trial court held that this disenfranchisement scheme, and in particular RCW 9.94A.637, violates article I, section 12, and article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution⁴ and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it discriminates on the basis of a felon's ability to pay his or her LFOs. We review summary judgment motions and issues of constitutional interpretation de novo. Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 590, 121 P.3d 82 (2005); In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 154 Wash.2d 52, 57, ¶ 9, 109 P.3d 405 (2005). In general, "`[a] statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 132, ¶ 25, 110 P.3d 192 (2005) (quoting State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 769-70, 921 P.2d 514 (1996)), overruled in part on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). Thus, the respondents bear the responsibility of proving that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. When presented with arguments under both the Washington and federal constitutions, we review the state constitutional arguments first. State v. Reece, 110...