Maestas v. Town of Taos

1

JOSEPH R. MAESTAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF TAOS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. A-1-CA-40439

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

May 6, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY Emilio Chavez District Court Judge

The Herrera Firm, P.C. Samuel M. Herrera Taos, NM for Appellant

Ortiz & Zamora, Attorneys at Law, LLC Tony F. Ortiz Santa Fe NM for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEGAN P. DUFFY, JUDGE

{¶1} Plaintiff Joseph R. Maestas appeals the district court's orders awarding fees and costs following remand in the previous appeal in this case. See Maestas v. Town of Taos (Maestas I), 2020-NMCA-027, 464 P.3d 1056. Having carefully considered the parties' briefing and the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} In Maestas I, this Court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), NMSA 1978, § 10-16C-4(A) (2010), and any costs he incurred before Defendant's Rule 1-068(A) NMRA offer of settlement. Maestas I, 2020-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 20, 27. On remand, the district court awarded Plaintiff $45,166.67 in attorney fees and denied Plaintiff's request for attorney fees and costs incurred for work on the appeal in Maestas I.

{¶3} The district court also granted Defendant $14,311.29 for costs incurred after Defendant's first Rule 1-068 offer of settlement. Plaintiff asked the district court to set aside or reconsider that ruling after the court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees, arguing that attorney fees are damages under the WPA and the amount of his fee award exceeded Defendant's second Rule 1-068 offer. The court denied Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff appeals from these rulings.

DISCUSSION

{¶4} Plaintiff raises six issues on appeal. He argues that (1) the district court erred in determining the amount of his attorney fee award; (2) he is entitled to gross receipts taxes on the attorney fee award; (3) he is entitled to attorney fees and costs for work on the appeal in Maestas I; (4) the district court erred in failing to reduce his attorney fee award to a judgment; (5) he is entitled to costs under Rule 1-068; and (6) the district court erred in holding him in contempt for failure to pay Defendant's costs under Rule 1-068.

I. Attorney Fees

{¶5} Plaintiff submitted his first motion for attorney fees with supporting billing records right after the jury trial concluded. At that time Plaintiff requested an award of $129,047.62. The district court denied Plaintiff's request, concluding that neither party had prevailed in the litigation. Plaintiff appealed, and in Maestas I this Court held that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees for his WPA claim. See Maestas I 2020-NMCA-027, ¶ 20 (holding that the WPA required the district court to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees even though the jury did not award Plaintiff damages because the jury found Defendant had violated the provisions of the WPA); see also § 10-16C-4(A) (stating that "an employer shall be required to pay the litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees of the employee"). On remand, Plaintiff filed a supplemental application for attorney fees in the amount of $211,026.67, which included time for work on the appeal. The district court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees for his WPA claim in the amount of $45,166.67, an amount that represented 35 percent of Plaintiff's original, preappeal fee request. {6} Plaintiff asserts fifteen claims of error related to the district court's determination of his attorney fee award. These claims all center on two aspects of the district court's decision, (1) that the district court only awarded Plaintiff 35 percent of the fees he requested, and (2) the court's application of the lodestar criteria.^[1] We review these matters for abuse of discretion. J.R. Hale Contracting Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 2008-NMCA-037, ¶ 93, 143 N.M. 574, 179 P.3d 579.

A. The District Court Did Not Err in Awarding Plaintiff 35 Percent of the Total Attorney Fees He Requested

{¶7} Plaintiff first argues that the district court erred in awarding him only 35 percent of the attorney fees he requested. The district court determined that this percentage reflected the amount of time Plaintiff spent on his WPA claim. Plaintiff claims the district court's reduction is in error because his invoices only included charges for the WPA claim, and the court's allocation of time to his other claims was incorrect in a number of respects.

{¶8} Plaintiff asserted in his motion for attorney fees that he had not included any charges for work on his breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. See Dean v. Brizuela, 2010-NMCA-076, ¶ 16, 148 N.M. 548, 238 P.3d 917 ("[I]t has long been the rule in New Mexico that a party is only entitled to those fees resulting from the cause of action for which there is authority to award attorney fees."). Plaintiff makes the same assertion on appeal-that he only requested fees for the WPA claim and did not include charges for work on his other claims. However, after reviewing the invoices Plaintiff submitted with his motion, it appears that Plaintiff's fee request included time for work on matters other than the WPA claim. See J.R. Hale Contracting Co., 2008-NMCA-037, ¶¶ 92, 95 (stating that when a statutory claim is joined with other nonstatutory claims, an award of attorney fees must be limited to the statutory claim). For example, Plaintiff's invoices included time for drafting the complaint and jury instructions, and for trial, all of which facially appear to include work on the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.

{¶9} As the district court noted, Plaintiff did not "address in detail, time toward specific claims." Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not itemize his attorney fees related to his specific claims, but suggests that this should have precluded the district court from concluding that some of the billed time was attributable to work on matters other than the WPA claim. Plaintiff appears to misunderstand that it was his burden to show what portion of the attorney fees were attributable to the WPA claim, or why it was difficult or impossible to segregate work on the WPA claim from the other claims. See Dean, 2010-NMCA-076, ¶ 19. Plaintiff made no showing on these matters. He has not stated, either to this Court or the district court, what efforts he made to segregate his time for his various claims. See id. ¶ 17 ("Our Supreme Court has continued to direct that recoverable fees be segregated from non-recoverable fees to ensure that only those fees for which there is authority to award attorney fees are in fact awarded."). Nor has Plaintiff argued that the work was inextricably intertwined. See id. ¶ 18 (stating that the burden to show the impossibility of segregating attorney fees is with the attorney who requests the attorney fee award). Consequently, based on the invoices submitted to the district court, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that Plaintiff's fee request included time for work on matters other than the WPA claim, and to take steps to review the claim to determine what fees to award. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to reduce Plaintiff's request for attorney fees to the amount relating solely to the WPA claim. See id. ¶ 19.

{¶10} Additionally, we reject Plaintiff's contention that because Defendant did not object to any particular time entry, it waived any challenge to the reasonableness of his requested fees. "[The d]efendant did not have to object to the time or show that it was separate. It was for the trial court to review the claim made by [the p]laintiff[] and in its discretion determine what fees to award." Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Once Plaintiff made his claim for attorney fees, "it was left to the discretion of the trial court to make the award based upon [the p]laintiff['s] proof of the reasonableness of the fees." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶11} Plaintiff also challenges the district court's particular allocations of time to his other claims. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in determining that 15 percent of the billed time was for work on the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, 40 percent was for time spent on damages, and 10 percent for time on ministerial matters.

{¶12} Regarding the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, Plaintiff asserts only that he did not submit charges for this claim. However, as discussed above, his invoices indicate otherwise. Based on Plaintiff's invoices, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Plaintiff spent 15 percent of his time on the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. See id. ¶ 19 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees where the defendant made no showing regarding what portion of the attorney fees charged were attributable to defending the statutory claim or why it was difficult or impossible to segregate the statutory claims from the nonstatutory claims).

{¶13} Plaintiff also contends that the district court erred in finding that 40 percent of the billed time reflected work to address damages. Plaintiff's only argument on this point is that punitive and emotional distress damages, and mitigation of damages, were not at issue at trial. ...