Maeda v. Pinnacle Foods Inc.

390 F.Supp.3d 1231

Michael MAEDA and Iliana Sanchez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.PINNACLE FOODS INC.; Does 1 Through 50, Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 18-00459 JAO-RLP

United States District Court, D. Hawai‘i.

Signed May 9, 2019

Filed May 10, 2019

Benjamin Heikali, Pro Hac Vice, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Brandee J. Faria, Perkin & Faria, Honolulu, HI, Timothy J. Peter, Pro Hac Vice, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Aubry Wand, The Wand Law Firm, P.C., Culver City, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew G. Phillips, Pro Hac Vice, Angela M. Spivey, Pro Hac Vice, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, Jesse J.T. Smith, David J. Minkin, McCorriston Miller Mukai MacKinnon LLP, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT PINNACLE FOODS INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Jill A. Otake, United States District Judge

This putative consumer class action arises out of the sale and marketing of Defendant Pinnacle Food Inc.'s ("Defendant") Hawaiian brand snacks, including: Hawaiian Kettle Style Potato Chips, Original; Hawaiian Kettle Style Potato Chips, Luau BBQ; Hawaiian Kettle Style Potato Chips, Sweet Maui Onion; Hawaiian Kettle Style Potato Chips, Ginger Wasabi; Hawaiian Kettle Style Potato Chips, Hulapeno; Hawaiian Kettle Style Potato Chips, Mango Habanero; Hawaiian Luau Barbeque Rings; and Hawaiian Sweet Maui Onion Rings (collectively "Hawaiian Snacks"). Plaintiffs allege that they purchased these snacks due to false and deceptive labeling, packaging, and advertising, which misled them into believing that the snacks are made in Hawai‘i from local ingredients.

Defendant moves to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of actionable misrepresentation as to the consumer protection claims, failure to state a claim, and lack of standing. For the reasons articulated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint. ECF No. 11.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 12, 2018 in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawai‘i. Defendant removed the action on November 23, 2018. Plaintiffs allege that although the Hawaiian Snacks are manufactured in Algona, Washington, Defendant markets them in such a manner as to mislead consumers into believing that they were manufactured in Hawai‘i.

Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) violation of Hawai‘i's made in Hawai‘i statute ( Haw. Rev. Stat. § 486-119 ); (2) violation of Hawai‘i's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 480); (3) violation of Hawai‘i's false advertising law ( Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-871 ); (4) violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act ( Cal. Civil Code § 1750 ); (5) violation of California's unfair competition law ( Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 ); (6) violation of California's false advertising law ( Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17500 ); (7) breach of express warranty; (8) breach of implied warranty; (9) common law fraud; (10) intentional misrepresentation; (11) negligent misrepresentation; and (12) quasi-contract/unjust enrichment/restitution.

The three proposed classes identified by Plaintiffs are as follows:

Hawaii Class: All persons, who, within the relevant statute of limitations period, purchased any of the Hawaiian Snacks, in the State of Hawai‘i.

California Class: All persons, who, within the relevant statute of limitations period, purchased any of the Hawaiian Snacks, in the State of California.

California Consumer Subclass: All persons, who, within the relevant statute of limitations period, purchased any of the Hawaiian Snacks for personal, family, or household purpose, in the State of California.

Compl. at ¶ 51.

In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs request a declaration that Defendant's conduct violates the law; restitution; damages; punitive damages; attorneys' fees and costs; and pre and post judgment interest. Id. at 31-32.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Federal Rule of Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(1), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims alleged in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "Standing is a threshold matter central to our subject matter jurisdiction." Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). "[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [FRCP] 12(b)(1)." Maya v. Centex Corp. , 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). In determining constitutional standing, the trial court has the authority to "to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). The court "must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party" when "ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing." Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

B. Rule 12(b)(2)

Under FRCP 12(b)(2), a defendant may seek dismissal of an action, or of particular claims, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, courts may consider evidence presented in affidavits and declarations. Doe v. Unocal Corp. , 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) abrogated on other grounds by Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that courts have personal jurisdiction over defendants. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy , 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Absent formal discovery or an evidentiary hearing, "this demonstration requires that the plaintiff make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss." Id. (quotations omitted). To make this prima facie showing, a plaintiff can rely on the allegations in its complaint to the extent that the moving party does not controvert those allegations. See Doe , 248 F.3d at 922.

C. Rule 12(b)(6)

FRCP 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, " ‘the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true,’ and ‘[d]ismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.’ " UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC , 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) ) (alteration in original). However, conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) ; Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology , 228 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the court need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. Sprewell , 266 F.3d at 988.

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Facial plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The tenet that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. As such, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ) (some alterations in original). If dismissal is ordered, the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend unless it is clear that the claims could not be saved by amendment. Swartz v. KPMG LLP , 476 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice on the following grounds: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiff Iliana Sanchez; (2) Plaintiffs' consumer protection claims fail because Plaintiffs have not alleged an actionable misrepresentation; (3) Plaintiffs' common law claims fail as a matter of law; and (4) Plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. The Court addresses each of Defendant's arguments in turn.

A. Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Plaintiff Iliana Sanchez and Unnamed Nonresident Class Members

Defendant contends that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiff Iliana Sanchez, as well as the unnamed nonresident class members.

1. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff Sanchez's Claims

Defendant successfully challenges Plaintiff Sanchez's satisfaction of personal jurisdiction requirements. Although they bear the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper, Boschetto v. Hansing , 539 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008), Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff Sanchez's claims, nor even addressed the specific jurisdiction test. It is well established that in a class action, personal jurisdiction requirements "must be...