Madison v. Virginia

474 F.3d 118

Ira W. MADISON, Plaintiff-Appellee, and United States of America, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Commonwealth of VIRGINIA, Defendant-Appellant, and R. Riter, a/k/a R. Ruter, CCS Chairman; Karen Polinsky; Duncan Mills; D.J. Armstrong; Gary Bass, Chief of Operations, CCS; Lewis B. Cei, Defendants.

American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Incorporated; The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty; Coalition of Prison Chaplain Associations, Amici Supporting Appellee.

Ira W. Madison, Plaintiff-Appellee, and United States of America, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary L. Bass, in his official capacity as Chief of Operations of Offender Management Services for the Virginia Department of Corrections; Louis B. Cei, in his official capacity as Special

Programs Manager for the Virginia Department of Corrections; Duncan Mills, in his official capacity as Central Classification Supervisor for the Virginia Department of Corrections; Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendants-Appellants American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Incorporated; The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty; Coalition of Prison Chaplain Associations, Amici Supporting Appellee.

No. 06-6266.

No. 06-6296.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued October 25, 2006.

Decided December 29, 2006.

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ARGUED:

William Eugene Thro, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Richard H. Menard, Jr., Sidley & Austin, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Michael Scott Raab, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, Mark R. Davis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Jay T. Jorgensen, Tiffani C. Smith, Jeffrey I. Shulman, Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Sidley & Austin, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee Ira W. Madison. Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General, John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Mark B. Stern, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for Appellee United States. Rebecca K. Glenberg, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia Foundation, Inc., Richmond, Virginia, for American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Incorporated, Amicus Supporting Appellee. Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Derek L. Gaubatz, Roger T. Severino, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C., for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and Coalition of Prison Chaplain Associations, Amici Supporting Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Judge DUNCAN joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Ira Madison, a Virginia state prisoner, sued the Commonwealth of Virginia and various Virginia Department of Corrections officials claiming, inter alia, that his requests for kosher meals were denied in violation of section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) ("RLUIPA"). On an earlier appeal, we held that RLUIPA did not impermissibly advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.2003) [hereinafter Madison I]. Virginia now argues that RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress' authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses and also that sovereign immunity bars its application against the States. The district court upheld RLUIPA under the Spending Clause and found that Virginia had waived its immunity.

We hold that RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress' spending power and that, because Virginia voluntarily accepted federal correctional funds, it cannot avoid the substantive requirements of RLUIPA. With respect to sovereign immunity, we find that Congress unambiguously conditioned federal funds on a State's consent to suit. Because that condition does not clearly and unequivocally indicate that the waiver extends to money damages, however, the Eleventh Amendment bars Madison's claim for monetary relief against the State. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Plaintiff Madison is an inmate at a Virginia state correctional facility. He is a Hebrew Israelite and member of the Church of God and Saints of Christ headquartered at Temple Beth El in Suffolk, Virginia. Members of Temple Beth El are required to eat a kosher diet and to celebrate Passover.

In July 2000 and again in March 2001, plaintiff informed Virginia correctional officials that his religious beliefs directed him to eat a kosher or "Common Fare" diet. Local prison officials approved both requests, but Central Classifications Services ("CCS"), a Richmond-based agency of the Virginia Department of Corrections, overturned the approval. CCS denied plaintiff's request because it found that the daily regular, vegetarian, and no-pork prison menus afforded plaintiff adequate dietary alternatives. CCS administrators also questioned the sincerity of Madison's religious beliefs and considered Madison's history of disciplinary problems.

In August 2001, Madison brought suit in federal district court claiming that he was being denied kosher meals in violation of section 3 of RLUIPA. This section prohibits prison officials from substantially burdening an inmate's religious exercise unless doing so is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Virginia argued that RLUIPA was unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment Clause and because it exceeded Congress' authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses. Madison v. Riter, 240 F.Supp.2d 566, 570 (W.D.Va.2003). The district court ruled that RLUIPA impermissibly advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause and dismissed plaintiff's RLUIPA claims. Id. at 582. We reversed, finding that "Congress can accommodate religion in section 3 of RLUIPA without violating the Establishment Clause," and remanded for consideration of Virginia's other arguments. Madison I, 355 F.3d at 313.

On remand, the district court ruled that RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress' Spending Clause power. Madison v. Riter, 411 F.Supp.2d 645, 650-54 (W.D.Va. 2006). Accordingly, the court declined to reach Virginia's Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 657. Finally, the district court concluded that, by accepting federal funds, Virginia had waived its sovereign immunity for RLUIPA damages claims. Id. at 656.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the district court certified its rulings on the constitutionality of RLUIPA for interlocutory appeal. Id. at 657. Virginia requested and we granted discretionary interlocutory review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000). Virginia also appeals the district court's ruling that Virginia waived its sovereign immunity from RLUIPA damages claims, a final order appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993).

II.

RLUIPA prohibits the States from imposing substantial and unjustified burdens on the religious liberty of state prisoners. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Congress enacted this statute in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). In that case, the Court ruled that the religious protections mandated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ("RFRA"), exceeded Congress' remedial power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-36, 117 S.Ct. 2157. Accordingly, RFRA could not be enforced against the States. See id. Following Boerne, Congress made findings on the burdens placed on inmates' religious exercise, and "attempted to reinstate" RFRA's religious liberty protections, titling the new statute RLUIPA. Madison I, 355 F.3d at 315. This time, Congress relied on its Spending and Commerce Clause authority. Id.

The Spending Clause provision at issue in this case, section 3(b)(1), applies RLUIPA's religious liberty provisions whenever a "substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). The term "program or activity" includes "all of the operations of . . . a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government." Id. § 2000d-4a(1)(A). The Virginia Department of Corrections is a state agency that receives federal financial assistance. Virginia insists, however, that RLUIPA cannot be applied to this case because the statute exceeds Congress' Spending Clause authority.

The Spending Clause is a "permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices," because "the ultimate decision" of whether to conform is retained by the States — who can always decline the federal grant. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). Congress has "broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal money to the States." Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 2459, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006) (citation omitted). This power is, of course, not unlimited. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, & n. 13, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). Because even those congressional directives imposed by Spending Clause inducement shift the federal-state balance, the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987), placed several restrictions upon Congress' authority to persuade.

To be valid, Spending Clause legislation must meet several requirements: (1) "`the exercise of the...