Madison v. State

RONALD EDWARD MADISON, JR., Appellant-Defendant,

v. STATE OFINDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 71A04-1110-CR-597

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

April 18, 2012

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be

regarded as precedent or cited before

any court except for the purpose of

establishing the defense of res judicata,

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

ERNEST P. GALOS

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Attorney General of Indiana

RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable J. Jerome Frese, Judge

Cause No. 71D03-1003-FD-00200

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Judge

Case Summary

Ronald Edward Madison, Jr., appeals his conviction for Class D felony possession of cocaine. Specifically, Madison argues that the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief Terry stop and the evidence is sufficient to support Madison's conviction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that just before midnight on March 12, 2010, South Bend Police Department Officer Aaron Knepper and Corporal Erik Schlegelmilch received a dispatch that an unidentified person had called in to report that a male had either been pointing a gun or threatening a female with a gun in the area of Elwood and Johnson Streets. When Officer Knepper arrived in the area, he was "flagged down" by people on the street. Tr. p. 56.¹ Dispatch told Officer Knepper that the unidentified caller had reported that the male was now headed to Olive Street in a green Ford Focus. Supp. Tr. p. 8. When Officer Knepper arrived in that area, dispatch told him that the car was heading southbound. Officer Knepper started driving southbound when he observed a green Ford Focus. It was the only car driving in the area.

According to Officer Knepper, the green Ford Focus was driving "rather quickly" and "was exceeding the speed limit." Tr. p. 57; Supp. Tr. p. 8. Although Officer Knepper was driving sixty miles per hour in this thirty-mile-per-hour zone, it still tookhim a couple of blocks to catch up to the green Ford Focus. Supp. Tr. p. 8. In addition to speeding, the green Ford Focus made two turns without signaling, at which point Officer Knepper activated his emergency lights. The green Ford Focus initially stopped but then pulled forward to the side of the street. Because Officer Knepper considered this a "high risk stop due to the nature of the call," he called for backup and waited outside his patrol car with his gun drawn and pointed at the green Ford Focus. Tr. p. 57. Once backup arrived, Officer Knepper ordered the driver to exit the vehicle and walk backwards toward him. Officer Knepper then handcuffed the driver, identified as Madison, and put him in his patrol car.

As Officer Knepper was putting Madison in his patrol car, Corporal Schlegelmilch approached the green Ford Focus to see if there were any passengers inside; there were none. But when Corporal Schlegelmilch walked up to the green Ford Focus, he plainly observed a plastic baggie containing a white rock-like substance on the driver's side floorboard. Corporal Schlegelmilch reported his finding to Officer Knepper. Officer Knepper then photographed the baggie, which both officers believed to contain crack cocaine. Officer Knepper field tested the contents, secured the baggie in his vehicle, and later placed the baggie in the evidence box. Laboratory testing revealed that the substance was cocaine.

Officer Knepper then transported Madison to the St. Joseph County Jail. During the booking process, Madison "started to forcibly gag, hold his stomach, [and] clutch in pain." Id. at 62. He told the nursing staff that he was not feeling well. Because Officer Knepper suspected that Madison may have swallowed drugs or something that couldhave harmed him, he took Madison to the emergency room. During the drive, Madison asked Officer Knepper to roll down the window so that he could vomit. Not willing to compromise or lose any evidence, Officer Knepper told Madison that if he needed to throw up, he could do so in his patrol car. Madison did not vomit. While at the hospital, Madison asked Officer Knepper if he could use the restroom. When Officer Knepper told Madison that he had to accompany him, Madison suddenly no longer had to use the restroom. The nurses then asked Madison to disrobe and put on a gown for treatment. At this request, Madison again changed course and said that he no longer wanted treatment. Officer Knepper took Madison back to the jail.

Madison was booked into the jail. Due to the nature of the crime, Officer Knepper and another officer took Madison to the showers for a strip search. ² Madison was "uncooperative" during the search. Id. at 65. The protocol is for the arrestee to remove one article of clothing at a time, turn it inside out, and hand it to the officers. But when Madison was down to his boxers, "he put one of his hands behind him and he would not remove his hand" and said he was "not doing nothing." Id. at 66. Believing that Madison was hiding contraband, Officer Knepper ordered him to remove his hands from his underwear. Although Madison eventually took off his underwear, he refused to turn around. The officers then approached Madison, grabbed his arms, and turned him around. At that point the officers saw a "bagg[ie] in between his butt cheeks." Id. at 67. The baggie contained a white rock-like substance. The officers retrieved the baggie andplaced it in the evidence box. Laboratory testing later revealed that the substance was cocaine. The weight of the cocaine in both baggies totaled 1.79 grams.

The State charged Madison with possession of cocaine as a Class D felony. Madison filed a motion to suppress both baggies of cocaine, which the trial court denied. A jury trial was held, at which Madison testified in his defense. The jury found him guilty as charged.

Madison now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Madison raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting the cocaine into evidence at trial because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to initially stop him. ³ Second, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

I. Reasonable Suspicion

Madison first contends that the trial court erred in admitting both baggies of cocaine into evidence at trial because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first place.⁴ The existence of reasonable suspicion is a question of law which is renewed de novo. State v. Campbell, 905 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.⁵ Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). "Searches performed by government officials without warrants are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Patterson, 958 N.E.2d at 482.

One such exception was established in Terry v. Ohio, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if, based on specific and articulable facts together with reasonable inferences from those facts, the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind. 2011). Reasonable suspicion is a "'somewhat abstract'" concept that is not readily reduced to a "'neat set of legal rules.'" Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1146 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). When making a reasonable-suspicion determination, reviewing courts examine the "totality of the circumstances" of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Id. at 1146-47.

Here, Madison argues that the anonymous tip did not supply the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop him because the caller was never identified. Our Supreme Court recently addressed anonymous tips and tips from concerned citizens in Renzulli. In Renzulli, a person, giving his name and phone number, called 911 around 1:00 a.m. to report a possibly intoxicated driver. The caller identified the car by saying that it just pulled into a BP gas station and was a "blue Jetta." Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1145. The caller, who never got close enough to the car to get a license plate number because of safety concerns, later said that it might be a "Volkswagen Passat." Id. A police officer immediately went to the BP, saw a blue Volkswagen about to leave, and asked the vehicle to stop. Observing that the driver showed signs of intoxication, the officer had her perform field-sobriety tests, all of which she failed. The officer then arrested the driver for operating while intoxicated.

Although Renzulli involves a tip from a concerned citizen and not an anonymous tip, our Supreme Court nevertheless analogized the case with anonymous-tip cases. Id. at 1147. Using an anonymous-tip case from the United States Supreme Court, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), our Supreme Court concluded that in White, "the factors upholding the anonymous tip were the officers' observations that validated the information received, substantiating the reasonable suspicion requirement." Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1147. Our Supreme...